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1 General introduction
1.1 Beliefs in the classical Savage framework
Beliefs over uncertain future consequences are important determinants of individ-
ual behavior. However, in economic theory the belief formation process is most
of time excluded from the analysis and models since uncertainty is described and
implemented by assuming variants of the prominent Savage (1954) and Bayesian ap-
proach. This underlying idea is to model uncertainty by a grand state space that is
sufficiently rich to describe and resolve all possible sources of uncertainties. It means
that all information, knowledge and past experiences are encoded and reflected in
the definition of the states. In this way the definition and determination of such an
all encompassing state space requires the (immense) cognitive ability to implicitly
come up with some ”perfect” belief and theories about structures and relationships
in the future. However, in many situations states are not naturally given, readily
available or easy to imagine and generate. Basically, often environments do not offer
sufficient (or too complex) information to suggest a ”correct” definition of a grand
state space.
Another cornerstone of the state based approach is the representation of a belief
as an unique probability over the grand state space that is endogenously deduced
from observable behavior of the agents. Such a purely subjective belief does not
explicitly process and incorporate (past) information into a belief formation in an
objective way. More importantly, the approach inherently lacks an explicit descrip-
tion of the formation of the belief and thus does not help an agent to form the
belief that eventually would lead to the behavior. Gilboa et al. (2012) discuss this
issue extensively and nicely summarize it (on p.8) ”... main difficulty with assigning
probability to the Grand State Space is that there is no information on which one
can base the choice of prior beliefs. Any information that one may obtain, and that
may help in the choice of a prior, should be incorporated into the description of the
Grand State Space. This means that the prior on this state has to specify beliefs one
had before obtaining the information in question. Thus, the information may help
one choose posterior beliefs (presumably according to Bayes’s rule), but not prior
6
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beliefs.” Consequently, employing the state based approach in modeling uncertainty
induces by definition an impossibility of an explicit belief formation. If the avail-
able information is sufficient to define an all encompassing state space, structurally
a state space precludes a belief formation process that takes into account (no ”re-
maining”) information directly. Thus, in order to allow for an explicit (objective)
belief formation process that enables agents to directly incorporate information into
a belief formation an alternative representation or description of the available infor-
mation and uncertainty is necessary. This applies also to environments that are not
appropriate to translate and condense its information into a ”perfect ” state space
(and thus prevents per se a deduction of a subjective belief a la Savage). Usually,
information can be interpreted as a list or collection of single pieces of past observa-
tions or cases, i.e. so called databases. In the following, we also have in mind that
a database might represent an agent’s memory. In the following we will adopt this
”database or case based”-representation of information and replace the state space
as an information aggregation. This appears especially appropriate for situations in
which the information is not all encompassing as needed for the correct description
of a grand state space. The main advantage of the database representation of in-
formation is that it enables an explicit belief formation that relies on the contained
information.
1.2 Belief formation in a case based framework of
information representation
In contrast to Savage’s state based approach a belief will and cannot be derived
purely subjectively anymore. A belief based on a database needs to explicitly pro-
cess and incorporate factual knowledge, properties and theoretical considerations
provided by the present database. This task appears to be very close to the goal
of statistical inference. However, statistical inference mainly deals with asymptotic
considerations (i.e. sufficiently rich databases), but the focus of our analysis lies
on environments that are mainly characterized by databases that contain insuffi-
ciently rich information (i.e. small or medium sized databases). In particular, we
are concerned with a belief formation process and its behavioral foundation (axiom-
atization) (similar as Billot et al. (Econometrica, 2005)). In contrast to statisti-
cal experiments that usually deal with identical observations which are considered
equally relevant, small or medium sized databases contain limited and heterogenous
information that might be differently relevant. Thus, agents might want to take into
account not only (a few) identical but also partially relevant observations for their
7
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belief formation. In this sense - differently to statistical experiments - relevance or
similarity measures become important, when data sets contain limited heterogenous
information. The underlying assumption of this idea is the similarity hypothesis,
stating that similar situations/actions induce similar outcomes, e.g. in the spirit of
Hume (1748): ”Reasoning rests on the principle of analogy”.
Case-based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001)) deals with such
a framework in decision theoretic contexts. Billot et al. (2005) can be interpreted
as an adoption of it to belief formation1. Their axiomatized belief describes a gen-
eralized (subjective) frequentist in which agents assign different similarity weights
to information with different degree of relevance. For a new problem, described
by a vector of properties x, and given a database or memory D of past observa-
tions/cases c = (x′, r′), their belief P over possible outcomes r is represented as a
similarity weighted average of estimates that are induced by the observed cases, i.e.
”BGSS- belief”: P (x,D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)P
c∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)
, (1.1)
where s(x, c) measure the degree of similarity of the problem under consideration x
with the past case c and P c is the estimate or prediction over outcomes an agent
derives from observing case c.
1.3 Content of the thesis
The thesis mainly consists of the Chapters 2-4, where each chapter is based on a self
contained article. Each chapter starts with a detailed introduction and motivation
of the particular issue and its relevance for the related existing literature. The three
chapters deal with axiomatizations of different belief formation process in the vein
of BGSS, i.e. (1.1). Their axiomatic belief formation can be seen as a starting point
for this thesis.
Chapter 22 deals with an issue that arises when dealing with small databases that
consist of limited and heterogenous content. As in controlled statistical experiments,
the number of observations may serve as a proxy for its informativeness, precision
or accuracy. Thus, small databases with few or insufficiently many observation of
cases might appear to be relatively imprecise or unreliable and evoke some concerns
about precision. Additional observations of the cases might increase its precision
and reliability.
1Related also to Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003), Gilboa (2009) and Gilboa et al. (2011).
2Based on Bleile (2014a) ”Cautious Belief Formation”, Working Paper No. 507, Center of Math-
ematical Economics, Bielefeld.
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However, not only the precision per se is important for prediction, but also the
related perception and sensation of it in form of confidence and cautiousness (or
anxiety) in evaluating or predicting based on differently precise information. Ells-
berg (1961) (p.657) summarizes the problem as follows: ”What is at issue might
be called the ambiguity [or imprecision] of this information, a quality depending on
the amount, type, reliability, and ”unanimity” of information, and giving rise to
ones degree of ”confidence” in an estimate of relative likelihoods.” In fact increasing
the number of observations is likely to influence both the forecast made by agent
and his confidence in this forecast, i.e. confidence that the observed frequencies
reflect the actual data-generating process. The more additional confirming evidence
is observed, the less cautious (anxious) and the more confident are the induced esti-
mates. This intuition is in line with approaches in controlled statistical experiments,
in which the set of possible priors shrinks as additional data confirm the evaluation,
as well as with the usual Bayesian updating method, in which additional information
is used to exclude states that have not occurred.
Chapter 2 tackles exactly the issue that additional confirming observations in-
creases precision and reliability of the information, which leads to more confident
and less cautious beliefs. The axiomatized cautious belief formation capture the im-
pact of precision and related cautiousness on the induced belief. The precision and
cautiousness concerns are in particular relevant for small databases with differently
precise pieces of information, for which the belief formation of BGSS is not suitable,
since their axiomatization incorporates some form of irrelevance of growing precision
or insensitivity to additional information. Our axiomatization leads to the following
representation
”Cautious belief”: PT (x,D) =
∑
c∈C s(x, c)fD(c)P
c
T ∗D∑
c∈C s(x, c)fD(c)
,
where T ∗D := maxc∈C fD(c)T and the estimates P
c
T ∗D
reflect the impact of precision
and related feelings of cautiousness and confidence in estimating based on differently
precise pieces of information c in the database, i.e. the estimate based on observing
a case T or L times should differ P cT 6= P cL.
Chapter 33 covers a belief formation process that does not rely on all potentially
available information, but relies only a somehow filtered subset of information. Ev-
idence and insight from psychology, marketing and recent decision theoretic devel-
opments show that individuals want to or are constraint to pay attention to (or
3Based on Bleile (2014b) ”Limited Attention in Case Based Belief Formation”, Working Paper,
Center of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld.
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recall) only parts of the in principle available information. Unintentional filtering
induced by unawareness, cognitive or psychological limitations (limited attention
span, cognitive overload, etc.) are plausible sources, but also intentional rough
screening heuristic for reasons of cost/effort efficiency are identified as sources in
the literature. We incorporate such a pre-stage of filtering information into the ax-
iomatization of a belief formation and allow for a deviation of the ”full attention”
hypothesis in BGSS and Chapter 2. This two stage approach enables to cover more
realistic and cognitively less demanding belief formation processes, which might, for
instance, be of interest for bounded rational agents or if the databases are inter-
preted as memory and the filtering as a retrieving process. An intuitive special case
of the axiomatized belief formation is the following similarity satisficing principle
(regarding a threshold level of similarity)
”Similarity Satisficing belief”: P (x,D,Γ) =
∑
c∈D s(x, c)1{s(x,c)≥sD}P
c∑
c∈D s(x, c)1{s(x,c)≥sD}
,
where sD denotes some appropriate database D specific threshold level and Γ repre-
sents the filtering process that selects ((un)intentional) the cases (from the database
or memory D, i.e. Γ(D) ⊆ D), that meet the filtering criterion, i.e. surpasses the
similarity threshold sD. Such an agent considers only cases in her memory, which
are sufficiently similar and hence relevant for the problem at hand. If one assumes
that those cases are retrieved or recalled first which are most similar to the ac-
tual problem, then the above principle would just take into account the cases that
comes to her mind first and ignore the experiences that were not retrieved quickly
enough. In this vein, the retrieval process stops after some time of brainstorming
about relevant past cases.
Chapter 44 deals with another characteristic of individual information process-
ing. There is a rich literature in cognitive science that shows that human minds
structure, process and store information by grouping (or summarizing) them into
subgroups or categories, rather than by treating the information piece by piece.
Depending on how the categorized information is activated and employed the liter-
ature distinguishes between two main procedures. One approach examines only the
single prices of information within the most appropriate (target) categories for a spe-
cific problem, whereas the information in the other categories are ignored. Another
benchmark approach considers only the summarized representative (prototypical)
information given by each category and ignores the detailed information in each
4Based on Bleile (2014c) ”Belief Formation based on Categorization”, Working Paper, Center of
Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld.
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category. Both procedures of categorizing information reduce the cognitive effort
and required ability of processing information.
In this chapter we axiomatize belief formation processes based on information
that is categorized according to the two mentioned procedures. For a category
based belief formation we obtain the following representation, which is based only
on the cases of the database that are also in (”target”) categories that are activated
by a specific problem x (i.e. C˜(x,D)).
”Category based belief”: P (x,D) =
∑
c∈C˜(x,D) s(x, xc)P
c∑
c∈C˜(x,D) s(x, xc)
,
where s measures the degree of similarity.
A prototype based belief only relies on the prototypical estimates P C˜
D
l on R for each
of the categories {(C˜Dl )l} that partition database D.
”Prototype based belief”: P (x,D) =
∑
l≤L s˜(x, C˜
D
l )P
C˜Dl∑
l≤L s˜(x, C˜
D
l
where s˜ measures the relevance or similarity of the particular category for the actual
problem. Basically, belief formations based on categorized and thus somehow orga-
nized information might reduce the cognitive effort and simplify the belief formation
process.
Thus far we have just introduced the main content of the thesis and briefly men-
tioned the structure of the framework. However, even though the chapters are closely
related, they still differ in the particular matter and axiomatizations, such that we
postpone the detailed discussion and placement into the relevant literature to the
particular chapters.
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Abstract
We provide an axiomatic approach to a belief formation process in an informational
environment characterized by limited, heterogenous and differently precise informa-
tion. For a list of previously observed cases an agent needs to express her belief by
assigning probabilities to possible outcomes. Different numbers of observations of a
particular case give rise to varying precision levels associated to the pieces of infor-
mation. Different precise information affects the cautiousness and confidence with
which agents form estimations. We modify the Concatenation Axiom introduced in
Billot, Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (BGSS) (Econometrica, 2005) in a way to cap-
ture the impact of precision and its related perceptional effects, while still keeping
its normative appealing spirit. We obtain a representation of a belief as a weighted
sum of estimates induced by past cases. The estimates are affected by cautiousness
and confidence considerations depending on the precision of the underlying observed
information, which generalizes BGSS. The weights are determined by frequencies of
the observed cases and their similarities with the problem under consideration.
2.1 Introduction and motivation
Beliefs of agents are important ingredients of many economic models dealing with
uncertainties. Belief formation is studied recently in environments with limited and
heterogenous information that are not suitable to be modeled in the widely used
and accepted state space framework of Savage (1954) and Bayes. Lacking a state
space representation of uncertainties an agent needs to form her belief explicitly by
directly incorporating available information.
We axiomatize a belief formation process based on limited, differently relevant and
precise information. Our main axiom modifies the Concatenation axiom in Billot et
al. (2005)(BGSS), which precludes the impact of agents’ perceptions and reactions
to differently precise information. Their axiom says that for any two information
sets the belief induced by their combination can be expressed as a weighted average
of the beliefs induced by each information set separately. The averaging of beliefs
12
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induced by any arbitrary information sets requires a cognitive challenging tradeoff of
identical, but differently precise information contained in the particular information
sets. Our axiom says that agents who care about precision of information can only
average beliefs (in a normatively reasonable way) induced by specific - almost disjoint
- information sets. Thereby, we focus not only on the precision itself, but mainly on
its perception and impact in form of cautiousness and confidence feelings.
The most prominent and often used models to describe and analyze uncertainty in
economic theory are versions of the approach of Savage and Bayes. The fundamental
idea in this approach is to model uncertainty by a grand state space, which is
sufficiently rich to describe and resolve all possible sources of uncertainties. In this
way a state space implicitly incorporates some (perfect) belief and theories about
structures and relationships in the future and thereby requires a large (often un-
achievable) task of imagination and theorization. In addition, insufficient (or too
complex) information may preclude the derivation or definition of a grand state
space. Another principle of the state based approach is the representation of a
belief as an unique probability over the grand state space. In this framework a
purely subjective probability distribution over states can be endogenously deduced
from preferences, which inherently lacks an explicit description of the formation of
the belief that generated the preference.1
There is basically only one way to deal with these two difficulties. Sticking to the
grand state space principle, but abandoning the subjective prior approach, would
precludes an direct (objective) assignment of probabilities, since the state space
already encodes all available information. More promising is to give up the repre-
sentation of uncertainties by a state space, when an agent is (cognitive) incapable to
translate information into states or when the information is not all encompassing as
needed for the ”correct” description of a grand state space. Usually in real life, our
information basis can be represented by a list or collection of pieces of information
(databases). Thus, we will replace the state space as an information aggregation by
such a database representation of (actually observed) information (data-points or
recalled cases).
However, a belief based on a database needs to explicitly incorporate factual
objective knowledge, characteristics and theoretical considerations provided by the
present database. In general, belief formation based on a database is very close to
the goal of statistical inference. In contrast to mainly asymptotic considerations in
statistical inference, our focus (as in BGSS and Eichberger and Guerdjikova (2010)
(EG)) lies on behavioral foundations (axiomatizations) of a belief formation and in
1See Gilboa et al. (2012) for extensive discussion of these issues.
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particular in the analysis of small databases containing differently precise informa-
tion.
Usually statistical experiments are dealing with identical observations that are
equally relevant. However, since small or medium sized databases contain limited
and heterogenous information agents might want to take into account not only (a
few) identical but also partially relevant observations for their belief formation. In
this sense - differently to statistical experiments - relevance or similarity measures
become important for data sets containing limited heterogenous information.
Case-based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001)) deals with
such a framework in decision theoretic contexts. BGSS can be interpreted as an
adoption of it to belief formation.2 Their axiomatized belief describes a generalized
(subjective) frequentist, in which agents assign different similarity weights to infor-
mation with different degree of relevance. For a new problem and given a database
of past observations,their belief over possible outcomes is represented as a similarity
weighted average of estimates that are induced by the observed cases.
Their main Concatenation Axiom deals with relationships between databases and
their induced belief. It requires that for a new problem x the belief P (probability
vector over outcomes for x) induced by the combination (concatenation) of any two
databases (D◦E), is a weighted average of the belief induced by each single database
(D and resp. E) separately, i.e. for all databases D and E, there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1)
such that
P (x,D ◦ E) = λP (x,D) + (1− λ)P (x,E)
Our paper deals mainly with the modification of this Concatenation Axiom in order
to allow for impacts of precision of information and its induced cautiousness and con-
fidence concerns. Additionally, our precision dependent belief formation is suitable
for small databases, which is only partially possible and reasonable for BGSS.
The Concatenation Axiom shows some irrelevance of growing precision. The belief
induced by a database coincides with the belief induced by arbitrary many repli-
cations of the same database, i.e. P (x,D) = P (x,DT ) for all T ∈ N. Growing
precision might not be a concern for sufficiently rich and large databases such that
observing additional identical information will not affect her predictions. However,
for small database, specifically consisting only of one piece of information c, it is un-
reasonable that additional observations do not induce some learning and refinement
of an already ”perfect” estimation, i.e. P (x, cT ) = P (x, c) for all T.
In this way the Concatenation Axiom implies that one observation carries already
all that can be inferred by arbitrary many confirming observations. Such an in-
2Related also to Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003), Gilboa (2009) and Gilboa et al. (2011).
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stantaneous learning in a highly objective (and perfect) way of forecasting appears
to be questionable and un-intuitive. For instance consider a situation, in which an
agent throws a dice once and the figure six results. A guess of the outcome of the
next throw of the dice would differ from the estimation an agent would come up
after observing one million times a six in one million throws of that dice. However,
roughly speaking, the Concatenation Axiom requires that an agent would infer right
after the first dice throw that all sides of the dice show the figure six without any
doubt. A procedure to base the estimation on just one observation appears to be
in-cautious, hazardous (error-prone) and unrealistic and cannot be considered as an
appealing normative advice. In fact, as in controlled statistical experiments, ad-
ditional (identical) confirming observations may serve as a proxy for its increased
informativeness, precision or accuracy, which should be reflected in a dynamic learn-
ing and refinement of the estimations.
In addition, increasing precision might affect estimations through its perception in
form of altered cautiousness (to wrongly eliminate some outcomes) with which the
forecast is made and her changed confidence in this forecast.3 If information becomes
more precise, an agent’s decreased cautiousness and increased confidence might allow
to specify their prediction more narrowly. After receiving substantial information of
disconfirming evidence that makes some outcomes negligible, agents (even) might
want to eliminate some (not observed) outcomes. More general, differently precise
information should lead to different induced beliefs, i.e. P (x, cT ) 6= P (x, cL) for
different L, T ∈ N, which contradicts the Concatenation Axiom and requires a
modification in order to incorporate precision and cautiousness issues.
In general, the Concatenation Axiom is stated for any kind of databases, but (with
regard to potentially induced different precise estimations) it is most appealing and
appropriate as a normative advice for disjoint databases. For disjoint databases,
the belief induced by the concatenated database can be quite intuitively interpreted
as an average of the beliefs induced by the single databases separately, since no
pieces of information appear in different precision in different databases and cause
conflicting considerations. The average is determined solely by a weighting of the
relevances of the concatenating databases.
However, we will explain that for unrestricted non-disjoint databases - with com-
mon, but differently precise pieces of information - the normative appealing spirit of
averaging beliefs conflicts with a simultaneous care about precision and cautiousness
3Ellsberg (1961) (p.657): ”What is at issue might be called the ambiguity of this information, a
quality depending on the amount, type, reliability, and ”unanimity” of information, and giving
rise to ones degree of ”confidence” in an estimate of relative likelihoods.”
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in the belief formation.4
A first obvious modification deals with the issue that a precision related Concate-
nation Axiom cannot be formulated for pure (non-disjoint) concatenating database,
but would require additional information, such that averaging occurs according to
P (D ◦E) = λP (DL) + (1− λ)P (ET ) for some appropriate L, T ∈ N (which we will
specify later). For example consider the concatenation of the easiest non-disjoint
databases (c7) = (c3)◦(c4). By definition, the beliefs induced by combining databases
(e.g. (c3), (c4)) are based on less precise pieces of information (and hence also their
weighted average) than the belief based on the combined database (e.g. (c7)). Thus,
for a cautious agent, who cares about precisions, the information contained in con-
catenating databases may not be sufficient for a belief formation according to the
(unmodified) Concatenation Axiom.5
However, in general there are no replications T and L, such that each single pieces
of information is captured in equal precision in all involved databases D◦E, DT and
EL. These differences in precision of single common cases complicate the averaging
of the beliefs. Determining the average weight cannot anymore be interpreted as
normatively appealing comparison based solely on relative relevance of the particular
databases. Rather, it is a result of a cognitive challenging (impossible) interwoven
tradeoff, balancing and aggregation of different emphasis an agent assigns to sin-
gle pieces of differently precise information in the various database. Moreover, the
average weight might need to reflect also the compensation for failures of the ”com-
pulsory” incorporation (by the axiom) of relative more imprecise estimations (based
on the same kind of information) contained in some beliefs than in others. There-
fore, a (modified) Concatenation Axiom allowing for all (replicated) databases leads
to the serious problem that agents might be cognitively overstrained by averaging
beliefs based on several identical information with different precision levels.6
As a consequence, we propose a restriction on databases to be admissible for our
modified version of the Concatenation Axiom, such that it sustains its normative
appealing spirit. Our anchored Concatenation Axiom restricts databases to a specific
(almost disjoint) structure consisting of only two cases, where only exactly one
of these cases (the anchor) appears in all involved databases and all other cases
4Stating the axiom only in terms of disjoint databases does not offer sufficient structure to derive
a belief formation.
5This problematic issue does not appear in the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS, where precision
is (endogenously) neglected and one appearance of a case captures already all information.
6Alternatively, if one would stick to general non-disjoint databases, then the only way to ”unify”
the differently precise information in all involved databases is given by assuming ad hoc some
arbitrary (imagined) level of precision, according to which all cases are evaluated independent
of their actual observation. This will be discussed in detail in Section 2.5 and 2.7.2.
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appear only in one database. The main feature is that this single common (anchor)
piece of information is contained in all involved databases in equal precision. This
enables an easy averaging of beliefs without cognitively demanding compromising
between estimations induced by differently precise observations. In addition, the
equal appearance of the anchor case in all involved databases intuitively allows to
”neglect” its effect in determining the average weights and to compare only the
relative importance of the pieces of information that appear only in exactly one
of the involved databases. This facilitates a very straightforward way to find the
average weights for the beliefs - almost in the spirit of averaging beliefs induced by
disjoint (singleton) databases or distinct cases.
In order to take into account the precision of beliefs induced by databases, our
agent focusses on the most precise and hence reliable information in the database.
Since it is impossible to capture all information in its actual precision level perfectly
in a non-disjoint combination of databases (as explained above), our agents require
to cover at least the most precise information objectively in her belief. Consequently,
our axiom requires that there exists no distortion of the most reliable information
in the process of averaging beliefs. To achieve this, the precision of the most reliable
information in the concatenated database must be conveyed by the single beliefs
induced by the corresponding admissible (sufficiently replicated) databases used for
the concatenation.
Besides BGSS, the closest work to ours is the axiomatization of multi-prior be-
liefs in Eichberger and Guerdjikova (2010) (EG) ”Case based belief formation under
ambiguity”. Their extension of the framework of BGSS aims to formalize two kinds
of ambiguity caused by insufficient information (vanishing ambiguity) and irrelevant
information (persistent ambiguity). The focus in their paper lies predominantly on
the introduction of a multi-prior setup for an information environment with persis-
tent ambiguity. Whereas our work focuses on the analysis of precision in the sense of
vanishing ambiguity (imprecision) and related cautiousness in a single prior belief.
EG’s modification of the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS is adequate to specify how
beliefs over outcomes change in response to additional information and tackles also
the mentioned drawback of BGSS regarding irrelevance of growing precision of in-
formation. Different to our work, their modification reflects the idea of ”controlling
for the ambiguity ” (p.4) (precision) by restricting the involved databases to equal
length. However, as discussed above controlling for precision by equal lengths of
the involved databases is not sufficient to control for different precise single pieces
of information contained in these databases. As a direct consequence, EG’s modifi-
cation of the Concatenation Axiom assumes (and does not prevent) that agents are
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(cognitively) able to aggregate and balance information of the same kind, but in dif-
ferent precision. In contrast, the focus of our paper lies exactly on the issue to avoid
such cognitive challenging or even impossible tradeoffs in the aggregation of differ-
ently precise information and to keep the spirit of a normatively reasonable and easy
averaging procedure. Moreover, in general EG’s axiom implies that no estimation
is based on objectively present information in the database, which would require
(in our context) that agents need to imagine the (true) cautiousness feeling evoked
by a precision level that is imagined as well. In contrast, our approach implicitly
requires only the ability to estimate based on already experienced cautiousness and
thus avoids imaginations of unexperienced feelings of cautiousness.
In sum, adopting parts of the axiomatization of BGSS and EG, our anchored
Concatenation Axiom will allow for a structural similar belief representation as in
BGSS and EG. All three axiomatized representations differ in the way, how they
treat information of different qualities of precision. BGSS does not take into account
precision at all and EG captures the effect of (persistent) ambiguous information by
a set of beliefs, which are based on precision-dependent estimates, where the level
of (imagined) precision is according to the total amount of information contained
in the entire database. In our representation the cautiousness related estimates are
based on the level of precision and cautiousness induced by the most precise infor-
mation in the database. More precisely, for a new problem and a given database,
its induced belief can be represented as a similarity-weighted average of cautious
estimates induced by past observations in the database. Thereby the similarities
and estimates are endogenously derived.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we will
outline the model and in Section 2.3 we develop an example to illustrate reason-
able belief formations and our leading example. Then, the axioms are stated and
discussed, where the central Section 2.4.2 points out the drawbacks and necessary
modification of the Concatenation Axiom to incorporate precision, which eventually
leads to our version of the Concatenation Axiom. Section 2.5 presents and discusses
the main representation result and gives a rough sketch of the main part of the proof.
Section 2.6 concludes the chapter and Section 2.7 deals with an objective belief, the
relationship to EG’s Concatenation Axiom and an alternative axiomatization of a
very cautious belief. The last two sections contain both directions of the proof.
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2.2 The model
2.2.1 Database framework
A basic case c = (x, r) consists of a description of the environment or problem
x ∈ X and an outcome r ∈ R, where X = X1 ×X2 × ....×XN is a finite set of all
characteristics of the environment, in which Xj denotes the set of possible values
features j can take. R denotes a finite set of potential outcomes, R = {r1, ..., rn}.
The set C ⊆ X ×R consists of all m ≥ 3 basic cases, i.e. |C| = m.
A database D is a sequence or list of basic cases c ∈ C. The set of databases D
consisting of L cases, i.e. D = ((x1, r1), ..., (xL, rL)) is denoted by C
L and the set
of all databases by C∗ = ∪L≥1CL. The description of databases as sequence of po-
tentially identical cases allows multiple observation of an identical case to be taken
into account and treated as an additional source of information.
For a database D ∈ C∗, fD(c) denotes the relative frequency of case c ∈ C in
databases D.
The concatenation of two databasesD = (c1, c2, ..., cL) ∈ CL and E = (c′1, c′2, ..., c′T ) ∈
CT is denoted by D◦E ∈ CL+T and is defined by D◦E := (c1, c2, ..., cL, c′1, c′2, ..., c′T ).
In the following we will abbreviate the concatenation or replication of L-times the
identical databases D by DL. Specifically, cL represents a database consisting of
L-times case c.
Definition 2.1
(i) The ∈- relation on databases is defined by c ∈ D if fD(c) > 0.
(ii) Two databases D and E are disjoint if for all c ∈ C: c ∈ D if and only if c 6∈ E.
2.2.2 Induced beliefs
For a finite set S, ∆(S) denotes the simplex of probability vectors over S and for
n ∈ N ∆n denotes the simplex over the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
An agent will form a belief over the outcomes P (x,D) ∈ ∆(R) for a certain problem
characterized by x ∈ X using her information captured in a database D ∈ C∗, i.e.
P : X × C∗ → ∆(R). The restriction to databases of length T is denoted by
PT (x,D) ∈ ∆(R) for D ∈ CT and PT : X × CT → ∆(R).
One can interpret PT (x,D) as the belief over outcomes induced by database D ∈ CT
(given environment or problem x ∈ X).
Throughout the paper the problem x is fixed, therefore x is often suppressed in the
following, i.e. P (x,D) = P (D).
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2.3 Motivating examples
2.3.1 Exemplary development of a belief formation process
A doctor needs to evaluate the likelihood of potential outcomes of a specific treat-
ment.
Let a patient be described by a vector of characteristics x ∈ X, where X might con-
sist of measures of characteristics like age, gender, weight, height, blood pressure,
temperature, blood count, vital signs, medical history, drug tolerability, etc.
The doctor might have observed several outcomes of the treatment in the past, which
are collected in a set R, containing for instance feels better/worse/unchanged, mea-
sures of side effects like headaches, sleepy, depressive, passed out, giddy, dizzy, etc.
The doctor has acquired some working experience prescribing this treatment and/or
has access to some medical record of this treatment. Thus, she is able to base her
judgement on past experience or observations collected in a databaseD = (c1, ..., cT ),
where in each case ci the characteristic and the observable outcome of patient i is
recorded, i.e. ci = (xi, ri). It means that a patient characterized by xi ∈ X re-
sponded to the treatment with outcome ri ∈ R.
Given the characteristics x ∈ X of a current patient and her available information
and experience in form of a database D, the doctor derives a probabilistic belief
P (x,D) ∈ ∆(R) over potential outcomes in R for this treatment. How can she do
the prediction?
a) A first intuitive approach for the prediction is to consider only patients in the
database that are identical (with respect to the measured characteristics) with the
present patient. Based on this sub-sample Dx := (c ∈ D|c = (x, ri) for some ri ∈
R) ⊆ D the doctor might derive a prediction over potential outcomes via empirical
frequencies:
P (x,D) =
∑
cj∈Dx δrj
|Dx| ,
where δj is the probability vector on R with mass 1 on the outcome rj ∈ R. Of
course this belief formation process is not practical if the sub-sample Dx contains
only few observations, i.e. if there are only a couple of identical (with respect to the
measured characteristics) patients.
b) To overcome this problem of limited or insufficiently many identical observa-
tions, the doctor might include into her prediction procedure not only identical,
but in addition also similar patients. Suppose that she is able to judge how similar
20
2.3 Motivating examples
patients are, i.e. she is able to employ a function s : X × X → R, where s(xt, xj)
measures the degree of similarity between patients characterized by xt and xj. Her
belief formation process might run in a ”subjective” frequentist way:
P (x,D) =
∑
cj∈D s(x, xj)δrj∑
cj∈D s(x, xj)
c) In addition, the doctor might infer from a case cj = (xj, rj) ∈ X × R not only
a point prediction on δrj , but a more general induced estimation P
cj .7 For instance,
she attaches also some likelihood to outcomes that are closely or reasonably related
to the observed rj:
P (x,D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, xj)P
c∑
c∈D s(x, xj)
. (2.1)
This belief formation process is axiomatized in BGSS.
d) Furthermore, the doctor might process the past observations not in an one by
one estimation problem as in the approaches above, but might want to sample the
database beforehand according to identical cases (i.e. patient-outcome pair). Many
observations of the same case might foster some learning and improved understand-
ing of the relationship between characteristics of a patient and corresponding out-
comes. Additional confirming observations should affect the judgment of a cautious
doctor as well by an increased confidence and decreased cautiousness in predicting
the observed outcome. In this way, the doctor might generate different predictions
depending on how many observations of this case are present in the database.
For instance, suppose there is a generally observed side-effect of many different
medicines, then the doctor might still assign a positive likelihood to this side-effect
if the doctor has observed just a few (identical) patients not suffering from this side
effect under the specific treatment. However, if the treatment is well established and
many identical patients did not feel this side-effect, then she might not consider this
side-effect as a potential hazard anymore. This intuition can be modeled by incor-
porating precision into a cautious belief formation, where the number of observation
can be interpreted as a proxy for the precision of the information:
P (x,D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)P
c
TD(c)∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)
,
7More precisely, actually P c = P (x,c) represents an (conditional) estimate induced by c given the
current patient x, i.e. if c is totally unrelated to the current patient, it might be that P c is
uniform on R.
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where P cL represents the precision dependent estimation on R induced by L obser-
vation of case c, where usually P cT 6= P cL for T 6= L. Hence TD(c) ∈ N denotes a
database dependent precision (and induced cautiousness) level, according to which
a doctor will estimate the outcomes based on observation of case c.
Interestingly, the already mentioned belief formations of BGSS and EG are special
cases of this representation:
(i) BGSS’s axiomatization implies TD(c) = ∞. Hence, their agent learns instanta-
neously the ”correct” distribution P c∞ = P
c induced by case c (see representation
(2.1)).
(ii) The axiomatic derivation in EG results in TD(c) = T for D ∈ CT .
(e) A natural interpretation of TD(c) in (d) is TD(c) = fD(c)T for all c ∈ D ∈ CT :
PT (x,D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)P
c
fD(c)T∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)
, (2.2)
where fD(c)T gives the actual number of appearance of case c in database D. Such
a representation is very objective by incorporating only actually available and ob-
served information. This representation is (unfortunately) irreconcilable (see Section
2.7.1) with any generalized version of a Concatenation Axiom (in the sense of not
only combining disjoint databases), which we consider as an important behavioral
component of a belief formation.
However, unless its appealing objective character, this belief formation might en-
tail the following problem. Obviously, the belief employs (in general) an aggregation
of estimates (P cfD(c)T )c∈D based on different precise single pieces of information c,
which carry different deficits in their ”correctness” of prediction. This might over-
complicate the evaluation since the doctor might want to accompany the fact that
some of her predictions are more reliable than others and should receive more weight
independent from the similarity and frequency weighting. In this sense, she might
want to include an additional weighting scheme taking into account the precision or
reliability of the estimates.8
f) However, a doctor might not only rely on objective precisions of the estimations,
but also wants to capture her perception of its precision, i.e. the influence of how
cautious and confident she feels while estimating P cTD(c). In this vein, we prefer a
8Alternatively, these considerations might be incorporated into the weights s, which prevents an
desirable independent interpretation in similarity terms and requires the function s to depend
also on the databases directly, which will be precluded (later) by our Constant Similarity Axiom.
In addition, it conflicts with the easy averaging intuition
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different choice for TD(c) in order to take the doctor’s cautiousness and confidence
concerns into account.
The underlying intuition is that she does not change or adjust constantly her cau-
tiousness and confidence attitude in response to each differently precise information.
Rather, after the doctor has experienced an (extreme) level of cautiousness and con-
fidence by estimating based on objectively available (unimagined) information, she
might keep it and adopt it to other estimations. Basically she attained an ”appro-
priate” sustainable attitude regarding her cautiousness sensation or learned how to
confidently estimate sufficiently cautious and applies it to all remaining estimations.
This also overcomes the mentioned potential disfavor of aggregating different precise
estimations emerging in the objective belief formation (2.2).
The most intuitive choices for a cautiousness attitude are the two extreme percep-
tions, i.e. the experience of minimal and maximal cautiousness, which are induced
by the most or least precise information in the database. A minimal cautious at-
titude might distract from any other more cautious perceptions, since the doctor
learned how to handle information in an appropriate cautious way. A maximal cau-
tious agent might be intimidated by the largest experienced imprecision and can
not be convinced to leave her skeptical mood to adopt a more confident attitude for
estimating according to the available more accurate information.
The following cautious belief formation captures these ideas (for a attitude of
minimal cautiousness) and will be axiomatized in this chapter:
PT (x,D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)P
c
T ∗D∑
c∈D s(x, c)fD(c)
,
where T ∗D := maxc∈C fD(c)T .
The above examples were intended to clarify the framework and demonstrate
a meaningful evolution of a belief formation taking into account subjective and
precision concerns. However, in the following we will use a reduced version as our
leading example.
2.3.2 Leading example
Assume that the patients are not anymore described by a large vector of their
personal characteristics, but just according to their symptoms or diagnosed sickness.
In particular, each patient is characterized by just a single symptom and the outcome
of a treatment is only roughly distinguishable between w(orse), n(ot affected) or
b(etter), i.e. R = {w, n, b}.
So basically a doctor has prescribed a certain medicine to many patients with
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different symptoms or illnesses and observed the outcome of this drug, i.e. a case
is described as a pair of symptom and outcome of the treatment. For example the
drug improved the state of patients suffering from sore throat, but was harmful for
most patients suffering from stomach problems.
2.4 Axioms
In the first part we state modified versions of the axioms in BGSS that we will
adopt. The second main part discusses in detail the Concatenation Axiom and its
drawbacks in a precision dependent framework that eventually leads to our new
anchored Concatenation Axiom.
2.4.1 Retained axioms
Invariance Axiom
For every T ≥ 1, every database D = (c1, ..., cT ) ∈ CT and any permutation pi on
{1, ..., T}
PT ((c1, ..., cT )) = PT ((cpi(1), ..., cpi(T ))).
The Invariance Axiom states that an induced belief over outcomes depends only
on the content of that database and is insensitive to the sequence or order in which
data arrives.
However, the order in which information is provided or obtained can influence
the judgment strongly and may carry information by itself (e.g. see Rubinstein and
Salant (2006)). For example, first and last impressions or reference effect demon-
strate the different impacts of cases depending on their positions. One way to cope
with these order effects is to describe the cases informative enough. E.g. if one
wants to capture the position or time of occurrence of a case in a database, one
could implement this information into the description of the cases itself. Put dif-
ferently, if one challenges the Invariance Axiom, then there must be some criteria
which distinguish the cases at different positions in a database and paying attention
explicitly to this difference in the description of the cases may lead the agent to
reconcile with the invariance assumption.
Hence, we will base our belief formation only on the content of the database D,
which allows to characterize each D by the pair of its frequency vector and length.
Learning Axiom
For every c ∈ C the limit of (PT (cT ))T exists, i.e. the sequence converges to P c∞.
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In the context of precision dependent beliefs the axiom can be interpreted as a stable
learning process. For instance, an agent starts out with an initial prior (like a uni-
form as in the principle of insufficient reason) that will be adjusted in the process of
observing additional information. Increasing the number of confirming observations
will lead to vanishing imprecision and cautiousness in estimating. Basically, the es-
timate will become less sensitive to new additional confirming information and will
eventually converge to a limit distribution. This intuition is as in Bayesian updating,
where additional (confirming) information may render the prior beliefs more precise,
but differently to Bayesian updating the support might change here. For instance,
it is reasonable to assume that finally the agent will learn the true distribution of a
case c = (x, r) ∈ C given the problem x ∈ X, i.e. limT→∞ P (x, cT ) = δr, where δr is
again the Dirac measure. However, for a problem x′ 6= x ∈ X the belief might just
converge to a general uniform-like distribution on R, since the observed case might
not give relevant information for the current problem at all. Hence, we require only
that a limit estimation exists.
Another intuition, that we mentioned already, runs as follows. T many observa-
tions a case c = (x, r) might not make a cautious agent feel confident to reliably rule
out a non-observed outcomes completely, but she wants to assign at least some pos-
itive likelihood to it, i.e. PT ((x, r)
T )(r′) > 0. However, observing further confirming
cases might carry sufficient evidence, such that an agent would feel confident not to
make a mistake or act incautious in excluding some outcomes, i.e. PL((x, r)
L)(r′) = 0
for L T .
Alternatively, one can apply a (accordingly adjusted) learning procedure as in
Epstein and Schneider (2007), where an agent might start out with a uniform esti-
mation and after observing new information keep only the most plausible estimates.
Plausible estimations in their sense are those that survive a maximum likelihood test
(according to some strictness parameter, which might correspond with a cautious-
ness measure in our setup) against the belief that best explains the observations,
i.e. the Dirac measure on the observed outcome.
Diversity Axiom
There exist T ∗ ∈ N, such that for all T ≥ T ∗, no three of {PT (cT )}c∈C are collinear.
From a technical point of view this axiom allows to derive an unique similarity
function, but it also carries an appealing intuition. Roughly it states that sufficiently
many observations induce always estimations that are informative (or diverse) in
the sense that no combination of two other sufficiently often observed cases can
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deliver the same estimation. Hence, no sufficiently precise case can be ”replaced”
by sufficient observations of two other cases in this sense. The reason to base the
diversity of induced estimation on a precision threshold T ∗ is the following. In order
to derive unique similarity values one could also require non-collinearity for every
value of T, but this would exclude learning as mentioned in the description of the
Learning Axiom. If an agent would start out with an uniform-like prior for databases
containing few observations, it might happen that different cases induce very similar
estimations, which are likely to be collinear. The axiom just rules out that after a
sufficient learning period any three estimations are still collinear.
2.4.2 Different versions of the Concatenation Axiom
Concatenation Axiom of BGSS
For every database D,E ∈ C∗ there exists some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
P(D ◦ E) = λP (D) + (1− λ)P (E).
In the following we will call the database that emerges from concatenations of other
databases the combined or concatenated database, whereas the databases used
for the concatenation will be called combining or concatenating databases. We
call the weights λ, (1− λ) average weights.
The Concatenation Axiom states that the belief induced by a combined database is
a weighted average of the beliefs induced by its combining databases. It captures
the idea that a belief based on the combined database cannot lie outside the interval
spanned by the beliefs induced by each combining database separately. Intuitively
it can be interpreted in the following way (from an exclusion point of view). If the
information in any database induces an belief that does not exclude an outcome r,
then the outcome r cannot be excluded by the belief induced by the combination
of all these databases.9 Alternatively, if a certain conclusion is reached given two
databases, the same conclusion should be reached given their union.
The normatively appealing spirit of the axiom is that the average weights are
determined by relative relevances or importance of the combining databases for its
combination.
As already mentioned, the Concatenation Axiom implies an irrelevance of growing
precision or insensitivity to additional information in the beliefs, i.e. P (D) = P (DZ)
9Of course the axiom is stronger in the sense that it not only requires that the probability of
such an r is positive, but it should lie between the minimal and maximal assigned probabilities
induced by the combining databases.
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for all D ∈ C∗ and Z ∈ N, which might be appropriate for sufficiently rich and large
databases. However, already BGSS admit that it ”... might be unreasonable when
the entire database is very small ....” (BGSS (2005), p. 1129).10 Indeed, the axiom
induces some sort of perfect objectivity and instantaneously learning. Estimation
based on one observation c = (x, r) needs to coincide with the estimation induced by
arbitrarily many observation, which can be identified in some sense with the ”true”
limiting distribution, i.e. P (x, (x, r)) = P (x, (x, r)∞). For our leading example it
would mean that a doctor would predict after one unsuccessful treatment of a sore
throat that this treatment is worthless for (identical) patients suffering from sore
throat. However, this appears very unrealistic and un-intuitive, since a database
c = (x, r) might be considered more imprecise and might induce a more cautious
belief than cT = (x.r)T for sufficiently many observations T, i.e. P (c) 6= P (cT ).
In order to incorporate precision and cautiousness aspects into the belief formation
process, the Concatenation Axiom needs to be modified in various ways to maintain
its normative appeal in a modified framework.
For this purpose an immediate modification concerns the issue that an agents can
not rely on beliefs induced by the concatenating databases directly, but requires
appropriately replicated concatenating database11, i.e.
P (D ◦ E) = λP (DT ) + (1− λ)P (EL) for appropriate T, L ∈ N (2.3)
The reason for this is that the information contained in non-disjoint concatenat-
ing databases appears by definition in less precision as in their concatenation, e.g.
consider c2Z = cZ ◦ cZ . However, for a cautious agent caring about precision,
P (cZ)(r) > 0 does not necessarily imply P (c2Z)(r) > 0. For example our doc-
tor might not want to rule out a successful treatment of a coughing agent after
observing 20 or 30 unsuccessful treatments according to her perceived cautiousness,
i.e. P (cT )(r) > 0 for T = 20, 30. However, the combined information of 50 un-
successful treatments on coughs might make her feel confident and convinced to
evaluate the treatment as useless for curing a cough without violating her cautious-
ness feeling, i.e. P (c50)(r) = 0. Thus, non-disjoint concatenating databases do not
carry sufficient information to capture refinements of a cautious belief implied by
the concatenated database and as stated in (2.3) more precise (i.e. appropriately
replicated) concatenating information is required.
10From this perspective, our modification can be interpreted as an extension of BGSS to derive a
belief formation also for relatively small databases, which is only partially possible and reason-
able given their Concatenation Axiom.
11This problem emerges only if the databases are non-disjoint. However, to allow only disjoint
databases in the Concatenation Axiom does not offer enough structure to derive a belief.
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Furthermore, in general there exist no replications T and L that ensure that
each case in D ◦ E is captured in identical precision for unrestricted non-disjoint
DT and EL.12 Depending on its precision the same case might induce differently
cautious estimations. This leads to the difficulties that agents need to balance the
differently cautious estimations induced by the same case appearing in different
precisions in the replicated concatenating databases. Such a compromising between
estimates is necessary for all cases that are observed in more than one database.
For instance, our doctor compares the (replicated) databases D2 = (c41, c
6
2, c
4
3) and
E2 = (c41, c
8
2, c
2
3) (and eventually average its induced beliefs), where each (replicated)
database contains differently many observations of harmfully treated colds c2 (6 vs.
8), neutrally treated colds c3 (4 vs. 2) and at least the successfully treated sore
throats c1 are observed identically often (4 vs. 4) (by replicating D and E, with
the focus on unifying according to c1). Hence each induced beliefs rely on different
precision with regard to observations of cases c2 and c3. How could an objective
doctor compare and average the differently precise information incorporated in these
databases? Intuitively, the doctor should use the most precise available information
contained in these databases. Information c2 is contained in the belief induced by
E2 in a more precise fashion than in database D2 and hence the doctor would like
to rely predominately on (i.e. assign high weight to) E2 regarding c2 (since P
c2
8 vs
P c26 ) and to ignore the less precise estimation wrt. c2 in D
2. However, the opposite
is true for the precision of information c3, for which she relies predominately on D
2
and ignores E2.
Anyway, such a reasonable behavior is not admissible in any version of a Concate-
nation Axiom, in which an agent is forced to assign exactly one (non-zero) average
weight to the beliefs induced by the entire databases D2 and E2 and not many
different weights to the estimates induced by the single pieces of information con-
tained in the databases.13 In order to reach one ”aggregated” average weight, these
single weights would need to be balanced, traded off and aggregated somehow. In
particular, since the beliefs induced by D2 and E2 contain induced estimates that
are too imprecise and cautious in comparison to other available ones, our doctor
needs to offset and capture these imprecisions and mistakes by adjusting the aver-
age weights accordingly. However, a determination of the average weight as a result
of difficult balancing and interwoven compromising appears to be even in this easy
12This follows from the general non-existence of solutions T, L to the system of equations resulting
from fD(c)|D|T ∈ {0, fD◦E(c)|D ◦ E|} and fE(c)|E|L ∈ {0, fD◦E(c)|D ◦ E|} for all c ∈ D ◦ E.
13However, this potential cognitive difficulties are not an issue in the way the Concatenation Axiom
of BGSS processes information, where information is additive in the sense that L observations
in one database and T observations in another is equivalent to observing T + L. Since one
observation caries all information.
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example rather cognitively challenging and becomes impossible for more complex
(decompositions of) databases. Further and most importantly, it conflicts with the
normatively appealing spirit of the Concatenation Axiom to average beliefs by an
easy comparison of relevances of the particular underlying databases.
Our modification of the Concatenation Axiom will deal with this problem by re-
stricting it to specifically structured database such that balancing and compromising
due to differently precise information is avoided and the cognitively simple averaging
intuition sustains.
However, interestingly, following the idea of a Concatenation Axiom that still al-
lows for unrestricted non-disjoint concatenating databases would eventually arrive
at an (not yet given) intuition and explanation for the modification of the Con-
catenation Axiom followed in EG. The basic idea is that agents tackle the immense
compromising considerations of different cautious estimations by assuming or choos-
ing a common arbitrary level of precision, according to which all cases are estimated
- independent of their true objective precision. Since objective or imagined preci-
sions might evoke different feelings of cautiousness such an approach would interfere
with our purpose to seriously take into account objective precision and its related
concerns. A more detailed discussion on that and on EG’s modification can be found
in Section 2.7.2.
Anchored Concatenation Axiom
The above discussion shows that a Concatenation Axiom for unrestricted non-
disjoint concatenating databases might destroy the underlying normatively appeal-
ing idea of an easy averaging, when agents care about precision and its perceptional
consequences. In order to keep the normative appealing spirit, we will restrict the
involved databases to a specific reasonable structure. These databases will contain
sufficiently precise information (in the sense of (2.3)) and allow an cognitively easy
averaging. We have seen that an agent will run into a difficult balancing process
to determine the average weights when she is faced with concatenating databases
containing common cases. For this reason, our anchored databases are as disjoint
as possible, but still sharing a specific (exploitable) structure to facilitate an easy
comparison (and in the end a straightforward averaging of its induced beliefs). In
particular, the anchored databases consist of only two different cases, where all
anchored databases admissible for the concatenation contain a common anchor (ref-
erence) case with identical frequency and one additional mutually different case in
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each of the databases.14 Apart from the desire to employ databases that are almost
disjoint, their structure is also driven by the general observation that agents can
compare items easier if they consist of less features (here: only two) and if they
contain common features in the same fashion as a reference (here: anchor case).
Recall that m ∈ N denotes the number of basic cases, i.e. |C| = m.
Definition 2.2
Let k ∈ [0, 1] and Tj ∈ N be s.th. kTj ∈ N for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m and let T :=
∑
j 6=i≤m Tj.
Let ci, cj ∈ C for all j 6= i ≤ m
(i) For all j 6= i ≤ m a database Dji (k, Tj) ∈ CTj defined by
Dji (k, Tj) : = (c
(1−k)Tj
j , c
kTj
i )
is called an anchored database of length Tj with non-anchor case cj (for all
j 6= i) and anchor (case) ci, which appears in the database with frequency k.
(ii) An anchored chain F ∈ CT (wrt. to case ci) is defined as a concatenation of
anchored databases Dji (k, Tj) ∈ CTj for all j 6= i (with common anchor case ci ∈ C)
F = ◦j 6=i≤mDji (k, Tj) = (c(1−k)T11 , ..., c(1−k)Ti−1i−1 , ckTi , c(1−k)Ti+1i+1 , ..., c(1−k)Tmm )
Note hat not all databases can be interpreted as an anchored chain, since it requires
to be a result of a concatenation of specifically structured anchored databases.
In order to illustrate the anchor-framework, we use our leading example of a doc-
tor that forms a belief over the outcomes of a treatment -worse, no effect, better-
{w, n, b}.
For our doctor anchored databases and chains might look as follows. Each involved
(anchored) database consist of only two different cases (patient groups or symptom-
outcome pairs), where one of these groups (the anchor case) needs to be observed
in all involved database, e.g. patients with a successful treatment (b) of their cough
(c) might be the anchor group (i.e. c1 = (c, b)). The other patient group observed
in each database is different in all involved databases, for instance the different non-
anchor groups might be patients with a neutral treatment (n) of their sore throats
(st) (i.e. c2 = (st, n)) or stomachache problems (i.e. c3 = (s, n)) or harmful treat-
ment (w) of patients suffering from sore throats (st) (i.e. c4 = (st, w)).
To simplify the comparison of the databases (by providing a systematical structural
guideline) the anchored database contain the (anchor) group c1 in a specific propor-
tion k (e.g. k = 2
3
) of the databases’ total length. E.g. each database consisting of
14In some sense, one can interpret the restriction to such database by agents feeling to be cogni-
tively skilled or capable to confidently compare only such easily structured databases.
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two thirds of successfully treated coughing patients and one third of patients with
any other mutually different (symptom,outcome)-pair.
• For example a anchored database consists of 20 successfully treated coughs
(i.e. c201 ) and 10 neutrally treated sore throats (i.e. c
10
2 ), which results in the
anchored database with 30 patients D21(
2
3
, 30) = (c201 , c
10
2 ).
• Another database might contain 40 successfully treated coughs (i.e. c401 ) and 20
neutrally treated stomachaches (i.e. c203 ), i.e. anchored database D
3
1(
2
3
, 60) =
(c401 , c
20
2 ) with 60 patients.
• Another anchored database consist of 16 successfully and 8 harmfully treated
coughs (i.e. c161 and c
8
4), i.e. D
4
1(
2
3
, 24) = (c161 , c
8
4) with 24 patients.
The corresponding anchored chain based on Dj1(
2
3
, Tj) (for j = 2, .., 4 and T2 =
30, T3 = 60, T4 = 24 and T :=
∑5
j=2 Tj = 114) reads F = ◦4j=2Dj1(23 , Tj) =
(c761 , c
10
2 , c
20
3 c
8
4).
However, within the anchor structure the comparison of the almost disjoint an-
chored databases (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i is still not directly straightforward, since the pre-
cision of the anchor case ci in each of the database varies with the corresponding
lengths Tj, i.e. ci is contained in D
j
i (k, Tj) in the amount of kTj. In our leading
example reflected by the different numbers of successfully treated coughing patients.
These difference in the precision would again cause the already extensively discussed
difficulties in determining the average weights. In order to avoid this problem and
as well to respond to the issue of insufficiently precise information in non-disjoint
concatenating database (see equation (2.3) and its derivation), we need to replicate
some of the anchored database to attain a common level of precision for the anchor
case. Due to the identical structure of the databases, enforcing a common precision
for anchor case is equivalent to obtain a specific common length L for all involved
anchored databases.15 More precisely, for an anchored chain F of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m
a belief induced by F should rely on an average of the beliefs induced by anchored
databases (Dji (k, L))j 6=i≤m. Obviously, this enables an agent to easily compare the
involved databases Dji (k, L) since their only common case -the anchor case ci - ap-
pears in identical amounts kL in all databases. Therefore, in comparing the anchored
database (and determining the average weights) the agent can concentrate on the
single and mutually different non-anchor cases.
15This seem to be close to the EG approach in fixing the lengths of the databases. However,
here it is a consequence of fixing a common precision for a single case. The two approaches
use different incompatible restrictions on the databases involved in the modifications of the
Concatenation Axiom.
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It remains to specify and motivate a choice for a common precision level of the
anchor case and (indirect) the common length L. We will introduce it in close rela-
tionship to our notion of the precision of an induced belief. As already discussed in
general for non-disjoint databases in the last section (see discussion after equation
(2.3)), there exists no replication for anchored concatenating databases, such that
all single cases appear in equally precision in (Dji (k, L))j 6=i≤m and in the related an-
chored chain F = ◦j 6=i≤mDji (K,Tj).16 Obviously, this leaves the freedom to reason
for a specific piece of information that should be captured in equal precision in all
involved induced beliefs. A very intuitive (and from our point of view most reason-
able) choice to control for precision (and related confidence and cautiousness) is to
ensure that the most precise and hence reliable piece of information in the anchored
chain is captured in the identical precision in the beliefs induced by the correspond-
ing replicated combining databases.17 The focus and reliance on the most precise
case can be justified by interpreting it as the driving factor of the precision of the
belief. Focussing on another, less precise information would imply a less precise be-
lief, since the most precise information would not be captured objectively anymore
(in all involved databases).18 Hence it appears reasonable to require that at least
the most reliable information is incorporated in the belief without any distortions,
which requires that it is also contained unbiased its generating (averaging) beliefs.
More technically, this can be achieved by requiring a particular adjusted length of
the combining anchored databases, which is given in the following definition.
Definition 2.3
Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m.
A length L ∈ N is called the adjusted (maximal) length, denoted by L(k, (Tj)j 6=i≤m),
if it is such that the number of observations of the most frequent case in an an-
chored chain F ∈ CT is identical to the number of observations of the most frequent
case in the anchored databases Dji (k, L) (for all j 6= i), (i.e. maxc∈C fF (c)T =
maxc∈C fDji (k,L)(c)L).
19
Our leading example will clarify the relationships and intuition of the adjusted
16This is due to the different appearances of the cases, i.e. for the anchored chain the appearance of
a non-anchor case cj is (1− k)Tj (for all j 6= i ≤ m) in contrast to (1− k)L in the (replicated)
anchored databases Dji (K,Tj) and similar for the anchor case ci, there exists the difference
between kT = k
∑
j 6=i≤m Tj and kL.
17Another reasonable choice is the least precise information that a very cautious agent might adopt
(see Section 2.7.3).
18Section 2.5.1 discusses another interpretation in terms of an induced persistent cautiousness
attitude that is evoked by the most precise information in the database and serves as basis for
all other estimations.
19In Section 2.7.3 the maximum is replaced by a minimum to focus on least precise information.
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length.
Example:
(i) Our doctor considers the records of different patient groups collected in two stud-
ies, i.e. D21(
2
3
, 30) = (c201 , c
10
2 ) and D
3
1(
2
3
, 60) = (c401 , c
20
2 ) with common patient group
c1. Patient group c1 is also the most precise information (with 60 observations) in
the corresponding anchored chain F = (c601 , c
10
2 , c
20
3 ) ∈ C90. Thus the doctor requires
it be matched equally precise in appropriate replications (of the study results) of
the anchored databases D21(
2
3
, 30) and D31(
2
3
, 60). The adjusted length L such that
for j = 2, 3
60 = max
c∈F
fF (c)90 = max
c∈Dj1
fDj1
(c)L = max{2
3
,
1
3
}L = 2
3
L,
is given by L = 90, i.e. D21(
2
3
, 90) = (c601 , c
30
2 ) and D
3
1(
2
3
, 90) = (c601 , c
30
2 ). Obviously,
the most precise case c1 is capture in identical precision (60) in all three databases
F,D21(
2
3
, 90) and D31(
2
3
, 90). This allows an easy averaging of beliefs induced by
Dj1(
2
3
, 90).
(ii) Similarly, let there be two public studies of the treatment for some specific
patient groups summarized in the following anchored chain
F = (c301 , c
40
2 , c
80
3 ) = (c
10
1 , c
40
2 ) ◦ (c201 , c803 ) = D21(
1
5
, 50) ◦D31(
1
5
, 100),
where again the anchor patient group is ”successfully treated coughs” c1. The
most precise case in F is c3 (with 80 observations). This implies that an ad-
justed length L = 100 is determined by 80 = max{1
5
, 4
5
}L. Again, the most pre-
cise case c3 is capture in identical precision (80) in the relevant databases F and
D21(
1
5
, 100) = (c201 , c
80
3 ), D
3
1(
1
5
, 100) = (c201 , c
80
2 ).
With these definitions at hand we can state our anchored Concatenation Axiom,
where a modified version focussing on least precise information can be found in Sec-
tion 2.7.3.
Recall that the length T of a database in an induced belief P becomes visible via
the restriction to PT . In particular for anchored databases D
j
i (k, Tj), we can skip
the length Tj in the induced belief, i.e. PTj(D
j
i (k, Tj)) = PTj(D
j
i (k)).
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Maximal Anchored Concatenation Axiom:
(i) Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m, i.e. F = ◦mj 6=iDji (k, Tj) and
let L = L(k, (T ji )j 6=i) ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted (maximal) length. Then
there exists λ ∈ ∆m (where λj = 0 for all j ≤ m s. th. Tj = 0) such that
PT (F ) =
∑
j 6=i≤m
λjPL(D
j
i (k))
(ii) Let for three distinct i, j, l ≤ m and any V,W ∈ N: Dji (1, V ) = (cVi ) ∈ CV and
Dlj(1/2, 2W ) = (c
W
j , c
W
l ) ∈ C2W . Let F = Dji (1, V ) ◦Dlj(1/2, 2W ), then there exist
λ ∈ int(∆2) such that
PV+2W (F ) = λPmax{V,W}(D
j
i (1)) + (1− λ)Pmax{2V,2W}(Dlj(1/2)).
Part (i) states that the belief induced by an anchored chain is a weighted average of
the beliefs induced by the related (replicated) anchored databases. The very similar
and almost disjoint databases allow a simple averaging, which keeps the normative
appealing spirit of the Concatenation Axiom. The databases share only one identi-
cal precise piece of information (the anchor case in kL-many observations). Hence
its induced identical estimate is contained in all their induced beliefs. This allows
to ”neglect” its impact for the determination of the average weights. Since in ad-
dition the mutually different non-anchor cases appear only in one of the anchored
databases, there emerge no difficulties in (cognitively challenging (interwoven)) bal-
ancing of differently cautious estimations based on identical, but differently precise
observations in various databases. Thus, the anchored-agent can basically determine
the average weights based on judging the relative importance and relevance of the
mutual different non-anchor cases.20 In this way, an anchored agent can find the
average weights in a very simple case by case comparison.
The particular (maximal adjusted) length of the related corresponding concate-
nating databases ensures that the most precise case in an anchored chain is captured
objectively in the average of their induced beliefs. An cautious agent does not ac-
cept an average of beliefs induced by databases that evoke less precise estimations
regarding this information, since this would directly imply a distortion of the preci-
sion of the belief induced by the anchored chain.
We continue the Examples to illustrate the anchored Concatenation Axiom.
(i) continued: The belief induced by F = (c601 , c
10
2 , c
20
3 ) is an average of the beliefs
20Of course, the estimation based on the anchor case is not contained in the same weight in each
belief, but this is directly adjusted for by assigning the desired weights to the beliefs induced
by the particular databases.
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induced by D21(
2
3
, 90) = (c601 , c
30
2 ) and D
3
1(
2
3
, 90) = (c601 , c
30
2 ). Since by construc-
tion the estimate based on the anchor case c1 is identically contained in all beliefs,
the doctor can neglect its influence of the anchor case for determining the average
weight. Hence the weights can be easily determined by just comparing the relative
(a frequency-weighted) importance of c302 and c
30
3 for evaluating the remaining parts
of the anchored chain (c102 , c
20
3 ). Intuitively, the discrepancies in the precisions for c2
and c3 are negligible, since the focus lies predominantly on capturing perfectly the
impact of the most precise case c1. This is directly achieved in this example, since
the most precise case c1 is also the anchor case, and hence appears equally often in
all databases.
(ii) continued: The belief induced by F = (c301 , c
40
2 , c
80
3 ) is an average of the beliefs
induced by D21(
1
5
, 100) = (c201 , c
80
2 ) and D
3
1(
1
5
, 100) = (c201 , c
80
3 ). Again, the anchor
case c1 appears equally in both replicated anchored databases, i.e. c
20
1 , which en-
ables to neglect it for finding the average weight. The agent only needs to weight
the amount and relevance of c802 and c
80
3 for judging (c
40
2 , c
80
3 ). Thereby it is essential
that the most precise case (in the anchored chain F) c3 is captured perfectly. The
discrepancies in the objective precisions for the cases c1 (20 in D
j
1 vs 30 in F) and
c2 are negligible, since the focus lies on capturing the most precise information c3
objectively.
A straightforward consequence of the agent’s focus on the most precise case and
the specific structure of the anchored databases is that the estimations based on
minor precise pieces of information are not made in their objective precision, but in
the precision of the most precise case. This can be seen directly by the recursive ap-
plication of the anchored Concatenation Axiom, i.e. PT (D) =
∑
c∈D λcP
c
maxc fD(c)·T
for appropriate λc ∈ (0, 1).
Since this structure (obviously) reappears in our representation theorem, we will
postpone the discussion of its plausibility and reasonability to Section 2.5.1.
Part (ii) of the anchored Concatenation Axiom describes just a restriction to the
very intuitive requirement that a belief induced by a combination of two disjoint
databases should lie in between the induced beliefs of the disjoint databases sepa-
rately. Averaging beliefs based on disjoint database are at the heart of the axiom,
since there are no interdependencies between the information (and their precision)
in the different databases. Furthermore, the axiom requires averaging only for very
specific databases, i.e. a database consisting only of observations of one case and
a database containing (potentially different, but) equally many observations of two
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other cases. The main assumption concerns the condition on the lengths that is
again driven by the agent’s focus on the most precise cases, in the sense that the
most precise information should be captured equally in all averaging beliefs induced
by the respective databases.
Constant Similarity Axiom (for maximal anchored version)
(i) Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m, i.e. F = ◦mj 6=iDji (k, Tj) and
let L ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted (maximal) length, i.e. L = L(k, (T ji )j 6=i).
If there exist some vector λ ∈ ∆m, (where λj = 0 for all j ≤ m such that Tj = 0)
such that for some Z ∈ N the following equation holds:
PZT (F
Z) =
m∑
j 6=i
λjPLZ(D
j
i (k)),
then this equation holds for all Z ∈ N.
(ii) Let for three distinct i, j, l ≤ m and any V,W ∈ N F = Dji (1, V ) ◦Dlj(1/2, 2W ).
If there exist λ ∈ int(∆2) for some Z ∈ N such that the following equation holds:
PZ(V+2W )(F
Z) = λPZ max{V,W}(D
j
i (1)) + (1− λ)PZ max{2V,2W}(Dlj(1/2)),
then this equation holds for all Z ∈ N.
The average weights (λj)j are related to (frequency weighted) relevance or similarity
weights, which could in principle depend on the length of the database. However,
the Constant Similarity Axiom allows to identify the similarity function independent
of the content and the size of the databases. It is reasonable to require a length-
independent similarity if the similarity values are determined by some primitive or
prior knowledge about the environment, which can not be learned, influenced or
based on the information contained in the database. Of course, the axiom is ques-
tionable if an agent uses the databases not solely for evaluation of the outcome
distribution, but also to learn something about structural (causal) relationship of
particular features in the cases. However, the approach taken in this work excludes
such deductive reasoning in deriving and updating the similarities from underlying
databases.21
21For deductive reasoning see also Section 2.5.4 about the relationship to statistical methods.
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2.5 Representation result of cautious belief formation
2.5.1 Representation Theorem with maximal anchored axioms
Theorem 2.1
Let there be given a function P : C∗ → ∆(R). Let PT be the restriction of P to CT
for T ∈ N. Let P satisfies the Learning and the Diversity Axiom.
Then the following are equivalent.
(i) The function P satisfies the Invariance, the maximal anchored Concatenation
and the Constant Similarity Axiom
(ii) There exists for each (T, c) ∈ N× C a unique P cT ∈ ∆(R), and a unique -up to
multiplication by a strictly positive number- strictly positive function s : C → R+,
such that for all T and any D ∈ CT :
PT (D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)P
c
T ∗D∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)
, (2.4)
where T ∗D ∈ N+ is defined by T ∗D := T ·maxc∈C fD(c).
Rough sketch of the proof:
The necessity part is straightforward calculations. The sufficiency part follows the
rough structure of the proof of BGSS and EG, but differs in the crucial arguments.
The idea is to transform the framework from the space of databases to the space
of frequency vectors that is structurally more tractable, i.e. the belief based on
databases PT (D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)P
c
T∗
D∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)
for D ∈ CT translates to frequency vectors
PT (f) =
∑
j≤m sjf(j)P
j
T∗
f∑
j≤m sjf(j)
for f that represents D ∈ CT via f = fD ∈ ∆(C) .
The essential part of the proof is to derive the similarity weights (si)i≤m. This will
be down inductively over m = |C|.
Step 1: Base case for the induction, i.e. |C| = m = 3, w.l.o.g. C = {c1, c2, c3}, i.e.
aim to find s1, s2, s3.
Step 1.1: A function P satisfying the anchored Concatenation and Constant Similar-
ity Axiom can be written as PT (f) =
∑
j≤m λiPT ∗f (f
j) for some appropriate λ ∈ ∆3
and j-th unit vectors (f j)j. Plugging f :=
1
3
(f 1 + f 2 + f 3) into this equation and
in the representation given by the theorem yields (with the Diversity Axiom) the
similarity values in terms of λ ∈ int(∆3). Using these derived similarity values, we
will define P sT (f) :=
∑
j≤3 sjf(j)PT∗f
(fj)∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
for all f ∈ ∆(C) and T ∈ N. The aim is to
show that
PT (f) = P
s
T (f) (2.5)
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for all f ∈ ∆(C). Of course (f j)j≤3 and f do already satisfy this equality.
Step 1.2: Partition the simplex ∆(C) into so called simplicial triangles recursively
and show that PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all simplicial points. Simplicial partitions are
defined as follows (see Figure 2.1 in Section 2.9.6). The 0-th simplicial partition is
exactly the simplex, i.e. consists of vertices qj0 ∈ ∆(C), which are exactly the unit
vectors f j for j = 1, 2, 3. The first simplicial partition of ∆(C) is a partition to four
triangles separated by the segments connecting the middle points between the two
of the three unit frequency vectors, i.e. q11 := (
1
2
f 1 + 1
2
f 2), q21 := (
1
2
f 2 + 1
2
f 3) and
q31 := (
1
2
f 3 + 1
2
f 1). The second simplicial partition is obtained by similarly parti-
tioning each of the four triangles to four smaller triangles, and the l-th simplicial
partition is defined recursively. The simplicial points of the l-th simplicial partition
are all the vertices of triangles of this partition.
Based on the fact that the points of the 0-th simplicial partition and f already sat-
isfy (2.5), the idea of the proof is to find a recursive procedure to cover all points of
any l-th simplicial partition.
The underlying intuition and reason that allows such a procedure is the following
observation. For any four specifically structured frequency vectors (namely anchored
frequency vectors or the pairs of vectors appearing in the anchored Concatenation
Axiom (ii)) that fulfill equation (2.5), also the intersection of the lines between two
of these vectors satisfies (2.5). The crucial step in the proof is to apply his fact
in a appropriate recursive way. Our ”algorithm” -which is different than the one
in BGSS and EG- ensures that all simplicial points of any l-th partition satisfies
equation (2.5).
Step 1.3: Show that PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all frequency vectors f ∈ ∆(C) for |C| = 3.
One can show that the beliefs P and P s induced by a sequence of simplicial points
that approximates f converge to the belief of P and P s induced by its limit f. Thereby
the Learning Axiom ensures the existence of such a limit belief. Thus the base case
for the induction is shown and we need to proceed with
Step 2: |C| = m > 3.
Step 2.1: Determination of s1, .., sm.
One can show that the similarity weights derived in Step 1 for any set of basic
cases C = {ci, cj, ck} are independent of the triplet {i, j, k} and thus we can define
P sT (f) :=
∑
j≤m sjf(j)PT∗f
(fj)∑
j≤m sjf(j)
for all f ∈ ∆(C) and T ∈ N.
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Step 2.2: Show PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all f ∈ ∆(C) via induction over m and us-
ing Step 1 (m = 3) as base case.
Any f ∈ ∆(C) can be written in m different ways as anchored chain with respect
to m different anchors. Applying the maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom to
these m different anchored chains delivers m-many different hyperplanes. Each of
these hyperplanes is spanned by m−1- many beliefs induced by anchored frequency
vectors, for which already the equation (2.5) holds by induction assumption. Since
both P sT (f) and PT (f) are elements of all these m many hyperplanes and one can
show that their intersection is unique, we have also (2.5) for all f ∈ ∆(C), which
concludes the proof.
Although the rough structure of the proof is similar to BGSS and EG, our proof
needs different arguments to complete the different parts of the proof. In partic-
ular the anchored version version of the Concatenation Axiom requires a different
recursive approach/algorithm to cover all simplicial points (Step 1.2), which is the
crucial step of the proof. Namely, in BGSS the combination of any databases or
frequency vector is allowed. Also in EG the combination of any frequency vectors
(by taking care about the lengths and the Constant Similarity Axiom) is basically
possible. However, we can combine only specific anchored databases or frequency
vectors. Also the induction step (Step 2.2) requires a different reasoning as in BGSS
or EG. As in EG, the Constant Similarity Axiom is an essential ingredient to facil-
itate the proof.
Interpretation of Theorem
The induced belief is a frequency and similarity weighted average of the estimations
based on past observations. All estimations (P cmaxc fD(c)T )c∈D are made according to
the level of cautiousness implied by the most precise case. This means that only the
most precise piece of information is captured objectively in its estimation. Hence, the
axiomatized belief formation does not achieve a perfectly objective representation
(as mentioned in (2.2)) without any imagination effort. However, such a ”perfect
imagination-free representation ” is impossible for a sufficiently rich Concatenation
Axiom (see Section 2.7.3) and also carries some drawbacks (see the discussion after
(2.2)). In any case, we are not concerned with imagining additional information to
take into account objective precision.
In fact, in first place we are interested in capturing the perception of precision
in form of the induced psychological effects on cautiousness and confidence. This is
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essential for small database containing relatively few information and is manifested
in the way how estimations P cT ∗D are made. From this perspective, the seemingly un-
desirable imagination in the axiomatized belief delivers the following intuitive and
reasonable interpretation. The underlying intuition is that an agent does not adjust
constantly her cautiousness and confidence attitude in response to each differently
precise information she encounters in a database. Rather, once an agent has ex-
perienced a (extreme) cautiousness and confidence feelings while estimating based
on objectively available information, she keeps, adopts and transmits her developed
feeling to other estimation situations. A fixed level of cautiousness according to
which all estimates are made can be interpreted as an gained attitude regarding
cautiousness or as a learned skill or ability to confidently estimate sufficiently cau-
tiously. In this way, it is a sustainable reference or state of mind, which does not
vanish and change for each new estimation.
For instance, an agent gained a feeling of cautiousness in the spirit of eliminating
un-reasonable outcomes. Suppose she feels confident and considers herself cautious
enough to assign only a small probability  to non observed outcomes r˜ 6= r in
estimating based on c = (x, r)L. Separately, her estimation induced by c′ = (x′, r′)T
with T > L assigns a slightly lower likelihood ′ <  to the not observed outcome
r˜ 6= r′ according to her lower cautiousness and higher confidence. Assume now that
in the past she has only estimated according to a precision level lower than L and
someone tells her that T −L pieces of information c were lost and she should better
estimate according to T many imagined observations. Without having experienced
estimating according to higher precision T (i.e. how far she can narrow down the
estimation) and being unable to imagine how she would feel if this information would
be objectively available, she might still stick to her already made estimation based on
objective information cL. However, if the agent would have estimated based on case
(c′)T in the past, then she has experienced her feeling of estimating according to the
objective precision in (c′)T and might adopt and apply the ”learned” procedure how
to eliminate and assign the likelihoods confidently for cT without concerns about
being too in-cautious.
The most intuitive choices for adopting a specific attitude towards cautiousness
are the two extreme situations, i.e. the least and most cautious (and confident)
experiences. The most precise case might come directly to her mind, because it has
been observed most frequently in the database and induces an attitude of (least)
cautiousness (and highest confidence) that is the basis for all estimation. In some
sense the most confident and least cautious feeling outshines and distracts from any
other more cautious perceptions. In contrast, the least precise information might
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intimidate or scare an agent and leaves a very cautious impression. She cannot be
persuaded to leave her skeptical mood for a less cautious attitude that might be
more appropriate for the remaining more accurate information. In our represen-
tation we focus on the optimistic view, i.e. our agent estimates according to the
confidence and cautiousness gained and experienced by estimating the most precise
information in the database.
In this way it is reasonable and natural to interpret the imagination of additional
information in the sense of estimating according to an experienced cautiousness level
or as gained skill to estimate cautiously.22
Differences in imagined information and its imagined perception
In fact, the imagination of further additional information or more precise cases
is not the cognitive difficult or challenging part in estimating based on imagined
information. Think about our doctor, who just needs to imagine that the same
patient enters her office again and shows the same outcome after being treated iden-
tically. Hence, the difficult part is to imagine the ”correct” feeling, which would
be induced by objective precision, but which is actually only existing in imagined
precision. Put differently, usually the implied perception of imagined (non exist-
ing) precision differs from the perception based on objective precision. The beliefs
(EG and partly our) require that agents are able to ignore this difference, which
might be fine if agents have experienced already a situation in which they actually
estimated according to that objective precision and know her induced perception of
that precision (as in our work). However, if an agent has never experienced such
a situation before (as in EG), the requirement to imagine her feeling ”correctly”
(i.e. ignore the differences) is cognitively challenging and psychologically confusing
and can be interpreted as intentionally lying to yourself without noticing. Does our
doctor judge the treatment less cautiously after adding an imagined patient to her
record?
2.5.2 Comparison to related belief representations
The initial motivation of EG and our paper is to modify the Concatenation Axiom
of BGSS to capture variations in the precision of data. A related and implied issue
concerns the way how an agent is capable to deal with the problem of combining
22From that perspective, our representation is even more convincing than the perfectly objective
imagination-free representation (2.2), in which the cautiousness and confidence is altered for
each case, putting the agent in different moods of cautiousness and confidence for each piece of
information.
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beliefs that might be based on identical, but different precise information and thus
contain induced differently cautious estimates.
BGSS, EG and our work share the property that eventually the estimations in-
volved in the final representation of a belief are subject to an unique level of preci-
sion.23 By that, technically speaking the aggregation of different precise information
is eventually not an issue. However, from an interpretational perspective, there are
important differences in the motivation and reasonability of the corresponding Con-
catenation Axioms.
Consider for example the database D = (c31, c
4
2, c
2
3) for which a purely objective
agent forms a belief according to P (D) ∈ conv({P (c31), P (c42), P (c23)}). In BGSS, the
induced belief is given by P (D) ∈ conv({P (c1), P (c2), P (c3)}), which neglects pre-
cision and cautiousness completely. EG gives P (D) ∈ conv({P (c91), P (c92), P (c93)}),
where no involved estimation is made according to its objective precision. Apart
from the (unproblematic) imagination of additional pieces of observation for all
cases, the main problematic point is the imagination on how this imagined precision
is perceived, since the estimation is based on a never (not yet) experienced cautious-
ness level 9 (see also the discussion above). In our paper, the belief would be based
on the most precise information, i.e. P (D) ∈ conv({P (c41), P (c42), P (c43)}), which also
would require some (unproblematic) imagination of additional observations with re-
spect to objective precision. However, the perception of this precision needs not to
be imagined, since the agent estimates according to an already experienced precision
and cautiousness level 4 (experienced for c2).
Arad and Gayer (2012) analyze beliefs based on datasets containing imprecise
pieces of information in the sense that ”it is not entirely clear what occurred in
them”. Roughly speaking, their approach models this sort of imprecision (ambigu-
ity) by assuming subjective capacities. The rough relationship to the approaches
discussed above is that these capacities would play the role of the probabilistic es-
timations occurring in the axiomatized representations of BGSS, EG and ours.
2.5.3 Remarks on the similarity function
One could be tempted to perceive and interpret the belief formation approaches as
a translation of the question from which probability to assign to which similarity to
employ. This is not completely misleading since the axiomatizations do not provide
help in choosing the similarity function. This problem occurs in a similar spirit for
the choice of a prior in the Bayesian approach. In the axiomatizations the similar-
ity function is derived from presumably observable probability assignments given
23in BGSS: P c∞ for all D ∈ C∗, in EG: P cT for all D ∈ CT and here PmaxcfD(c)T for all D ∈ CT .
42
2.5 Representation result of cautious belief formation
various databases. Fortunately, the similarity values need not satisfy any partic-
ular properties (even no symmetry) and hence can be derived also objectively or
empirically. For example, Gilboa et al. (2006) estimate an empirical similarity func-
tion from the data by asking which similarity function best explains the observed
data in a similarity-weighted frequency formula. Billot et al. (2004) axiomatized an
exponential similarity function. Moreover, assigning similarities appears to be cog-
nitively easier than stating explicit probabilities and many models in the psychology
and computer-science literature deal with determination of similarity measures (e.g.
Tversky (1977), Schank (1986), Heit, Heit and Rubinstein (1994), Goldstone and
Son (2005)).
2.5.4 Remarks on relationship to statistical methods
In the introduction we mentioned already the relationship between the axiomatic
approaches to belief formation in the data-based information structure and statisti-
cal approaches like inferences. In this section we want to discuss shortly similarities
and differences to existing statistical methods. Obviously, the versions of the Con-
catenation Axioms and the derived representations satisfies the following special
cases of frequentism. For s(xi, xt) = 1, our belief formation coincides with the sim-
ple average or frequentist approach if we identify with P c a Dirac measure on the
actually observed outcome. However, the conditional frequentist cannot be covered
since the corresponding s(xi, xt) = 1{xt=xi}(xi) is not strictly positive (as required),
but Bleile (2014b) (or Chapter 3) offers a modification that captures it. Gilboa
et al. (2010, 2011) and EG show the compatibility with other statistical methods,
like kernel estimation and classification (e.g. assign x to either class a or b: de-
fine s(a, (xc, ac)) = k(xc, x)1{a=ac} using a kernel function k). As discussed in more
detail in Gilboa et al. (2010) p. 16f, the framework can be also employed in con-
texts, where the observations (e.g. cases) and the prediction (e.g. possible theories)
are structurally disjoint. For instance ranking theories by log likelihood methods
s(t, c) = log(p(c|t)) is also possible where t represent a theory and p(c|t) denotes the
conditional likelihood of case c if theory t is true.
However, the main difference to statistical inference is that the axiomatic ap-
proaches are concerned with inductive reasoning and do not allow for deductive
reasoning, which is the issue of traditional statistical regression approaches. Let
there be a database consisting of observation D = ((xi, ri)i≤n) and a new prob-
lem xt. A regression approach would try to learn the (empirical) similarity weights
(s(xi, xt))i that best explains the database by best fitting an estimate of rj for all
j ≤ n and rsj =
∑
i6=j s(xi,xj)ri∑
i s(xi,xj)
(see also Gilboa et al. (2006)). Hence in a statistical
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regression context the weights s are deduced endogenously via the observed data and
are updated with new observation, i.e. the weights would be database dependent.
Put differently, linear regression analysis (and empirical similarities) use deductive
reasoning to derive the weights and then apply them inductively to infer the predic-
tion. In contrast, the Constant Similarity (and the Concatenation) Axiom requires
that the weights are fixed and database independent, i.e. there is no updating or
learning of the weights.
However, the axiomatization of a belief formation (in close relationship to statis-
tical methods) is still meaning- and insightful, since it allows to inspect, how plausi-
ble, consistent and sensible (in the sense of normative appealing axioms) asymptotic
statistical methods are also for small database and its implied precision related con-
cerns. From this perspective, axiomatizations suitable for small databases (as done
here) play an important role in order to find a sound foundation of statistical meth-
ods in non-asymptotic contexts.
Basically, our paper tries to capture exactly the environment of small databases,
whereas the framework of implied instantaneously perfect learning of BGSS and
EG are rather embeddable in an asymptotic setup. Interpreting EG in asymptotic
terms requires some explanation, since EG is intended to deal with different (”non-
asymptotic”) precisions. From our point of view, when dealing with small and
less precise databases, not only the objective precision is important for the belief
formation, but also an agent’s feeling regarding the precision (e.g. in terms of its
implied cautiousness). In this context, EG’s axiomatized agent is able to imagine the
true feeling induced by any imagined level of precision, as if she actually observed
the precision objectively and experienced that feeling. Endowed with this skill (of
”perfect” imagination of feelings), it appears un-intuitive that an agent limits herself
to use it only until an arbitrary pre-specified level of precision (given by the entire
amount of observations in the database, i.e. unrelated to any former experience).
Rather one would expect her to continue (unboundedly) with the imaginations such
that she will estimate according to an imagined full precision level P c∞ for all c ∈ D
and does not need to deal with imprecisions at all. Thus, from our perspective the
approaches of BGSS and EG coincide for an interpretation in terms of precision
related perception and feelings.
2.6 Conclusion
Chapter 2 deals with the question how agents form beliefs explicitly in an envi-
ronment with limited, heterogenous and differently precise information that cannot
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be condensed into a widely used (perfect) state space a la Savage. We axiomatize
a belief formation that can be interpreted as a generalized subjective frequentist
approach that incorporates subjective perceptions regarding the relevance and pre-
cision of the information in the database. We identify increasing precision of infor-
mation by additionally observed pieces of confirming information.
Our work is based on the axiomatization of a belief in BGSS that neglects the po-
tential impacts of differently precise information. Thereby, their belief formation is
most suitable for sufficiently large databases and less reasonable for small databases,
which are captured by our approach. Their belief formation implies that an agent is
able to perfectly learn from observations in a very objective and instantaneously way,
without displaying any sense of cautiousness and concerns about being potentially
mistaken. Our axiomatized cautious belief focusses on precision related cautiousness
and confidence in the predictions. The different versions of the main Concatenation
Axiom in the approaches of BGSS, EG and ours describe the relationships between
databases and their induced beliefs. In the context of caring for precisions in a
cautious belief formation an agent following the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS and
EG’s version would be faced by immense cognitive problems to handle and com-
pare differently precise pieces of information contained in different databases. Our
modification and restriction of the axiom takes into account these precision related
cognitive problems in describing the relationships. This is achieved by requiring that
agents only need to be capable to determine the relationship between databases and
their induced beliefs for specifically structured (almost disjoint) databases that al-
low an cognitively easy comparison (without precision and cautiousness concerns).
Moreover, it states that an agent controls for precision and its perceptional impacts
in a cautious belief by capturing the most precise (and hence reliable) information
objectively in its induced belief.
The resulting cautious belief is a weighted sum of cautious estimates induced by past
observed information. The weights are determined by frequencies of the observed
cases and their similarities with the problem under consideration. The induced es-
timates depend on a cautiousness level implied by the most precise case, which can
be interpreted as the appropriate (gained) attitude regarding cautiousness in this
database.
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2.7 Further remarks and considerations
2.7.1 Incompatible objective belief formation
An objective belief without any imagination effort for each case reads
PT (D) =
∑
j≤C s(cj)fD(cj)P
cj
fD(cj)·T∑
j≤C s(cj)fD(cj)
.
Is there a modification of the Concatenation Axiom that is necessary for an objec-
tive representation and which database are admissible?
(Specifically) Modified Version of the Concatenation Axiom
For two databases D ∈ DT1 and E ∈ DT2 , T := T1 +T2 and two numbers G,H ∈ N+
such that fD ·G ∈ Nm and fE ·H ∈ Nm, there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
PT (D ◦ E) = λPL(DG) + (1− λ)PH(EH).
Applying the objective belief to the modified Concatenation Axiom yields:∑
j≤m s(cj)fD◦E(cj)P
cj
fD(cj)T1+fE(cj)T2∑
j≤m s(cj)fD◦E(cj)
= λ
∑
j≤m s(cj)fD(cj)P
cj
fD(cj)L∑
j≤m s(cj)fD(cj)
+(1− λ)
∑
j≤m s(cj)fE(cj)P
cj
fE(cj)H∑
j≤m s(cj)fE(cj)
We do not consider a law of dynamics for the probabilities P
cj
T (which is also not
reasonable), e.g. like some function Y of P
cj
T = Y (P
cj
L , P
cj
H ). Thus, we directly need
to equalize the precision level for the estimations for each single case, i.e. for all
j ≤ m
Situation 1
Assume that there exists c ∈ D such that fD(c) = 0, then we get directly from
fD(c)T1 + fE(D)(c)T2 = fE(c)H
that H = T2. Assume that there is another c ∈ D∩E, then we have that fD(c)T1 +
fE(c)T2 = fE(c)T2 = fD(c)G, which is impossible. Hence, a databases D with
fD(c) = 0 for some c ∈ D allows only concatenations of disjoint databases.
Situation 2
We consider only databases that share the same support, i.e. fD(c) > 0 iff fE(c) > 0.
Thus we need to have fD(c)T1 + fD(c)T2 = fD(c)G = fE(c)H. Summing over all
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c ∈ D ∩ E leads to T1 + T2 = G = H. This also implies that fD(c) = fE(c)
for all c ∈ D ∩ E. Thus, the only non-disjoint concatenating database a modified
Concatenation Axiom allows for are replicated identical databases, which is naturally
true for all λ ∈ (0, 1), i.e. PT1+T2(A) = λPT1+T2(A) + (1− λ)PT1+T2(A).
In sum, a objective belief satisfies a modified Concatenation Axiom only for con-
catenations of disjoint databases or replicated identical databases. However, it will
become clear in the proof that a restriction to disjoint concatenating databases offers
not sufficient structure to derive the desired objective belief.
2.7.2 Relationship to EG’s axiom ”Concatenation restricted to
databases of equal length”
As mentioned at the end of Section 2.4.2, a Concatenation Axiom that allows for
concatenations of any unrestricted databases faces immense compromising between
differently precise (or cautious) estimates. This can only be avoided by assuming a
common arbitrary level of precision according to which all cases are estimated, inde-
pendent of the objective precision of the information. For each piece of information,
literally agents need to imagine (or forget) sufficiently many observation of cases to
reach an assumed artificial common level of precision. This ensures that no con-
siderations and compromising regarding different precisions is required and allows
an easy averaging based only on relative relevances of the concatenating databases.
However, thereby an agent also needs to know a priori that she evaluates all infor-
mation in an imagined precision and the beliefs contains only (imagined) equally
precise and cautious estimations. Consequently, a version of a Concatenation Ax-
iom that cares for precision and also applies to arbitrary non-disjoint concatenations
accomplishes the averaging of differently precise information by explicitly assuming
(consciously) away these differences. This is somehow problematic if one wants to
take precision into account seriously.
Nevertheless, this discussion delivers an explanation and intuition for the (unex-
plained) statement in EG: ” ... we modify the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS by
restricting it to databases of equal length, i.e. thus controlling for the ambiguity
resulting from insufficient amount of data ”. Their restriction to equal lengths is
ad hoc. However, technically one could argue for the equal length assumption by
referring to the discussion above. An aggregation of differently precise information
is only feasible if estimations are based on a common precision level, which is a
consequence of the restrictions in their axiom. More detailed, their axiom demands
that for a set of n databases of the same length T, that can be concatenated to a
n-times replication of a database, a belief induced by this database (not the n-th
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replication) is a average of the beliefs induced by each of the n databases separately.
Obviously, this implies for a appropriate set of concatenating databases (consisting
only of a single case)24 that the belief induced by the database - which underlie the
n-th replication- is formed by an average of the beliefs induced by T-times observed
cases, i.e. for some appropriate (λc)c∈D ∈ (0, 1)
P (D) =
∑
c∈D
λcP (c
T ).
Thus, the restriction to equal lengths implies directly that all contained estimation
are based on this common level as well. In this way, EG is indirectly adopting the
procedure discussed above.
However, as already discussed, from our perspective and motivation, equal lengths
of database are not sufficient to control for precision of its contained information.
Moreover, in the spirit of the above discussion, EG’s restriction to equal lengths
cannot be meaningful interpreted as controlling for imprecision, but more as an
(implicit) proposal to employ the length of the entire databases as the common
(imagined) precision level according to which all estimations are made.
2.7.3 Minimal anchored axiomatization
Instead of focussing on the most precise case in a database to determine the precision
of its induced belief, we can also take the least precise case as the key determinant
for the precision of a belief. This modification results in a minimal version of an
anchored Concatenation and Constant Similarity Axiom and a corresponding ex-
tremely cautious belief formation.
Definition 2.4
Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m.
A length M ∈ N is called the adjusted (minimal) length, denoted M(k, (Tj)j 6=i≤m),
if it is such that the number of observations of the least frequent case in an an-
chored chain F ∈ CT is identical to the number of observations of the least fre-
quent case in the anchored databases Dji (k, L) (for all j 6= i) (i.e. minc∈C fF (c)T =
minc∈C fDji (k,M)(c)M).
Minimal Anchored Concatenation Axiom:
(i) Let F ∈ CT be an anchored chain of (Dji (k, Tj))j 6=i≤m, i.e. F = ◦mj 6=iDji (k, Tj) and
let M = M(k, (T ji )j 6=i) ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted (minimal) length. Then
24This is always possible, for example consider D = (c21, c2, c
3
3) ∈ C6, then D6 = (c61) ◦ (c61) ◦ (c62) ◦
(c63) ◦ (c63) ◦ (c63), which implies P (D) = λ1P (c61) + λ2P (c62) + (1− λ1 − λ2)P (c63)
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there exists λ ∈ ∆m (where λj = 0 for all j ≤ m s. th. Tj = 0), such that
PT (F ) =
∑
j 6=i≤m
λjPM(D
j
i (k)).
(ii) Let for three distinct i, j, l ≤ m and any V,W ∈ N F = Dji (1, V ) ◦Dlj(1/2, 2W )
then there exist λ ∈ int(∆2):
PV+2W (F ) = λPmin{V,W}(D
j
i (1)) + (1− λ)Pmin{2V,2W}(Dlj(1/2))
For an analogously adjusted Constant Similarity Axiom the resulting theorem
reads:
Theorem 2.2
Let there be given a function P : C∗ → ∆(R). Let PT be the restriction of P to CT
for T ∈ N+. Let P satisfies the Learning and the Diversity Axiom.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) The function P satisfies the Invariance, the minimal anchored Concatenation
and the (minimal) Constant Similarity Axiom.
(ii) There exists for each (T, c) ∈ N× C a unique P cT ∈ ∆(R), and a unique -up to
multiplication by a strictly positive number- strictly positive function s : C → R+,
such that for all T and any D ∈ CT :
PT (D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)P
c
TD∗∑
c∈D s(c)fD(c)
,
where TD∗ ∈ N+ is defined by TD∗ := T ·minc∈D fD(c).
Interpretational, this means that all estimations are based on the least precise infor-
mation contained in the database and no information needs to be imagined. How-
ever, the focus on the least precise information results in neglecting and discarding
many more precise pieces of information, by processing only until the level of least
precision. A detailed interpretation in terms of perception of precision and an adop-
tion of an implied attitude of extreme cautiousness can be found in the discussion
after Theorem 2.1.
2.8 Proof of Theorem 2.1, necessity part
We need to show that the representation (2.4) satisfies the axioms. The Invariance
Axiom is obviously met.
49
2 Cautious Belief Formation
Maximal Anchored Concatenation Axiom, part (i):
Let D ∈ CT be a chain of Dji (k, Tj) = (c(1−k)Tjj , ckTji ) for all j 6= i ≤ m and
T :=
∑
j 6=i Tj, i.e.
D = ◦j 6=iDi = (c(1−k)T11 , c(1−k)T22 , ..., c(1−k)Ti−1i−1 , ckTi , c(1−k)Ti+1i+1 , ....., c(1−k)Tmm ).
Let L = L(k, (Tj)j 6=i) be the corresponding adjusted length. Hence, we have
fD = (
(1−k)T1
T
, (1−k)T2
T
, ...., (1−k)Ti−1
T
, k, (1−k)Ti+1
T
, ..., (1−k)Tm
T
)t and
fDji (k,ZTj)
= (0, ..., 0, (1− k), 0, .., 0, k, 0, ..., 0)t for any Z ∈ N.
Observe that fDji (k,Tj)
= fDji (k,ZTj)
and hence we will abbreviate fDji (k,ZTj)
by fDji (k)
.
Let T ∗D := T maxc∈D fD(c), then:
PT (D) =
∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)P
c
T ∗D∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
=
1∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
s(cj)
(1− k)Tj
T
P
cj
T ∗D
+ s(ci)
∑
j 6=i kTj
T
P ciT ∗D
)
=
1∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
[
s(cj)
(1− k)Tj
T
P
cj
T ∗D
+ s(ci)
kTj
T
P ciT ∗D
])
=
1∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C
s(c)fDji (k)
(c)P cT ∗D
[∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)
])
To proceed, we need to specify T ∗D = maxc∈C fD(c) · T , which is by definition of the
adjusted length L exactly equal to maxc∈C fDji (c)L. Observe that (∗)
∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c) =∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c), hence
PT (D) =
1∑
c∈C s(c)fD(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C
s(c)fDji (k)
(c)
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)P
c
maxc∈C f
D
j
i
(c)L∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)
)
(∗)
=
1∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)
·
(∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C
s(c)fDji (k)
(c)PL(D
j
i (k, L))
)
=
∑
j 6=i
λjPL(D
j
i (k, L))
From the last equation we get for all j 6= i ≤ m
λj =
Tj
T
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)∑
j 6=i
Tj
T
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k)(c)
(2.6)
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Hence the first part of the anchored Concatenation Axiom is satisfied.
For the Maximal Anchored Concatenation Axiom, part (ii):
let w.l.o.g. Dji (1, T ) = D
2
1(1, T ) = (c
T
1 ) ∈ CT and Dlj(1/2, 2W ) = D32(1/2, 2W ) =
(cW2 , c
W
3 ) ∈ C2W , then we need to show:
PT+2W (D
2
1(1, T ) ◦D32(1/2, 2W )) = λPmax{T,W}(D21(1,max{T,W}))
+ (1− λ)Pmax{2T,2W}(D32(1/2, 2 max{T, L}))
We have Pmax{T,W}(D21(1,max{T,W}) = P c1max{T,W}
Since P satisfies the maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom part (i) we have for
D32(1/2, 2 max{T,W}) = D21(0,max{T,W}) ◦D31(0,max{T,W})
= (c2)
max{T,W} ◦ (c3)max{T,W}
with the adjusted length L such that 1
2
2 max{T,W} = L, i.e.
L(0,max{T,W},max{T,W}) = max{T,W}
the existence of some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Pmax{2T,2W}(D32(1/2, 2 max{T,W})) = λP c2max{T,W} + (1− λ)P c3max{T,W}
Using this, we get for the maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom (ii) the following
representation for some λ ∈ ∆3:
PT+2W (D
2
1(1, T ) ◦D32(1/2, 2W )) =
3∑
i=1
λiP
ci
max{T,W}
But this is obviously satisfied by the representation (2.4) in Theorem 2.1, since for
the frequency vector fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W ) = (
T
T+2W
, W
T+2W
, W
T+2W
, 0, ...., 0)t, we have
maxc∈C fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2L)(c)(T + 2W ) = max{T,W}, and hence
PT+2W (D
2
1(1, T ) ◦ D32(1/2, 2W )) =
∑3
i=1 s(ci)fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W )
(i)P
ci
max{T,W}∑3
i=1 s(ci)fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W )
(ci)
, i.e. for i =
1, 2, 3
λi =
s(c1)fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W )(ci)P
c1
max{T,W}∑3
i=1 s(ci)fD21(1,T )◦D32(1/2,2W )(ci)
(2.7)
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Hence the (ii)-part of the maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom is also satisfied.
The Constant Similarity Axiom is also satisfied, which can be shown by adopt-
ing the above proof for the anchored Concatenation Axiom.
Replacing D = ◦mj 6=iDji (k, Tj) by DZ = ◦mj 6=iDji (k, ZTj) (where
∑m
j 6=i Tj = T ) in
the proof of the maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom part (i) and transforming
equation (2.6) delivers the existence of some λj(Z) ∈ (0, 1) such that
λj(Z) =
ZTj
ZT
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k,ZTj)(c)∑
j 6=i
ZTj
ZT
∑
c∈C s(c)fDji (k,ZT )(c)
= λj,
where in the last equation fDji (k,ZT )
(c) = fDji (k)
(c) is used.
For part (ii), analogous reasoning using equation (2.7) yields the desired result.
Therefore the Constant Similarity Axiom is satisfied, which completes the neces-
sity part of the proof of Theorem 2.1.
.
2.9 Proof of Theorem 2.1, sufficiency part
An essential step in the proof will be to identify databases with their frequency
vectors of contained cases (and its length), which allows to exploit the more tractable
structure of the space of frequencies on C (rather than the space of databases) and
to adopt the approach taken in BGSS. By the Invariance Axiom each database
D ∈ CT can be identified (with respect to the induced belief formation) by a pair
(fD, T ), where fD ∈ ∆(C) represents a frequency vector of appearances of cases in
the database D and T is the length of the database. Based on this, we will translate
the database structure to a frequency framework.
2.9.1 General definitions for a frequency framework
The set of all frequency vectors on C is given by
∆(C) := {f = (f1, ..., fm) s. th. fi ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] for all i ≤ m and
∑
i≤m fi = 1}
Without knowing the exact database D that a frequency vector f ∈ ∆(C) represents,
the frequency vector can be linked to infinitely many databases DZ for all Z ∈ N+.
Hence one needs to link frequency and the length of the database for an ”unique”
(up to reordering) representation of a database.
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The following set represents frequency vectors corresponding to databases D ∈ CT :
∆T (C) : = {f ∈ ∆(C) ∩Qm, f(i) = li
T
, li ∈ N+,
m∑
i=1
li = T and
∃D ∈ CT such that fD(i) = f(i) = li/T}
Observe that if f ∈ ∆T (C), then f ∈ ∆TZ(C) for all Z ∈ N+.
Since the set of cases C is fixed, we reduce the notational effort and will abbreviate
∆T (C) by ∆T , i.e. ∆T denotes the set of all frequency vectors representing databases
of length T and the set of all rational frequency vectors on C is denoted by ∆.
Hence by the Invariance Axiom each D ∈ CT can be represented by a f ∈ ∆T ,
where again f(i) := fD(ci) denotes the frequency of case ci for all i ≤ m.
Definition 2.5
(i) For all j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} denote by f j the j-th unit vector in Rm, i.e. the frequency
vector representing a database containing only cases cj ∈ C, hence an extremal point
in ∆, i.e. f j = (0, ..., 0, 1︸︷︷︸
j−th
, 0, ..., 0)t
(ii) The frequency vector corresponding to the anchored database
Dji (k, T ) = (c
(1−k)T
j , c
kT
i ) is given by
fDji (k,T )
= (0, ...0, (1− k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−th
, 0, .., 0, k︸︷︷︸
i−th
, 0, ..., 0)t
Since fDji (k,W )
= fDji (k,T )
for all T and W, the length is totally immaterial for the
frequency vector and hence neglected from now on, i.e. the frequency vector corre-
sponding to the anchored databases Dji (k, T ) for all j 6= i ≤ m is denoted for all T
such that kT ∈ N by
f ji (k) := fDji (k,T )
Note that f ji (k) is still the whole frequency vector, i.e. f
j
i (k) ∈ ∆, whereas f ji (k)(l)
represents the l-th component of the vector and refers to the frequency of case cl,
i.e. f ji (k)(l) ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q.
2.9.2 Beliefs induced by frequency vectors
From now on we consider only beliefs P that satisfy the Invariance Axiom. Con-
sequently, as mentioned above, we can transform beliefs defined on databases to
beliefs defined on frequency vectors in the following way (remember that we fixed a
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problem x ∈ X and skip it).
Definition 2.6
The beliefs P : C∗ → ∆(R) and its restriction PT : CT → ∆(R) for all T ∈ N
based on databases translates to corresponding beliefs based on frequency vectors in
the following way:
(i) P : ∆ → ∆(R) such that P (f) := P (D) for f ∈ ∆ and D ∈ C related by
f = fD.
(ii) PT : X × ∆T → ∆(R) such that PT (f) := PT (D) for f ∈ ∆T and D ∈ CT
related by f = fD.
As long as no length is fixed, f ∈ ∆ is universal and the length T of the database that
f represents becomes ”visible” only through the restriction of P (f) to the specific
PT (f), i.e. PT ”pins” down the unique database the frequency vector is able to
represent, namely the database with length T. Of course, under the condition that
the frequency vector allows the existence of such a database with this specific length.
2.9.3 Axioms in the frequency framework
Maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom:
(i) Let there be f ∈ ∆T , for all j 6= i ≤ m f ji (f(i)) ∈ ∆Tj and
∑m
j 6=i Tj = T such
that for (αj)j 6=i≤m ∈ [0, 1] and
∑m
j 6=i αj = 1, i.e. f =
∑m
j 6=i αjf
j
i (f(i)).
Let L = L(f(i), (Tj)j 6=i≤m) ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted length, i.e.
maxi≤m f(i)T = maxl≤m f
j
i (f(i))(l)L = max{f(i), 1− f(i)}L.
Then there exist λ ∈ ∆m−1 (where λj = 0 for all j 6= i ≤ m such that αj = 0), such
that
PT (f) =
∑
j 6=i≤m
λjPL(f
j
i (f(i)).
(ii) Let f ji (1) ∈ ∆T and f lj(1/2) = (0, ...0, 1/2, 0, ..., 0, 1/2, 0, .., 0)t ∈ ∆2W for distinct
i, j, l ≤ m, then for all α ∈ (0, 1) there exist λ ∈ ∆2 such that
PT+2W (αf
j
i (1) + (1−α)f lj(1/2)) = λPmax{T,W}(f ji (1)) + (1−λ)Pmax{2T,2W}(f lj(1/2)).
Constant Similarity Axiom:
(i) Let there be f ∈ ∆T , for all j 6= i ≤ m f ji (f(i)) ∈ ∆Tj such that for (αj)j 6=i≤m ∈
[0, 1] and
∑m
j 6=i αj = 1, i.e. f =
∑m
j 6=i αjf
j
i (f(i)).
Let L = L(f(i), (Tj)j 6=i≤m) ∈ N be the corresponding adjusted length.
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If there exist λ ∈ ∆m−1 (where λj = 0 for all j 6= i ≤ m such that αj = 0), such
that for some Z ∈ N+
PZT (f) =
∑
j 6=i≤m
λjPZL(f
j
i (k)),
then the equation holds for all Z ∈ N+.
(ii) Let f ji (1) ∈ ∆T and f lj(1/2) = (0, ...0, 1/2, 0, ..., 0, 1/2, 0, .., 0)t ∈ ∆2W for dis-
tinct i, j, l ≤ m. Then (for all α ∈ (0, 1)) if there exist λ ∈ ∆2 such that for some
Z ∈ N+
PZ(T+2W )(αf
j
i (1)+(1−α)f lj(1/2)) = λPZ max{T,W}(f ji (1))+(1−λ)PZ max{2T,2W}(f lj(1/2)),
then the equation holds for all Z ∈ N+.
Learning Axiom:
For all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}: (PT (f i))T∈N+ converges to P∞(f i) = P i∞.
Diversity Axiom:
There exist some T ∗ ∈ N+, such that for all T ≥ T ∗, no three elements of {(PT (f j))j≤m}
are collinear.
Before stating the sufficiency part of Theorem 2.1 in the frequency version we will
present some helpful observations.
2.9.4 Useful observations
Smallest anchored chain of a frequency vector
Remark 2.1
For all anchor cases ci ∈ C, i ≤ m, there exists for each f ∈ ∆ an (frequency
based) anchored chain f =
∑
j 6=i α
j
if
j
i (f(i)), where α
j
i ∈ [0, 1] are given by f(j) =
αji (1− f(i)) for all j 6= i ≤ m.
Note that αji corresponds to the (relative) lengths of the databases D
j
i (f(i), ·) (cor-
responding to the particular frequency vectors f ji (f(i))) to the length of the specific
database D (which is represented by the frequency vector f).
For instance, assume that f ji (f(i)) ∈ ∆Vj and
∑
j 6=i Vj = V , then f ∈ ∆V and
αji =
Vj
V
.
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In general for all j 6= i ≤ m, f ji (f(i)) can represent a database with length t · T˜ ji ,
where t ∈ N and T˜ ji ∈ N is the smallest length W such that f(i)W is a natural
number (and hence also (1− f(i))W ∈ N).
To specify the (smallest) length Zi ∈ N of the database D corresponding to the
anchored chain of f via anchor case ci, i.e. f =
∑
j 6=i α
j
if
j
i (f(i)), we extend all
T˜ ji ∈ N with the smallest zji ∈ N such that all αji are the fractions with the smallest
common denominator Zi, i.e. α
j
i =
zji T˜
j
i
Zi
(for j 6= i ≤ m). In this way, the small-
est lengths of the databases represented by (f ji (f(i)))j 6=i that can be used for the
decomposition of f via anchor ci are exactly given by
T ji := z
j
i T˜
j
i = α
j
iZi ∈ N and Zi =
∑
j 6=i≤m
T ji (2.8)
Hence f ∈ ∆Zi and f ji (f(i)) ∈ ∆T ji for all j 6= i ≤ m.
Obviously, choosing a different anchor case cl ∈ C for the decomposition of f will
lead to a different smallest denominator Zl (and induced length of database which
f represents) and different lengths of the databases (Djl (f(l), T
j
l ))j 6=l≤m that are
represented by (f jl (f(l)) ∈ ∆T jl )j 6=l≤m.
Definition 2.7
For all f ∈ ∆ and i ≤ m, we call the anchored chain (wrt. to anchor case ci)
f =
∑
j 6=i α
j
if
j
i (f(i)) defined in (2.8) the smallest anchored chain of f representing
a database of length Zi =
∑
j 6=i≤m T
j
i and denote it by (f
j
i (f(i)), T
j
i )j 6=i.
The following Lemma shows consistency of the axiomatization with respect to the
possible smallest decompositions based on different anchor cases.
Lemma 2.1
Let P : ∆→ ∆(R) and its restriction PT to ∆ satisfies the maximal anchored Con-
catenation and the Constant Similarity Axiom. Then, P is consistent with respect
to the different possible smallest decomposition and for all T ≥ 2 and any f ∈ ∆T
there exist λ ∈ ∆m
PT (f) =
∑
j≤m
λjPmaxi≤mf(i)T (f
j) (2.9)
Proof:
For all f ∈ ∆, there exists the smallest anchored chain via anchor case ci ∈ C
(as in Definition 2.7) (f li (f(i)), T
l
i )l 6=i, where f(l) =
T li
Zi
(1 − f(i)) (which implies
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(1− f(i))T li = f(l)Zi).
We have to show that independent of the choice of the anchor case ci ∈ C, the
induced beliefs PT (f) coincide for all T ∈ N such that f ∈ ∆T .
Observe that the adjusted length defined in Definition 2.3 can be stated explicitly:
L(k, T1, T2, ..., Tm) =

maxj{Tj} if k ≤ maxj{Tj}maxj{Tj}+T =: k∗ ∈ ( 1m+1 , 12)
k
1−kT if k ∈ (k∗, 12)
T if k ≥ 1
2
Thus, we can differentiate the three situations of adjusted lengths depending on the
different frequencies of the chosen anchor case ci ∈ C, i.e. (i) f(i) ≤ k∗ or (ii)
f(i) ∈ (k∗, 1
2
) or (iii) f(i) ≥ 1
2
.
(i) Let f(i) ≤ k∗, assume w.l.o.g. that maxl≤m f(l) = f(j), hence maxl≤m T li = T ji :
Applying the maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom in a first step for k = f(i) ≤
maxj 6=i T
j
i
maxj 6=i T
j
i +Zi
with adjusted length L(f(i), (T li )l 6=i) = T
j
i , and in the second line for
k = 0 with adjusted length L(0, f(i)T ji , (1−f(i))T ji ) = (1−f(i))T ji . Then, for some
a ≤ m such that a 6= i, l, we get for some λ, γ, β ∈ ∆m:
PZi(f) =
∑
l 6=i
λlPL(f(i),(T li )l 6=i)(f
l
i (f(i))) =
∑
l 6=i
λlPT ji
(f li (f(i)))
=
∑
l 6=i
λl(γlPL(0,f(i)T ji ,(1−f(i))T ji )(f
i
a(0)) + (1− γl)PL(0,f(i)T ji ,(1−f(i))T ji )(f
l
a(0)))
=
∑
l 6=i
λl(γlP(1−f(i))T ji (f
i) + (1− γl)P(1−f(i))T ji (f
l))
=
∑
l
βlP(1−f(i))T ji (f
l) =
∑
l
βlPmaxl≤m f(l)Zi(f
l)
By the Constant Similarity Axiom we get that PT (f) =
∑
l βlPmaxl≤m f(l)T (f
l) for all
T such that f ∈ ∆T .
Analogous reasoning and application of the Constant Similarity Axiom would yield
the same result for (ii) and (iii) directly. However, we just show that for all f ∈ ∆,
there exist i 6= j ≤ m, such that f(i) ≤ k∗. Assume that would not be true, then
for all l ≤ m f(l) > maxj 6=i T ji
maxj 6=i T
j
i +Zi
and hence
∑
l≤m f(l) > m
maxj 6=i T
j
i
maxj 6=i T
j
i +Zi
≥ 1, since
Zi ≤ (m− 1)(maxj 6=i T ji ). 
The following Lemma mirrors Lemma A.4 in EG.
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Lemma 2.2
Let P satisfy the maximal anchored Concatenation, Constant Similarity and Diver-
sity Axiom and let (sj)j≤m be a collection of positive numbers (similarity weights).
Define the function P s : ∆(C)→ ∆(R) and for any T ∈ N, T ≥ 2 and any f ∈ ∆T
the restriction P sT to ∆T by
P sT (f) =
∑
j≤m sjf(j)Pmaxj≤m f(j)T (f
j)∑
j≤m sjf(j)
.
Suppose that for some T ≥ T ∗ (given by the Diversity Axiom) and f ∈ ∆T it holds
PT (f) = P
s
T (f).
Then, PW (f) = P
s
W (f) for all W ∈ Z+ such that f ∈ ∆W .
Proof:
Let T (f) be the smallest T such that f ∈ ∆T (f), then for all l ∈ N f ∈ ∆lT (f).
By Lemma 2.1 we know that P can be represented as in representation (2.9).
Hence, if there exist some λ ∈ ∆m (with λi = 0 if and only if f(i) = 0) such that it
satisfies for some l ∈ N+,
PlT (f)(f) =
m∑
j=1
λjPmaxi≤mf(i)T (f)(f
j),
then by the Constant Similarity Axiom it also holds for all l ∈ N+. In particular,
for l such that lT (f) = T the following holds.
PT (f) =
m∑
j=1
λjPmaxi≤mf(i)T (f)(f
j)
by ass.
=
∑m
j=1 sjf(j)Pmaxi≤mf(i)T (f
j)∑m
j=1 sjf(j)
= P sT (f)
By the Diversity Axiom we get λj =
sjf(j)∑m
j=1 sjf(j)
.
Since P slT (f) =
∑m
j=1 sjf(j)Pmaxi≤mf(i)lT (f)(f
j)∑m
j=1 sjf(j)
=
∑m
j=1 λjPmaxi≤mf(i)lT (f)(f
j) = PlT (f)(f)
for all l, the proof is completed. .
Remark 2.2
Let f ∈ ∆ be expressed as convex combination of the set {f1, f2, f3} for some fi ∈ ∆T
for all i = 1, 2, 3, i.e. f = β1f1 + β2f2 + (1− β1 − β2)f3.
As in Remark 2.1 we apply the relative length interpretation of the weights βi ∈ (0, 1)
for all i = 1, 2, 3, to get the (potentially) smallest induced length H of the database
represented by f via the convex combination of databases Di ∈ CT , which are repre-
sented by fi ∈ ∆T . That is, H is again the smallest possible denominator of all βi
such that for all i = 1, 2, 3 βi =
ziT
H
for some zi ∈ N and hence we have that f ∈ ∆H
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can be combined by the decomposition (fi)i≤3, where fi ∈ ∆βiH=ziT for i = 1, 2, 3.
2.9.5 Theorem 2.1, sufficiency part in frequency version
Theorem 2.3
Let there be given a function P : X × ∆ → ∆(R). Let PT be the restriction of P
to X × ∆T and let for T ≥ 2 PT : ∆T → ∆(R) satisfy the Learning, Diversity,
maximal Anchored Concatenation and Constant Similarity Axiom.
Then there exist unique probability vectors (P jT )j≤C ∈ ∆(R) for all T ≥ 2 and
unique -up to multiplication by a strictly positive number- strictly positive numbers
(sj)j≤m ∈ R+ such that for every f ∈ ∆T
PT (f) =
∑
j≤qm sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)·T∑
j≤m sjf(j)
. (2.10)
Proof
Step 0:
Obviously, we have to define P jT = PT (f
j) for all T ≥ 2 and j ≤ m.
Thus it remains to show that there exist positive numbers (sj)j≤m such that the
representation holds for all T ≥ 2 and for every f ∈ ∆T .
Rough outline of the proof
As already mentioned in the Sketch of the Proof, we follow an inductive proof on
the number of cases in the set of basic cases, i.e. on m = |C|.
In Step 1, which serves in Step 2 as the base case for the induction, we proof the
theorem for a set of basic cases consisting only of three different basic cases, i.e.
C = {c1, c2, c2}.
Step 1.1: Determination of the similarity values s1, s2, s3
The representation (2.9) in Lemma 2.1 and the representation (2.10) in Theorem
2.3 applied to f := 1
3
(f 1 + f 2 + f 3) yields (with the Diversity Axiom) the similarity
values, which allows the definition of P sT (f) :=
∑
j≤3 sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)T∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
for all f ∈ ∆T
and T ∈ N. Of course f ∈ {f 1, f 2, f 3, f} satisfy PT (f) = P sT (f).
Step 1.2: Show that PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all simplicial points (Figure 2.1 illustrates
simplicial partitions and points)
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The main tool to show this claim is the observation that for four specifically struc-
tured frequency vectors (anchored frequency vectors) that satisfies already the de-
sired equation, also the intersection of the lines between two of these (specific)
vectors satisfies the above equation (Lemma 2.4). The crucial step in the proof is
to apply this fact in an appropriate recursive way. In this step again the maxi-
mal anchored Concatenation Axiom and the Constant Similarity Axiom (in form of
Lemma 2.2) are necessary.
Step 1.3: Show that PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all frequency vectors f ∈ ∆(C)
The proof is similar to a (rewritten/revised) proof of Lemma A.6 in EG, which is
based on the existence of the limit of P cT for all c ∈ C (Learning Axiom). Since all fre-
quency vectors f ∈ ∆ can be approximated by a series of simplicial triangles/points,
we can show the claim (by using Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2). In particular, one can
show that the beliefs P and P s induced by the sequence of simplicial points, which
approximates f, converges to the belief of P and P s induced by the limit f. Using
the equivalence of P sT (g) and PT (g) for the sequence of simplicial points g ∈ ∆ by
Step 1.2 delivers the claim.
In Step 2, the result from Step 1 is used inductively for a general set of basic
cases C = {c1, c2, ..., cm} with m > 3.
Step: 2.1: Defining the similarity weights s1, ..., sm
Step 1 yield for any triple of cases {cj, ck, cl} ⊆ C for distinct j, k, l ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}
similarity weights s
(j,k,l)
j , s
(j,k,l)
k , s
(j,k,l)
l . As in the proof of Proposition 3, Step 2.1 in
BGSS, one can show that each similarity weight can be chosen independent of the
choice of the triple, i.e. s
(j,k,l)
j = sj. Hence, we define P
s
T (f) :=
∑
j≤m sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)T∑
j≤m sjf(j)
for all f ∈ ∆(C) and T ∈ N.
Step 2.2: Show PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all f ∈ ∆(C)
Inductively on |C| = m for f ∈ conv({(f j)j≤m}), where we use Step 1 as base case of
the induction. Each f ∈ ∆ can be written as anchored chain with different anchors
(Remark 2.1). Applying the maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom to these chains
yield m-many different hyperplanes, which are spanned by (P (f ji (f(i))))j 6=i≤m, for
different i ≤ m. All these hyperplanes contain P (f) and include P s(f) as well, since
PT (f
j
i (k)) = P
s
T (f
j
i (k)) for any i 6= j ≤ m and f ji (k) ∈ ∆T by induction assumption.
Using the Constant Similarity Axiom (Lemma 2.2) and Lemma 2.1 to harmonize
the different hyperplanes wrt. lengths, we can show that the intersection of all these
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induced hyperplanes is unique, which delivers the desired result.
2.9.6 Step 1: C = {c1, c2, c3}, i.e. m = 3
Step 1.1:
Define f :=
∑
j≤3 1/3f
j, for f j ∈ ∆T , and T ≥ T ∗ then f ∈ ∆3T . The positive
numbers s1, s2, s3 result from equating the evaluation of f using the representation
(2.9) in Lemma 2.1, i.e. P3T (f) = λ1P
1
T + λ2P
2
T + (1− λ1 − λ2)P 3T with representa-
tion (2.10) in Theorem 2.3 and solving the linear system. The solution of this linear
system s1, s2, s3 exist uniquely up to multiplication by a positive number due to the
non collinearity condition of the Diversity Axiom for T ≥ T ∗, otherwise uniqueness
is not achievable.
Define for all T and f ∈ ∆T
P sT (f) :=
∑
j≤3 sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)T∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
Obviously P sT (f
j) = PT (f
j) (Step 0) for all j = 1, 2, 3 and P sT (f) = PT (f).
The aim is to show for all T and for every f ∈ ∆T :
P sT (f) = PT (f) (2.11)
In the following, we will recursively partition the simplex ∆ into so called simplicial
triangles, as illustrated in the Figure 2.1 below.
Definition of Simplicial Triangles:
The 0-th simplicial partition consist of vertices qj0 ∈ ∆, which are exactly the unit
vectors f j for j = 1, 2, 3. The first simplicial partition of ∆ is a partition to four
triangles separated by the segments connecting the middle points between two of
the three unit frequency vectors, i.e. q11 := (
1
2
f 1 + 1
2
f 2), q21 := (
1
2
f 2 + 1
2
f 3) and
q31 := (
1
2
f 3 + 1
2
f 1). The second simplicial partition is obtained by similarly parti-
tioning each of the four triangles to four smaller triangles, and the l-th simplicial
partition is defined recursively. The simplicial points of the l-th simplicial partition
are all the vertices of triangles of this partition. Note that for j = 1, 2, 3 the qj0
are frequency vectors representing databases consisting only of one case, but of any
length T ∈ N, i.e. qj0 ∈ ∆T for all T ∈ N+. All vertices qvl of the l-th simplicial
partition are in ∆2lT for all T ∈ N+ for appropriate v ≤ nl (defined below in (2.12)).
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•
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•
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•
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•
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• q62
•
q72
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1
Figure 2.1: 1st and 2nd simplicial partitions
Considering the simplicial points on the line between f 1 and f 2, we get for the 0-
th simplicial partition: 2 simplicial points, for 1st simplicial partition: 3 simplicial
points: for 2nd simplicial partition: 5 simplicial points, for 3rd simplicial partition:
9 simplicial points and so forth, i.e. it follows the series al = 2
l + 1 for all l ∈ N.
Observe that for each parallel line to (f 1, f 2) between simplicial points of the l-th
simplicial partition, the line which is one ”step closer” to f 3, possesses one simpli-
cial point less than the parallel line that is further away from f 3. The number of
simplicial points on these parallel lines decreases until reaching the point f 3. Hence
the total number nl of simplicial points of the l-th partition is given by
nl :=
al∑
i=1
i =
2l+1∑
i=1
i = 22l−1 + 2l + 2l−1 + 1 where al = 2l + 1 (2.12)
Step 1.2: PT (f) = P
s
T (f) holds for all Simplicial Points
Lemma 2.3
The vertices qvl with v ≤ nl of the l-th simplicial partition satisfy equation (2.11)
for all l ∈ N.
Notation: In the following we will denote for a, b ∈ ∆ or a, b ∈ ∆(R) the straight
line through a and b by (a, b) (since there is no confusion with the usual interval
notation).
Main tool of the proof of this Lemma is the following observation.
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Lemma 2.4
Let a, b, c, d ∈ ∆ be distinct frequency vector satisfying equation (2.11) and the
lines (a, b) and (c, d) are not collinear. Then the intersection y of the line (a,b) and
(c,d), i.e. y = (a, b)∩ (c, d) satisfies equation (2.11) (for an appropriate T such that
y ∈ ∆T ) if either of the following conditions hold for the pairs a, b and c, d:
(i) both vectors a and b (respectively c and d) lie on a line (f ji (k), f
h
i (k)) for some
k ∈ [0, 1] and distinct i, j, h ≤ m, which represent anchored databases with identical
anchor case ci ∈ C or
(ii) a, b (respectively c, d) lie on a line through (f ji (1), f
h
j (1/2)) for some distinct
i, j, h ≤ m.
Proof of Lemma 2.4
We will show the situation, where both pairs a, b and c, d satisfy condition (i).
Assume that a, b ∈ (f ji (k), fhi (k)), hence also y ∈ (f ji (k), fhi (k)). By Remark 2.1 we
know that there exist an anchored chain of y composed of (f ji (k), f
h
i (k)), i.e. there
exists some α ∈ (0, 1) and Zy ∈ N such that y = αf ji (k) + (1 − α)fhi (k) ∈ ∆Zy
with corresponding adjusted length Ly := L(k, αZy, (1− α)Zy) such that PZy(y) ∈(
PLy(f
j
i (k)), PLy(f
h
i (k))
)
.
Analogously, there exist some Zx and Lx for all x ∈ {a, b}. Let L := LCM(Zy, Za, Zb)
(least common multiple), then for all v ∈ {y, x} the following holds
PZv L
Lv
(v) ∈ (PL(f ji (k)), PL(fhi (k)))
In particular PZa L
La
(a) and PZb L
Lb
(b) determine already the slope of the line(
PL(f
j
i (k)), PL(f
h
i (k))
)
and hence PZy L
Ly
(y) ∈
(
PZa L
La
(a), PZb L
Lb
(b)
)
.
The same derivation with P s yields P s
Zy L
Ly
(y) ∈
(
P s
Za L
La
(a), P s
Zb L
Lb
(b)
)
and since we
know that a, b ∈ ∆ satisfy (2.11), we get:
PZy L
Ly
(y), P s
Zy L
Ly
(y) ∈
(
PZa L
La
(a), PZb L
Lb
(b)
)
The same procedure applied to pair c, d instead to a, b with G := LCM(Ly, Lc, Ld)
yields:
PZy G
Ly
(y), P s
Zy G
Ly
(y) ∈
(
PZc G
Lc
(c), PZb G
Lc
(c)
)
Finding a least common multiple J = LCM(L,G) will deliver the desired result,
since
PZy J
Ly
(y), P s
Zy J
Ly
(y) ∈
(
PZa J
La
(a), PZb J
Lb
(b)
)
∩
(
PZc J
Lc
(c), PZd J
Ld
(d)
)
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and the intersection is unique (otherwise this would be a contradiction to the Di-
versity Axiom). Hence P s
Zy J
Ly
(y) = PZy J
Ly
(y) and by Lemma 2.2 PT (y) = P
s
T (y) for
all T such that y ∈ ∆T .
The situation, in which one of the two pairs satisfies condition (i) and the other
condition (ii) or both pairs fulfill condition (ii) can be shown analogously. 
The proof of Lemma 2.3 is conducted by using the observation in Lemma 2.4 in
an appropriate procedure recursively, as can be seen in the series of figures (Figures
2.2 to 2.4) below.
Proof of Lemma 2.3 by induction over l (l-th simplicial partition)
Base case for induction l = 0:
By Step 1.1 we know that for (f 1 = q10, f
2 = q20, f
3 = q30) the representation holds.
Induction step:
The idea of the (recursive) procedure to capture all simplicial points of the (l+1)−th
simplicial partitions as intersections of two lines that run through simplicial points
of the l-th simplicial partition can be understand by inspecting the series of Figures
2.2-2.4. However, we need some definitions first:
(i) g
(i,j)
l (d) denotes the simplicial point in the l-th partition on the line (f
i, f j) such
that it is the d closest to f i.
(ii) bil(d) denotes the simplicial point of the l-th partition that lies on the line (f
i, q∗)
and also on the d- closest line to f i that is parallel to (f j, fh) in the l-th partition.
We construct a procedure such that appropriately chosen lines through these points
can intersect exactly in all simplicial points. Lines through these points are essential
to cover all simplicial points through intersections.
More precisely, for all l ∈ N and all distinct i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, 3} it holds that bil+1(d) :=
(f i, 1
2
(f j + fh)) ∩ (g(i,j)l (d), g(i,h)l (d)), where all frequency vectors on the right hand
side satisfy the conditions in Lemma 2.3 and given that (2.11) holds for the fre-
quency vector of the l-th partition, also it holds for bil+1(d). Figures 2.2-2.4 show the
procedure given that all simplicial points of the 2nd partition satisfy (2.11) and show
how all simplicial points of the 3rd partition can be covered. In each of these figures
bullets represent points that satisfy (already) equation (2.11) and any intersections
of (appropriate) lines through these ”bullet”-points are again simplicial points that
satisfy (2.11).
For the sake of completeness we will spell out the general steps of the illustrated
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procedure.
Let the claim be true for the l-th simplicial partition. For the (l + 1)-th partition
the following procedure will capture all simplicial points qvl+1 for v ≤ nl+1.
f1 f2
f3
q21q
3
1
q11
•
•
•
• •
•
•
• •
•
• •
• •
• •
g
(1,3)
2 (1) g
(2,3)
2 (1)
g
(1,2)
2 (1) g
(2,1)
2 (1)
g
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2 (1) g
(3,2)
2 (1)
Abbildung 1: a
1
f1 f2
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3
1
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•
•
•
• •
•
•
• •
•
• •
• •
• •
g
(1,3)
2 (1) g
(2,3)
2 (1)
g
(1,2)
2 (1) g
(2,1)
2 (1)
g
(3,1)
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(3,2)
2 (1)
•
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•b23(1)
•b
3
3(1)
Abbildung 1: a
1
Figure 2.2: From 2nd to 3rd simplicial partition.
Assume that all simplicial points (bullets) of the 2-nd partition satisfy
already equation (2.11). Here some points are named according to the
notation used in the procedure.
For example take the simplicial points of the 2nd partition that is on
(f 1, f 2) and closest to f 1, i.e. g
(1,2)
2 (1). Analogously, take the clos-
est to f 1 on (f 1, f 3), i.e. g
(1,3)
2 (1). Intersecting (g
(1,2)
2 (1), g
(1,3)
2 (1)) with
(f 1, q21) shows that b
1
3(1) satisfies equation (2.11) as well. Analogously,
this can be shown for bi3(1) (i = 2, 3) using appropriate combinations of
g
(i,j)
2 (1), q
u
1 , f
h for u, h ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Procedure:
(i) For d = 1:
W.l.o.g. take the perspective of f j = f 1 for a j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Given the l-th simplicial
partition, there exist a simplicial point of the (l + 1)-th simplicial partition b1l+1(1),
which is the intersection of the lines (f 1, f 2) and (g
(1,2)
l (1), g
(1,3)
l (1)) (Corresponds
to Figure 2.2 RHS). By the induction assumption these pairs of points satisfy equa-
tion (2.11) and the conditions of the Lemma 2.4. Hence P s
2l+1
(b1l+1) = P2l+1(b
1
l+1),
i.e. b1l+1(1) satisfies equation (2.11). Analogously the same procedure applied to f
j
for j = 2, 3 yields that bjl+1(1) satisfies equation (2.11).
(ii) Draw the line between two elements of {b1l+1(1), b2l+1(1), b3l+1(1)}, w.l.o.g. take
b1l+1(1) and b
3
l+1(1). (Corresponds to Figure 2.3 LHS) The line (b
1
l+1(1), b
3
l+1(1)) in-
tersects for all 0 ≤ z ≤ al (defined in (2.12)) with the lines (g(1,3)l (z), g(2,3)l (z)) (that
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Figure 2.3: From 2nd to 3rd simplicial partition.
a) Using lines (bi3(1), b
j
3(1)) and their intersections with existing lines will
show equation (2.11) for all simplicial points of the 3rd partition that
are on the closest parallel lines to the rim of the simplex.
b) Now, consider the simplicial points of the 2nd partition that are on
the lines (f i, f j) and third closest to f i (note: the second closest are
covered indirectly). For example, take g
(1,2)
2 (3) (third closest to f
1 on
line (f 1, f 2)) and g
(1,3)
2 (3)) (third closest to f
1 on (f 1, f 3)). Intersect-
ing (g
(1,2)
2 (3), g
(1,3)
2 (3)) with (f
1, q21) shows that b
1
3(3) satisfies equation
(2.11) as well. Analogously, this can be shown for bi3(3) (i = 2, 3) using
appropriate combinations of g
(i,j)
2 (3), q
u
1 , f
h for u, h ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
are parallel to the line (f 1, f 2)) and also with all lines (g
(1,2)
l (z), g
(1,3)
l (z)) (that are
parallel to (f 2, f 3)). Lemma 2.4 yields that all simplicial points of the (l + 1)-th
partition that lie on the line (b1l+1(1), b
3
l+1(1)) satisfy equation (2.11).
Analogously, the procedure yields that all simplicial points of the (l + 1)-th parti-
tion that lie on the lines (bil+1(1), b
j
l+1(1)) for all combinations of i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
satisfy equation (2.11), i.e. all points that are on the closest parallel lines to
(f 1, f 2), (f 1, f 3), (f 2, f 3) and in particular, the closest (l + 1)-simplicial points to
f 1, f 2, f 3 on the boundary of conv({f 1, f 2, f 3}).
(iii) Apply the procedure of (i) and (ii) (where d = 1) (Corresponds partially to
Figure 2.3 RHS and 2.4) recursively for d = 2n− 1 > 1 for 2 ≤ n ≤ al+1−1
2
(from f 1-
view).
Derive {b1l+1(d), b2l+1(d), b3l+1(d)} by (i) using fh and (g(i,j)l (d) for i, j, h ∈ {1, 2, 3}
appropriately. Using (ii), we can show that all simplicial points of the (l+1)-th par-
tition that lie on the lines (bil+1(d), b
j
l+1(d)) for all combinations of i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
satisfy equation (2.11).
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Figure 2.4: As before, the next step would be to intersect the lines between
(bi3(1), b
j
3(1)) for any distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and the existing lines. It
shows that all simplicial points of the 3rd partition that are on the third
closest parallel lines to the rim of the simplex satisfy (2.11). This covers
all simplicial points of the 3rd partition.
Observe that for d = 2n with 1 ≤ n ≤ al+1−1
2
the simplicial points of the (l+1)-th par-
tition, which lie on the lines (bil+1(d), b
j
l+1(d)) for all combinations of i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
are already satisfying the equation (2.11) directly, since these lines already are ’used’
for the procedure in the l-th partition and the simplicial points of the (l+ 1)-th par-
tition are just indirectly processed via the intersection steps in (ii).
Step 1.3: Completion to all f ∈ ∆, i.e. for all 2 ≤ T ∈ N and f ∈ ∆T :
PT (f) = P
s
T (f).
Some helpful considerations:
For each f ∈ ∆ there exists a sequence of simplicial triangles of the l-th partition
(qill , q
jl
l , q
hl
l )l∈N (remember q
v
l ∈ ∆2l for all v ≤ nl) for distinct il, jl, hl ≤ nl such that:
(i) f ∈ conv({qill , qjll , qhll }) for all l ∈ N, i.e. there exist βvl ∈ [0, 1] for all v ∈ {il, jl, hl}
such that f = βill q
il
l + β
jl
l q
jl
l + β
hl
l q
hl
l
(ii) For all v ∈ {il, jl, hl} and l ∈ N it holds qvl ∈ ∆βvl Hl , such that Hl (as in Remark
2.2) is the smallest common denominator of all βvl , i.e. there exist z
v
l , such that
βvl =
zvl 2
l
Hl
. Hence, if f is represented by combination of l-th simplicial points, then
f ∈ ∆Hl .
(iii) liml→∞qvl = f for all v ∈ {il, jl, hl}
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Clearly this construction is possible for all f ∈ ∆.
In order to proof that for all f ∈ ∆T : PT (f) = P sT (f) we will show the follow-
ing observations.
(A) liml→∞ ||P sHl(f)− P sHl(qvl )|| = 0 and
(B) liml→∞ ||PHl(f)− PHl(qvl )|| = 0 for all v ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Proof of (A):
By the Learning Axiom and since P sT (f
i) = PT (f
i) for all T ∈ N, we know that for
all i ≤ 3, we have liml→∞P sHl(f i) = P∞(f i) = P i∞.
We want to show for all v ∈ {il, jl, hl}: liml→∞||P sHl(f)− P sHl(qvl )|| = 0.
Let for all r ∈ R, P iT (r) be the r-th component of the probability vector.
For all l, any v ∈ {il, jl, hl} and qvl we have that liml→∞ qvl = f and hence
liml→∞ P
j
maxj qvl (j)Hl
(r) = P jmaxj f(j)Hl(r) holds. This directly implies liml→∞(P
s
Hl
(f)(r)−
P sHl(q
v
l )(r)) = 0 for all r ∈ R and hence the desired result.
Proof of (B):
By Lemma 2.1 we know that PH(f) =
∑3
j=1 λjPmaxi=1,2,3 f(i)H(f
j), where λ ∈ ∆2 is
independent of the length of the database by the Constant Similarity Axiom .
Hence by the Learning Axiom liml→∞PHl(f) = liml→∞
∑3
j=1 λjPmax{i=1,2,3} f(i)Hl(f
j)
exists and hence with the same reasoning as in (A) for P s we get
lim
l→∞
||PHl(qvl )− PHl(f)|| = 0 for all v ∈ {il, jl, hl}
Combining Step (A) and (B) and the triangle inequality yields:
liml→∞||P sHl(f)− P sHl(qvl )− PHl(f) + PHl(qvl )|| ≤ 0
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By Step 1.2 we know that PHl(q
v
l ) = P
s
Hl
(qvl ) for all l, which leads to liml→∞ ||P sHl(f)−
PHl(f)|| = 0 and for all r ∈ R we get:
0 = lim
l→∞
(PHl(f)(r)− P sHl(f)(r))
= liml→∞
( 3∑
j=1
λjPmaxi f(j)Hl(f
j)(r)−
∑
j≤3 sjf(j)P
j
maxj f(j)Hl
(r)∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
)
= lim
l→∞
3∑
j=1
Pmaxi f(j)Hl(f
j)(r)
(
λj − sjf(j)∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
)
=
3∑
j=1
P∞(f j)(r)
(
λj − sjf(j)∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
)
By the Diversity Axiom no three of (P∞(f j))j≤3 are collinear (i.e. also no three of
(P∞(f j)(r))j≤3 are convex combinations for all r), which implies that it must hold
that λj =
sjf(j)∑
j≤3 sjf(j)
for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Therefore, PHl(f) = P sHl(f) for all l and by
Lemma 2.2 PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all T such that f ∈ ∆T . .
Thus, the proof for C = {c1, c2, c3} is concluded.
2.9.7 Step 2: Set of basic cases with |C| = m > 3 many cases
Step 2.1 Defining the similarity weights:
Consider for T ≥ T ∗ and distinct j, k, l ≤ m a triple {P jT , P kT , P lT}
Adopting the considerations of Step 1 in the previous subsection for {j, k, l}, i.e.
f3T :=
∑
i∈{j,k,l} f
i and f i ∈ ∆T we can derive the similarity weights (s{j,k,l}i )i∈{j,k,l}
and the following representation for all f ∈ conv({f j, fk, f l}) ∩∆T :
P
{j,k,l}
T (f) =
∑
i∈{j,k,l} s
{j,k,l}
i f(i)P
{j,k,l}
maxif(i)T
(f i)∑
i∈{j,k,l} s
{j,k,l}f(i)
i
.
Moreover for all i ∈ {j, k, l}, we have P {j,k,l}T (f i) = PT (f i) = P iT and (s{j,k,l}i )i∈{j,k,l}
are unique up to multiplication by a positive number.
Now we want to show that the similarity values s
{j,k,l}
i are independent of the choice
of j, k and l for all i ∈ {j, k, l}. Similar to BGSS we shown it two steps:
1. We show that
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
=
s
{j,k,n}
j
s
{j,k,n}
k
for any n 6= l, i.e. the ratio between two simi-
larity number is independent of the choice of a third case/frequency.
Consider the evaluation of a rational combinations of f j ∈ ∆T and fk ∈ ∆T , i.e.
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for α ∈ Q: f = αf j + (1 − α)fk, where H is the smallest common denominator of
α, (1− α) and hence f ∈ ∆H , w.l.o.g. assume α ≥ (1− α). Then,
P
{j,k,l}
H (f) =
s
{j,k,l}
j αP
j
αH+s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)PkαH
s
{j,k,l}
j α+s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)
and P
{j,k,n}
H (f) =
s
{j,k,n}
j αP
j
αH+s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)PkαH
s
{j,k,n}
j α+s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)
.
Equating these two expressions, we get:
s
{j,k,l}
j α
s
{j,k,l}
j α+s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)
=
s
{j,k,n}
j α
s
{j,k,n}
j α+s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)
and
s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)
s
{j,k,l}
j α+s
{j,k,l}
k (1−α)
=
s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)
s
{j,k,n}
j α+s
{j,k,n}
k (1−α)
,
which leads to
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
=
s
{j,k,n}
j
s
{j,k,n}
k
Denote this ratio by Sj,k :=
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
, which is defined for all distinct j, k ≤ m, since
the similarity numbers are strictly positive.
Further observe that the following holds:
Sj,kSk,lSl,j =
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
s
{j,k,l}
k
s
{j,k,l}
l
s
{j,k,l}
l
s
{j,k,l}
j
= 1 (2.13)
2. Define s1 := 1 and sj = Sj,1 for all j ≤ m.
The aim is to show that for all triple {j, k, l} it holds that s{j,k,l}i = asi for some
a ∈ R+.
If we can show that
s
{j,k,l}
i
s
{j,k,l}
m
= si
sm
for all m 6= i ∈ {j, k, l}, then s{j,k,l}i = sism s
{j,k,l}
m = asi
for all m 6= i ∈ {j, k, l}, e.g. with m = k we have a = s
{j,k,l}
k
sk
and hence s
{j,k,l}
j =
asj, s
{j,k,l}
k =
s
{j,k,l}
k
sk
sk, s
{j,k,l}
l = asl and we have shown the claim.
Hence it suffices to show w.l.o.g. that
s
{j,k,l}
j
s
{j,k,l}
k
=
sj
sk
or equivalent Sj,k =
sj
sk
.
The latter follows directly from (2.13), i.e. 1 = S1,jSj,kSk,1 = 1/sjSj,ksk, hence
Sj,k =
sj
sk
.
The independence of the similarity values s
{j,k,l}
i on {j, k, l} allows to replace the
(unique up to multiplication by a strictly positive number) s
{j,k,l}
i by the just defined
si for all i ≤ m. Based on these (si)i≤m we define as in the consideration in Step 1.1
for all 2 ≤ T ∈ N and any f ∈ ∆T .
P sT (f) :=
∑
i≤m sif(i)P
i
maxif(i)T∑
i≤m sif(i)
As in the subsection before the aim is to show that for all T and any f ∈ ∆T
P sT (f) = PT (f) holds.
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Step 2.2: Completion to all f ∈ ∆
For M ⊆ {1, 2, ....,m}, let ∆MT := ∆T ∩ conv({f j | j ∈ M}) denote the set of all
frequency vectors f ∈ ∆T , which assign zero frequency to all cases (ci)i∈{1,2,...,m}\M .
Lemma 2.5
For every subset M ⊆ {1, 2, ....,m} with |M | = m ≥ 3, PT (f) = P sT (f) holds for
every f ∈ ∆MT .
Proof:
For m = 3 the claim has been shown in Step 1 (or Step 1.3) and serves as the base
case for our induction over m.
Hence we assume now that the claim holds for m ≥ 3 and we prove it for M with
|M | = m+ 1.
(1) Let f ∈ ∆MT such that f ∈ conv({f j}j∈M\l) for some l ∈ M , then by induc-
tion assumption P sT (f) = PT (f).
(2) Now we consider f ∈ int(conv({f l | l ∈M}))
By Remark 2.1 we know that for all i ∈ M and l ∈ M\{i} there exist for all
l 6= i ≤ m some αli ∈ (0, 1) and
∑
l∈M\{i} α
l
i = 1 such that f =
∑
l∈M\{i} α
l
if
l
i (f(i))
with f li (f(i)) ∈ ∆T li and then f ∈ ∆Zl (where T
j
i = α
j
iZi). W.l.o.g. (due to Constant
Similarity Axiom, Lemma 2.2) assume that for all l 6= i ≤ m there exist T li such
that max{f(i), (1− f(i))}T li ≥ T ∗ (to overcome potential collinearity problems). In
the following we abbreviate the corresponding adjusted lengths L(f(i), (T ji )j 6=i∈M)
by Li for all i ∈M .
The maximal anchored Concatenation Axiom induces that PZl(f) lies on the fol-
lowing induced (m+ 1)-many hyper-planes Am+1l (Zl) for all l ∈M , w.l.o.g. assume
that M = {1, 2, ...,m+ 1}:
PZ1(f) ∈ int(conv({PL1(f 21 (f(1))), PL1(f 31 (f(1))), ..., PL1(fm+11 (f(1)))})) =: Am+11 (Z1)
PZ2(f) ∈ int(conv({PL2(f 12 (f(2))), PL2(f 32 (f(2))), ..., PL2(fm+12 (f(2)))})) =: Am+12 (Z2)
∈ · · ··
PZm+1(f) ∈ int(conv({PLm+1(f 1m+1(f(m+ 1))), PLm+1(f 2m+1(f(m+ 1))), .....
....., PLm+1(f
m
m+1(f(m+ 1)))})) =: Am+1m+1(Zm+1)
Since for all l 6= j ≤ m, P sT (f jl (f(l))) = PT (f jl (f(l))) for all T such that f jl (fl) ∈ ∆T ,
we have also P sZl(f) ∈ Am+1l (Zl) for all l ∈M .
For Z = LCM(Z1, ...Zm+1) Lemma 2.2 implies that PZ(f), P
s
Z(f) ∈ Am+1l (Z) for
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all l ∈ M , i.e. PZ(f), P sZ(f) ∈
⋂
l∈M A
m+1
l (Z). By Lemma 2.1 we have that for
all l ∈ M the sets Am+1l (Z) consist of identical (P jmaxl∈Mf(l)Z)j∈M (with (differ-
ent) positive weights after evaluation of PZ(f
j
i (f(i))) = λjP
j
max{f(i),(1−f(i))}Z + (1 −
λj)P
i
max{f(i),(1−f(i))}Z for particular λj ∈ (0, 1)).
This implies that determining
⋂
l∈M A
m+1
l (Z) means solving the (m+ 1)× (m+ 1)
system of linear equations. We know that |⋂l∈M Am+1l (Z)| ≥ 1, since P sZ(f) and
PZ(f) are included in the intersection. The claim of PZ(f) = P
s
Z(f) is proofed if we
can show that
⋂
l∈M A
m+1
l (Z) is a singleton.
We will proof this by contradiction:
Assume that PZ(f) 6= P sZ(f), then the line g := (PZ(f), P sZ(f)) has to be contained
in Am+1l (Z) for all l ∈M . Hence this line g must intersect two of the faces
Hj := conv({(P kmaxi≤m f(i)Z)k∈M\{j}}) (for j ∈M).
W.l.o.g. let these two faces be named Hu, Hv for some distinct u, v ∈ M . But then
for all l ∈ M Am+1l (Z) has to intersect with these two faces Hu, Hv. We will show
that this is not true. Observe that each Am+1l (Z) intersects with all (Hj)j 6=l∈M .
Further, observe that applying the successive intersection, we get for t ≤ m + 1
∩tj=1Am+1j (Z) ∩ {H1, ...Ht} = ∅, which implies that there is no faces Hj for any
j ∈ M that intersects with ∩m+1j=1 Am+1j (Z), i.e. there exist no faces such that all
Am+1l (Z) intersect them.
Hence there cannot exist a line g such that g ∈ Ak+1l (Z) for all l ∈ M , which
implies that there cannot be more than one unique element in the intersection
of all (Am+1l (Z))l, i.e. ∩l∈MAm+1l (Z) = P sZ(f) = PZ(f). By Lemma 2.2 we get
PT (f) = P
s
T (f) for all T such that f ∈ ∆T , which completes the proof of the Theo-
rem 2.3 and hence also Theorem 2.1.

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3 Limited Attention in Case Based
Belief Formation
Abstract
An agent wants to derive her belief over outcomes based on past observations col-
lected in her database (memory). There is well establish evidence in the psychology
and marketing literature that agents consistently fail (or choose not) to process all
available information. An agent might be constraint to pay attention (recall) and
consider only parts of her potentially available information due to unawareness, cog-
nitive or psychological limitations or intentionally for effort-efficiency. Based on this
insight, we axiomatize a two-stage belief formation process in which in a first step
agents filter ((un)intentionally) the available information. In a second step individ-
uals employ the remaining observations to express a belief. We impose cognitively
and normatively desirable properties on the filtering process. The axioms on the
belief formation stage describe the relationship between databases and their induced
beliefs. The axiomatized belief induced by a filtered databases is representable by
a similarity weighted average of the estimations induced by each past attention-
grabbing observation. An appealing application is a satisficing filter that induces
a filtered belief that relies only on past experiences that are sufficiently relevant
for a current problem. For the specific situation that agents (are able to) always
pay attention to all available information, our axiomatization coincides with the
axiomatization of belief formation in Billot et al. (Econometrica, 2005).
3.1 Introduction and motivation
In many situations agents need to evaluate uncertain consequences of their actions.
In order to compare different potential consequences agents need to assign likelihoods
to these outcomes. How can individuals form (probabilistic) beliefs over outcomes?
Traditionally, economic theory models uncertainties in a state space representa-
tion a la Savage (1954) and Bayes and derive a subjective prior based on observable
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actions of an agent. This implicitly requires that an agent already posses a subjec-
tive prior belief, which is expressed by her observable actions. However, the Savage
and Bayesian approach does not help an agent to find or form a prior explicitly, for
instance by incorporating pieces of information directly into a belief formation. In
particular in situations in which an agent might not be able to condense her insuf-
ficient or too complex information into a consistent state space, their normatively
appealing and convincing approach to endogenously derive a belief is not feasible.1
We will consider such an environment and axiomatize a belief formation that
allows to take directly into account the available information. This is strongly related
to the aim of (asymptotic) statistical inference, where from data a distribution
is derived. However, in this chapter we give a behavioral foundation for a belief
formation in ”non-asymptotic environments” that are characterized by heterogenous
and limited information gathered in a list or database.
The impact of data and experience on the formation of a probabilistic belief was
examined initially by the axiomatization of Billot et al. (2005) (BGSS from now
on).2 The axiomatizations of BGSS and related ones of Eichberger and Guerdjikova
(2010) (EG) (for ambiguous multiprior beliefs) and Bleile (2014a) (precision de-
pendent cautious beliefs) yield that a belief induced by a database is a similarity
weighted average of the estimations induced by all observed cases in the database.3
Thereby similarity weights capture different degrees of relevance of the potentially
very heterogenous information.
A common shortcoming of these approaches is that an agent is obliged to take into
consideration and account all past observations in her database. This precludes rea-
sonable situations in which an agent might want to neglect, does miss or just forgets
some pieces of information that would be in principle available. Our work relaxes
this drawback of ”compulsory” paying attention to all obtainable information. For
this purpose we extend the mentioned axiomatic approaches (in particular BGSS)
by adding a component of limited attention or consideration regarding available
information.
A traditional and widely accepted assumption in economic theory is that gaining
more information is beneficial and leads to improved actions. In this way, it is
usually assumed that agents incorporate and take into account all available pieces
of information.4 However, the assumption of full attention and consideration of all
1For more details on the difficulties of the Savage and Bayesian approach, see e.g. Gilboa et al.
(2012) and Chapter 1 and Section 2.1.
2The framework is based on Case based Decision Theory and its application to prediction problems
(Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001, 2003)).
3Basically, the three axiomatizations differ in the way the estimations are made.
4In addition, it is also a key assumption in all traditional revealed preference approaches.
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available information requires that agents are aware of it, perceive it (unbiased) and
eventually are able to process it without any cognitive and psychological constraints.5
The idea and concept of limited attention goes back to the seminal studies in
psychology of Miller (1956), in which he identified limited cognitive abilities in pro-
cessing information as the source for incomplete consideration, especially deficits
and constraints in parallel (simultaneous) processing of information. Since then,
mounting evidence in psychology and marketing shows that agents process and re-
strict attention to only a small fraction of the overall available information and
consistently fail to consider all potentially available information due to their limited
attention span (e.g. Broadbent (1958), Stigler (1961), Pessemier (1978), Hauser and
Wernerfelt (1990), Chiang et al. (1998)). Often agents employ (implicitly) a multi-
stage process to assign different degrees of attention to specific pieces of information
(Bettman (1979)). In an initial rough filtering or screening stage agents pre-selects
these elements that receive (or are worth to capture) full attention and considera-
tion. In the literature this set of ”surviving” elements is called a consideration set
(Wright and Barbour (1977), Bettmann (1979), Roberts and Lattin (1991)).
A formation of a consideration set might emerge for many reasons. Cognitive
constraints in parallel processing of information and unawareness of the presence of
information (due to complexity, size, sequential processing or search) might cause
an unintentional filtering (Miller (1956), Nedungadi (1990), Schwartz (2004)). The
formation of a consideration sets as a (unintentionally) reply to avoid cognitive
overload has been also studied in economic problems, e.g. recently Masatlioglu et
al. (2012) axiomatized choices under (unintentional) limited attention.
In contrast, a consideration set can also be the result of a purposeful strategic
elimination process. Agents often use (heuristic) filtering procedures to screen in-
formation rapidly and roughly before engaging into a costly and detailed evaluation
(e.g. Wright and Barbour (1977), Gensch (1987), Nedungadi (1990), Gigerenzer et
al. (1999), Hauser (2013)). Usually, these heuristics are noncompensatory cutoff
or satisficing rules that allow for an uncomplicated ”effort-efficient” comparison.
This approach has recently gained prominence in economics (in particular in deci-
sion theory), e.g. through the works of Lleras et al. (2010) and Eliaz and Spiegler
(2011a,b).
Another reason for the emergence of a consideration set relies on mounting evi-
dence from psychology showing that often non-objective criteria like value systems,
5According to Simon (1959, p.272) perception and cognition intervene between subjective view
and the objective real world. In this context perception is often referred to as a ”filter”, where
filtering can not only be seen as a passive, but also as an active selection process involving
exclusion of almost all that is not within the scope of attention.
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subjective motives or aversions, etc. restrict the attention of agents. Recent work
has modeled these subjective and psychological biases ranging from overwhelming
temptation (Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Dekel and Lipman (2012)), rationalization
(Cherepanov et al. (2013)), status quo bias (Masatlioglu and Ok (2005)), routes
(Apesteguia and Ballester (2013)) and reason based choice (Lombardi (2009), De
Clippel and Eliaz (2012)).
In this chapter, we want to incorporate the formation of a consideration set in-
duced by limited attention (consideration) as an intermediate stage into a belief
formation process. In this way, our agent is not obliged to take into account all po-
tentially available information, but might base her belief only on (survived) filtered
information in the consideration set. In order to illustrate the basic idea and plau-
sibility of such a two stage belief formation process we modify the doctor example
of BGSS.
A doctor needs to evaluate different outcomes of a treatment. She has some
working experience or access to some medical database D = (c1, ..., cl), where she
recorded in a case ci = (xi, ri) the vector of characteristic of a patient i, xi ∈ X (e.g.
age, gender, weight, blood count) and the observable outcome of the treatment
ri ∈ R (e.g. better, worse, adverse effects). A new patient characterized by x
enters her office and using a medical record D, the doctor wants to derive a belief
Px(D) ∈ ∆(R) over potential outcomes in R. She might apply an empirical frequency
and use only a part Dx of the database D, which contains only cases c = (x, rc) of
patients with ”identical” characteristic x compared to the current patient:
”Frequentist”: Px(D) =
∑
c∈Dx δrc
|Dx| .
However, if the database contains not sufficiently many of these ”identical” patients
x, she might want to include also ”similar” patients. She judges the degree of
similarity between patients x and x′ by s(x, x′) ∈ R+. Further, she might induce
from a case c = (xc, rc) not only a point estimate δrc on the realized outcome, but
derives a more general estimate P c ∈ ∆(R) on likelihoods of particular (related)
outcomes and forms the belief as axiomatized in BGSS by:
”BGSS-belief”: Px(D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, xc)P
c∑
c∈D s(x, xc)
. (3.1)
However, if the database D is long, complex or retrieved partly from her memory, the
doctor might not want or is just not able to (recall) pay attention to and take into
account all potential cases (patients) in the database D. She filters out some patients
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contained in her record D with specific features Γ(D) ⊆ D. An intuitive example is
a similarity satisficing procedure, in which she considers only sufficiently relevant
patients that surpass a threshold of similarity s∗, i.e. Γ(D) = (c ∈ D|s(x, xc) ≥ s∗):
”Filtered-belief”: (Px ◦ Γ)(D) =
∑
c∈D 1{s(x,xc)≥s∗}(c)s(x, xc)P
c∑
c∈D 1{s(x,xc)≥s∗}(c)s(x, xc)
(3.2)
The filtered belief formation based on the similarity satisficing principle (under addi-
tional restrictions on the threshold value s∗) represents a special case of the general
result we obtain in our representation theorem in Section 3.5.
Roughly, our filtered belief formation consist of two stages, in which initially a
subjective (specific) filter process ”selects” the information that builds the consid-
eration set. In the second step, the agent forms her belief based on the remaining
un-eliminated information in her consideration set.
One might be tempted to interpret such a filtered belief as the belief (3.1) of BGSS,
based on an already (exogenously) ex-ante and independently filtered database
Γ(D). However, such an separation of filtering and belief formation would exclude
plausible and appealing filters based on similarities (as in (3.2)), since the similarity
values are endogenously derived in the belief formation. Moreover, in our axiomati-
zation both stages are merged by an axiom that focusses on the relationship between
filtered databases and their induced beliefs.
The initial filtering process captures appealing and desirable psychological prop-
erties that are rooted in psychology and marketing literature. The main property
is the well known and accepted consideration property. It is based on the idea and
evidence that if a case is considered in a database, i.e. is attention grabbing, then it
should attract attention also in all of its subdatabases, since it faces less competition
for attention by fewer pieces of information.6 Further, we make some assumptions
on the cognitive ability of agents and assume that an agent is able to pay attention
to at least k (k ≥ 3)-many available different pieces of information. A slightly more
demanding characteristics requires that order and frequency in which information
appears in a databases does not affect the level of attention an agent attributes to
it. Basically that means that pieces of information are per se attention grabbing
and not due to their specific position or a sufficiently high number of appearance.
The second layer of a filtered belief formation concerns the axiomatization on
the belief level. The normatively reasonable axioms follow the basic intuition of
the axioms in BGSS, but are modified to capture the previous filtering stage. We
6This property is also implied by the appealing axiomatic rationalization theory of Cherepanov
et al. (2013) (based on specific kinds of rationales).
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generalize the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS in order to capture the previous fil-
tering process on the involved databases. The original Concatenation Axiom says
that a belief induced by a combination of two databases is formed as an average
of the beliefs that are induced by each of these databases separately. We cannot
directly translate this to filtered database, since concatenations of already filtered
databases can differ enormously from the result of filtering the concatenation of the
two underlying databases (before they were filtered).7 Thus, in order to ensure a
reasonable averaging of the induced beliefs in the spirit of the axiom, we require
consistent relationships between the involved filtered databases. Another (implicit
enforced) axiom ensures that the order in which information appears is irrelevant
for the belief it induces.
As a result, our filtered belief formation can be represented as a similarity weighted
average of the estimates induced by each case that the agent actually pays attention
to, i.e. of those that survive the filtering. Hence the representation coincides with
BGSS if the agent does not filter any information, but takes into account always all
available information.
Apart from the appealing intuition of filtering according to similarities (as in
(3.2)), the filtering process can be any general arbitrary process that satisfies the
required properties. Various subjective and psychological motives, constraints, bi-
ases and justifications can be employed as elimination criteria.8 In particular, many
recently developed multi-criteria decision procedures include elimination procedures
to (implicitly) form a consideration set. The literature varies in the kind of criteria
that are employed, e.g. using (compositions of) rationale(s) (sequentially) to elim-
inate alternatives (Manzini and Mariotti (2007, 2012a), Apesteguia and Ballester
(2013), Houy (2007, 2010), Houy and Tadenuma (2009), Horan (2013)), focusing
only on subjectively justifiable alternatives (Cherepanov et al. (2013), Gerasi-
mou (2013)), considering only alternatives belonging to un-dominated or best cat-
egory(ies) (Manzini and Mariotti (2012b)) or considering only top N eye-catching
elements according to some exogenously given order or ranking (Salant and Rubin-
stein (2008)). Most of these approaches form consideration set in a way that can
be interpreted as seeking for a reasons to select (based on Shafir et al. (1993) and
Tversky (1972) and more related also in Lombardi (2009) and de Clippel and Eliaz
(2012)).
Another approach to form a consideration set can be seen in a satisficing procedure
7This is unproblematic for unfiltered databases, where the result of their combinations is directly
clear.
8For instance salience, familiarity, ”roughly” identical features, heuristics, fairness, extremeness
aversion, limited memory, reference effects, etc.
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(Simon (1959) and more related Tyson (2008, 2013), Papi (2012), Manzini et al.
(2013a)). The resulting consideration set contains only these elements which surpass
a (endogenously) given threshold level according to some criteria. This is close to
our motivating similarity satisficing example in (3.2).
However, for our purpose the most interesting paper is the axiomatic rationaliza-
tion theory of Cherepanov et al. (2013), since our assumed consideration property
(of the filter) is a direct consequence of their normatively and descriptively appeal-
ing rationalization process. Modifying their justification procedure in order to cope
with our other filter properties yields a corollary of our main representation result
that allows for an interpretation in terms of a ”rationalized” filtered belief.
The next section gives the general framework for the two stage filtered belief
formation. In Section 3.3 we introduce and discuss the properties on the filtering
process. Section 3.4 deals with the axioms on the belief formation induced by a
filtered database. The main representation theorem and a sketch of the proof is
presented in Section 3.5 and we derive as a corollary the similarity satisficing belief
process. Section 3.6 relates the filtering process to the recently developed multi-
criteria/stage decision procedures. In particular we exemplarily modify the choice
model of Cherepanov et al. (2013) to a filter process in our terms. An interpretation
of the resulting representation in terms of multi-similarities is given. Section 3.7
concludes. All proofs can be found in the last section.
3.2 The model
In this section, we introduce the case-based information framework and the basic
building blocks of our belief formation based on filtered information. Further, we
introduce some definitions and notations necessary for our approach.
3.2.1 Database framework
A basic case c = (x, r) consists of a description of the environment or problem
x ∈ X and an outcome r ∈ R, where X = X1 ×X2 × ....×XN is a finite set of all
characteristics of the environment, in which Xj denotes the set of possible values
features j can take. R denotes a finite set of potential outcomes, R = {r1, ..., rn}
The ordered set C ⊆ X ×R consists of all m ≥ 3 basic cases, i.e. C = {c1, ..., cm}.
A database D is a sequence or list of basic cases c ∈ C. The set of databases D
consisting of L cases, i.e. D = (c1, ..., cL) where ci ∈ C for all i ≤ L, is denoted
by CL and the set of all databases by C∗ = ∪L≥1CL, including the empty database
∅. The description of databases as sequence of potentially identical cases allows
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multiple observation of an identical case to be taken into account and treated as an
additional source of information.
For a database D ∈ C∗, fD(c) denotes the relative frequency of case c ∈ C in
databases D.
The concatenation of two databasesD = (c1, c2, ..., cL) ∈ CL andE = (c′1, c′2, ..., c′T ) ∈
CT (where ci, c
′
j ∈ C for all i ≤ L, j ≤ T ) is denoted by D◦E ∈ CL+T and is defined
by D ◦ E := (c1, c2, ..., cL, c′1, c′2, ..., c′T ).
In the following we will abbreviate the concatenation or replication of L-times the
identical databases D by DL. Specifically, cL represents a database consisting of
L-times case c.
For any D ∈ C∗ the diversity of a database D is given by div(D) := |{D}|, where
as usual {D} denotes the set of different cases contained in database D. So div(D)
gives the number of different cases contained in database D.
We need to translate some relations from sets to the list framework.
Definition 3.1
(i) The ∈-relation on databases is defined by c ∈ D if fD(c) > 0.
(ii) The ⊆-relation on the set of databases C∗ is defined by D ⊆ E ⇔ fD(c)|D| ≤
fE(c)|E| for all c ∈ C. We will call such databases to be nested.
(iii) The ∩-relation on databases is given by D ∩ E = ((cmin{fD(c)|D|,fE(c)|E|})c∈C)
(iv) Two databases D and E are disjoint if for all c ∈ C: c ∈ D if and only if c 6∈ E.
The definitions are basically independent of the order of cases in the databases.
Note however that the definition of ∩-relation in (iii) is very specific, since the order
of C is transferred, i.e. by intersection a specific order (on C) is induced.9
3.2.2 Filter
In the literature so far, a filter on C∗ is usually defined as a set function Γ : C∗ → C∗,
such that for all E ∈ C∗ ∅ 6= Γ(E) ⊆ E. In this way, implicitly the information E
is filtered from the perspective of the available information E. However, it does not
cover and specify how any subdatabase D of E is filtered, while knowing database
E. In particular a case c in subdatabase D might attract attention in D if the
agent does not take into account the additional information in E. But she might
not pay attention to this case when having the larger database E in mind (and
its relevant cases). Thus, the underlying perspective from which a filtering occurs
might affect the assigned attention (see Section 3.3.1 for further discussion). Our
9In contrast to intersections of sets, where orderings are immaterial, intersection of databases do
require some assumption on resulting orderings.
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filter determines as well, how any subdatabase D of E is filtered from the perspective
of E. Formally, a function Γ : X × C∗ × C∗ → C∗ such that for all x ∈ X and
D ⊆ E ∈ C∗, Γ(x,D,E) := ΓE(x,D) ⊆ D is called a filter on (sub)database D
induced by (perspective) database E and given a problem x. We use the notation
ΓE(x,D) to highlight the roles of the two database. Basically the (sub)database D
is screened from the perspective of (or having in mind) the richer information E.
3.2.3 Induced belief
For a finite set S, ∆(S) denotes the simplex of probability vectors over S and for
n ∈ N ∆n denotes the simplex over the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
In the axiomatizations of BGSS, EG and Bleile (2014a) (or Chapter 2), an agent
will form a belief over outcomes P (x,D) ∈ ∆(R) for a certain problem charac-
terized by x ∈ X using her information captured in a database D ∈ C∗, i.e.
P : X × C∗ → ∆(R).
In the current approach a filtered belief is formed based only on parts of the in-
formation captured in D and that is filtered from the perspective of richer in-
formation E ∈ C∗, i.e. filtered belief (P ◦ Γ) : X × C∗ × C∗ → ∆(R) and
(P ◦Γ)(x,D,E) = (P ◦ΓE)(x,D) for D ⊆ E (with slight abuse of notation). In this
sense the filtered belief (P ◦ΓE)(x,D) is induced by a nested pair of databases D and
E and can be interpreted as the belief over outcomes induced by database D ∈ C∗
seen through a filter that rests on perspective E (given problem x ∈ X). Hence, a
filtered belief is a two stage process of filtering followed by a belief formation.
Technically, the filtered belief induced by the pair of nested databases D and E co-
incides with the BGSS belief based on an a priori already filtered database ΓE(D).10
However, as discussed in the introduction, a priori filtering would separate the filter
procedure and the belief formation process that would exclude desirable applications
based on endogenously derived similarity values, like the similar satisficing behavior
(as discussed in our motivating example (equation (3.2)). Further, the nice axioma-
tization of BGSS based on relationships between filtered database and their induced
beliefs would need to be defined on filtered databases as well, which merges both
stages again. However, for our motivation and purpose the most intuitive (and de-
sirable) filtered belief formation is based on a single database, i.e. the filtered belief
(P ◦ Γ)(x,D,D) induced by database D.
Throughout the paper the problem x is fixed, therefore x is often suppressed in
the following, i.e. (P ◦ ΓE)(x,D) = (P ◦ ΓE)(D).
10Basically meaning that (P ◦ ΓE)(D) = P (ΓE(D)).
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3.3 Filter definition and properties
Instead of defining explicitly a procedure how to filter information we are more gen-
eral and rather impose natural, well accepted and established properties in psychol-
ogy and marketing. These properties are normatively and descriptively compelling
in several situations and are indeed true for many heuristics people actually use
in real life to screen their ”information set”. In particular many of the recently
developed multistage decision models contain a wide variety of (endogenous and
exogenous) filter procedures that satisfy our filter properties, which supports their
relevance and generality (see Section 3.6). In this sense, we can also interpret our
filter as a choice correspondence in which elements surviving the pre-choice process
form a consideration set of acceptable and relevant information. This (filtered) con-
sideration set represents the underlying basis for a filtered belief formation process.
3.3.1 Basic properties of a filter
In the last section, we mentioned briefly our concept of a filter. More precisely:
Definition 3.2 Filter
A set function Γ : C∗×C∗ → C∗ is called a filter on D induced by (perspective)
database E if for all D,E ∈ C∗ such that D ⊆ E ∈ C∗ it holds
(i) Γ(E,E) =: ΓE(E) =: Γ(E) 6= ∅ and
(ii) Γ(D,E) =: ΓE(D) = Γ(E) ∩D.
Note that by definition ΓE(D) ⊆ D holds for all D ⊆ E, but it does not imply that
ΓE(D) 6= ∅.
As mentioned already, the traditional definition of a filter is based only on one
database, i.e. ∅ 6= Γ(D) ⊆ D, which is covered as well by our definition for D = E.
However, our definition also specifies how all subdatabases D of a given database E
are filtered. The knowledge of a database E affects the evaluation of the relevance of
cases in the subdatabase D, since the ”attractiveness” of pieces of information might
vary strongly with different perspectives, available information or knowledge. Basi-
cally, the aim is to capture that a case c ∈ D∩E may attract attention in database
D, but not in database E, i.e. ΓD(c) = c, but ΓE(c) = ∅. Thus, the perspec-
tive from which filtering occurs is an important characteristic to determine whether
some piece of information survives a filtering process or not. Our definition requires
a consistent filtering of parts of the available information, i.e. knowing database E,
an agent should pay only attention to those cases in a (smaller) subdatabase D that
(already) captured attention in the richer database E.
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We will discuss the three properties the definition proposes, namely the filtering,
its specific content and induced ordering.
There are many reasons, why an agent demonstrates partial attention to available
information. Cognitive limitations and constraints in parallel processing of complex
and large information sets is often associated with an unconsciously allocation of
attentional resources (Anderson (2005) pp.72-105). This kind of cognitive unaware-
ness can lead to a formation of a consideration sets as well as an intentional heuristic
elimination procedure in order to explicitly simplify the information set in a cost or
effort efficient way, while still keeping the most relevant information. In addition,
consideration sets are often constructed unrelated to the objective features of the
elements in their information sets, e.g. subjective constraints, like motives, mood,
rationales, value systems, biases, attitudes might affect acceptability, attractiveness
or moral justification of an object and affects its assigned attention level. In sum,
filtering a set of available information is a natural and plausible behavior under
many circumstances and for many reasons.
The nested perspective-structure in our definition of the induced filter, i.e. ΓE(D) =
Γ(E)∩D for D ⊆ E, states that a subdatabase D is filtered from the perspective of
a database E. In this specific form an agent already processed and filtered out the
information in E (resulting in Γ(E)) that she deems relevant, wants to consider or
is able to pay attention to. Since an agent actually needs to process and screen only
information in a subdatabase D, she will pay attention to all elements in D that
already grabbed her attention and are still in her mind, i.e. Γ(E) ∩ D. Basically
D is not filtered independently but compared with the information that is atten-
tion grabbing in E. Put differently, D is filtered through E- colored glasses and not
by inspecting elements in D in detail. However, it is important to stress that this
definition applies only to situation in which both databases are processed ”simul-
taneously”. If databases are processed independently, such an interwoven filtering
(from the perspective of one) is not feasible or desirable. In particular, in the follow-
ing we will introduce a (consideration) property which specifies how independently
filtered nested databases are related.
Finally, we are concerned with the ordering of the resulting filtered database,
which stems from the definition of the intersection and the ordering on C. Of course,
it is restrictive to assume ad hoc a specific arbitrary ordering of a resulting filtered
database, since amongst other things this may depend on orders of D or/and E.
However, in course of the axiomatization of a belief formation, we would adopt the
Invariance Axiom of BGSS, which states that only the content and not the ordering
of cases is important for an induced belief. From that perspective any reordering of
83
3 Limited Attention in Case Based Belief Formation
a resulting filtered database would lead to the same induced belief, which leaves the
definition and its induced ordering rather harmless.
Moreover, the implied ΓE(D) = ΓE(pi(D)) for all D ⊆ E and any reordered database
pi(D) will be further generalized by the following property.
Definition 3.3 Filter order invariance
For all L ∈ N and D ∈ CL and any permutation pi on {1, .., L}, let D = (c1, .., cL)
and pi(D) = (cpi(1), ..., cpi(L)). A filter Γ is order invariant if it holds that
c ∈ Γ(D) if and only if c ∈ Γ(pi(D)).11
Basically it states (in close relationship to BGSS Invariance Axiom for beliefs) that
the order of the cases is immaterial for the resulting filtering of the cases, i.e. only
the content of a database matters. Information should be attention grabbing per se
and not due to its specific position in the database. From a first sight the property
seems to be rather restrictive since agents appear to be able to consider all cases in
the database ”simultaneously” without any order biases, like first impressions and
recency effect (see Rubinstein and Salant (2006)). However, if some of these effects
are important, then they can be captured by a more elaborated description of the
cases. For example, its description can include time or the order in which it was
observed.
The filter order Invariance implies that in combination with the definition of inter-
sections of databases
ΓE(D) = Γpi
′(E)(pi(D)) for all D ⊆ E and any reordered databases pi(D) ⊆ pi′(E),(3.3)
It will imply the identity of beliefs induced by all possible combinations of reordered
databases pi(D) and pi′(E) that enter the filtering process.
A closely related property states and ensures quite naturally that if a case catches
attention then all other cases of this type are attention grabbing as well.
Definition 3.4 Equal treatment of information
A filter Γ on C∗ × C∗ treats information equally if for all c ∈ D
ΓD(c) = c if and only if ΓD(cT ) = cT for all T such that cT ∈ D.
Basically, this means that all pieces of the same type are treated equally and either
are attention grabbing or not.
11Note that independent of the filter definition, the property would just enforce that the content
is identical. Only in combination with our definition of a filter the ordering coincide, i.e.
Γ(D) = Γ(pi(D)) is implied.
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Another content dependent property is similarly based on the view that attention
or disregard is structural in a way that per se either a piece of information is eye-
catching or attention grabbing or not. Namely, the filtering process is not affected
by an (sufficiently large) amount of occurrence of a piece of information.
Definition 3.5 Filter ignorance of repeated information
A filter Γ satisfies the ignorance property if for all D ∈ C∗ it holds:
Γ(D ◦ c) ∩D = Γ(D) for all c ∈ D.12
A repeated appearance of a case does not influence its perception in the sense that
a case attracts attention if it is relevant or outstanding in itself and not because
itself or another case appears in a specific amount. The assignment of attention to
a case might be altered only if another new case appears or all appearances of a
specific case are removed from the database (as induced by the consideration filter
property defined below). In this sense, additional observation of already known and
evaluated cases do not alter (already attached) attention levels.
The property finds support in Gul et al. (2012), which examines the probabilities
of choices when alternatives are duplicated. They propose, that duplicate alterna-
tives should be identified as observational identically and should be (in a specific
sense) irrelevant for the likelihoods with which an observational identical alterna-
tive is chosen. This can be related to a ”pay attention”- choice in which we restrict
the probabilities to pay attention to zero or one. However, duplication of evidence
might affect the composition of a filtered consideration set in the list-framework of
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) and hence violate our property (and their partition
independence property). Of course, the number of times an element appears might
have an influence on attention, for instance in a procedure that pays attention only
to the most frequent element.
3.3.2 Main structural properties of a filter
The two following structural properties characterize the impact of nested databases
on their induced filtered consideration set and the cognitive ability of an agent to
process and pay attention to at least a minimum amount of available information.
12This is equivalent to: for all D ⊆ E and all c ∈ E, ΓE◦c(D) = ΓE(D).
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Consideration property
The consideration property specifies the relationship between the induced consider-
ation sets of nested databases in a quiet naturally way. It states that if an agent
pays attention to a case in a database, then also her attention is drawn to this case
in all of its subdatabases. This follows the idea and evidence that elements in an
information set compete for attention and need to outperform other pieces of infor-
mation to be considered. If a case manages to attract attention or is salient enough
in a database, then it also gains attention in a subdatabase, in which some of its
rivals for attention are not anymore present. The classical example in marketing
deals with the attention an agent assigns to products in a supermarket with a huge
variety compared to a small neighborhood store. A specific jam catching your eye
standing in front of a large supermarket shelf with fifty different jams will catch
your attention also in the convenience store selling only five different sorts of jam.
Definition 3.6 Consideration property
A filter Γ on C∗×C∗ satisfies the consideration property if for all D ⊆ E ∈ C∗
and c ∈ D: c ∈ Γ(E) implies c ∈ Γ(D).
From another point of view, if there is no reason (e.g. an (outstanding) piece of
information) in the larger sample E that shadows case c, i.e. c ∈ Γ(E), then it still
cannot happen that case c is shadowed by any reason (e.g. any information) in the
smaller subdatabase.
Apart from the ”competition for attention”-explanation the consideration prop-
erty can be motivated by the finding that with increasing complexity and size of
a set agents reduce the amount of alternatives they consider and also lower its in-
tensity and seriousness.13 If the complexity of a database is caused by a difficult
detailed evaluation of alternatives involving compromising and tradeoffs, an agent
might find it much harder to find reasons why to ”choose” to consider a case. As
a consequence agents might stick to only superficial analysis, where only the very
important, salient or extraordinary alternatives receive attention. With decreasing
complexity of a set agents might return to a more detailed analysis that facilitates
the selection of more alternatives to be worth or justified to be included into the
consideration set.
13See e.g. Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) and Shugan (1980).
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Minimal attention span
The following property describes the cognitive ability of an agent to handle and
process information. Our minimal attention property requires that an agent consid-
ers in full detail at least k-many (k ≥ 3) available different pieces of information.
More precisely, for all databases containing less than k many different information
an agent takes into account all pieces of information. For more complex databases
an agent is free to apply filtering techniques to process her information and neglects
some pieces of information, as long as she pays attention to at least k-many different
pieces of information.
Definition 3.7 Minimal attention span
A filter is minimal attentive with k ≥ 3 if for all D ∈ C∗ such that
(i) for div(D) = l ≤ k it holds div(Γ(D)) = l and
(ii) for div(D) > k it holds div(Γ(D)) ≥ k.
From this perspective, the property induces that agents are cognitively sophisticated
enough to handle at least k-many different pieces of information completely and
with full attention. Also, agents might want to gather a certain minimal amount of
information in order to evaluate and act in an informed and confident way. Thus
they take into account all available information, when only few (less than k different)
information is around.14
The property combines basically two components -minimum required amount of
information and filtering in case of potential information overload - which are well
supported by empirical findings. We state it in terms of a general minimal attention
span k, but for our purpose k = 3 is sufficient and also meets empirical evidence.
For example Gensch (1987) found that screening and filtering rules may be invoked
for as few as four alternatives, but agents consider and rely on all information for
less diverse information sets. In the marketing literature Jarvis and Wilcox (1977)
examined the usual size of consideration sets and discovered that the average size
of consideration sets is three to eight products, independent of the size of the initial
information.15
So far a minimal attention property is usually not assumed in the (choice) liter-
ature in which usually no lower limit is given for the filtering stage unless a non-
emptiness condition. In a special case of Lleras et al. (2010) agents have no limited
14One can also think about it as in Simon (1959, p.263) based on an aspiration or satisfaction
level such that at least k cases are attracting interest or attention. If not, the level was too
high and a reduction of the level leads to some search behavior of the agent to pay attention
to more available alternatives.
15Miller’ s insight (1956) that agents can process or remember at least seven case is also covered.
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attention problem for situations of binary alternative set, i.e. their agents are always
able to pay attention to both alternatives.16 However, their version does not cover
any restrictions for more general situations, as specified in our property.
The requirement of filtering a minimum amount of information constitutes a
strong constraint to identify filters as choice correspondences. We will discuss this
problematic issue in Section 3.6, where we interpret filtering in a choice theoretic
perspective.
Definition 3.8 Admissible Filter
A filter Γ on C∗×C∗ is called an admissible filter if it satisfies the invariance, equal
treatment, ignorance, consideration and minimal attention span property.
3.4 Axioms on level of belief formation
In this section we introduce the axioms on the stage of belief formation.
As mentioned in the section before, a natural axiom for a belief process that is al-
ready implied by the definition of intersections and the filter properties, is a version
of an Invariance Axiom as in BGSS for filtered databases that reads:
Filtered Invariance Axiom (already implied)
For every T ≥ 1, every database D,E ∈ C∗ with D ⊆ E. Let ΓE(D) = (c1, .., cT ) ∈
CT and for every permutation pi : {1, ..., T} → {1, ..., T} and any filter ΓE(D), where
pi(ΓE(D)) = (cpi(1), ..., cpi(T )) the following holds:
(P ◦ ΓE)(D) = (P ◦ pi(ΓE))(D)
Basically it says that an induced belief over outcomes depends only on the content
of a filtered database and is insensitive to the sequence and order in which data
arrives. However, by our definitions of a filter any filtered databases containing
the same content have exactly the same specific ordering (according to the order
on C), which makes the invariance property superfluous, since re-orderings do not
occur after filtering (see eq. (3.3)). In this sense the filtered Invariance Axiom is
substituted by the definition of a filter and the filter ignorance property.17
16See also Masatlioglu et al. (2012), where Γ(D) ≥ 2 allows the full revelation of preferences
17We would have required the axiom directly if our filtering process would have allowed for dif-
ferent orderings of databases consisting of the same content. Technically speaking, there is no
difference between restricting the filtering process to specific orders or allowing for different
orderings and requiring an Invariance Axiom for beliefs.
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Per se the invariance property does not allow for different impacts whether a
case appears earlier or later. However, the order in which information is provided
or obtained can influence the judgment strongly and may carry information by it-
self. One way to cope with these order effects is to describe the cases informative
enough. E.g. if one wants to capture the position or time of occurrence of a case in
the filtered database, one could implement this information into the description of
the cases itself. Put differently, if one challenges the consequences of an invariance
property, then there must be some criteria which distinguish the cases. Taking into
account these differences explicitly in the description of the cases may lead the agent
to reconcile with such an invariance.
Filtered Concatenation Axiom
Let Γ be a filter. For all database D,E, F ∈ C∗ such that D ◦ E ⊆ F there exists
λ ∈ [0, 1] such that:
(P ◦ ΓF )(D ◦ E) = λ(P ◦ ΓF )(D) + (1− λ)(P ◦ ΓF )(E)
where λ = 0 if and only if ΓF (D) = ∅.
In the following we will call the database which emerges from concatenation of other
databases as the combined or concatenated database, whereas the databases
used for the concatenation will be called combining or concatenating databases.
The filtered Concatenation Axiom says that a filtered belief induced by a con-
catenated database is a weighted average of the filtered beliefs induced by their
respective combining databases. The axiom captures the idea that the belief based
on the combination of two databases cannot lie outside the interval spanned by
the beliefs induced by each combining database separately. Intuitively it can be
interpreted in the following way (stated from an exclusion point of view): if the
information in any database induces an agent’s belief not to exclude an outcome r,
then the outcome r cannot be excluded by the belief induced by the combination
of all these databases.18 Alternatively, if a certain conclusion is reached given two
filtered databases, the same conclusion should be reached given their filtered union.
However, in order to sustain the normative appealing interpretation of averag-
ing (filtered) beliefs, the filtered concatenation of two databases must coincide with
18Of course the axiom is stronger in the sense that it not only requires that the probability of
such an r is positive, but it should lie between the minimal and maximal assigned probabilities
induced by the combining (filtered) databases.
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the concatenation of these two filtered databases. This is achieved by employing
the common perspective F ⊇ D ◦ E according to which all involved databases are
filtered, i.e. ΓF . Otherwise it would not be in general reasonable to require the exis-
tence of such an average of beliefs, since the elements surviving the filtering process
for each single database might differ from the elements surviving the elimination of
the database generated by the combination of the two.19 In this situation, it would
be implausible and unreasonable to determine a relationship between the induced
filtered beliefs. The required structure ensures that a filtered belief induced by the
concatenated database relies on information that is also employed in the filtered be-
liefs induced by the single concatenating databases and thus allows for an interwoven
filtering and belief formation.
Moreover, another important reason for requiring this specific common perspec-
tive is based on the motivation that an agent should filter from the perspective of
the richest information available, which is at least the concatenated database D ◦E,
i.e. F ⊇ D ◦ E. This is very reasonable and natural, since the agent processed
already at least the information in the concatenated database due to the fact that
she actually wants to form a (filtered) belief based on this filtered database. In this
way she cannot remove (intentionally) some (gained or experienced) information for
filtering the concatenating database from a less informative perspective.20 In this
way, the concatenated databases represent a quite natural choice as a ”smallest”
perspective from which the filtering process is initiated.
Collinearity Axiom
No three elements of {((P ◦ Γc)(c))c∈C} are collinear.
Technically speaking this axiom allows to derive a unique similarity function (in
combination with the other axioms), but it has also some reasonable intuition.
Roughly it states that the estimation based on a case is never equivalent to the
combined estimations based on two other cases. Hence, a case is always informative
in the sense that no combination of two other cases can deliver the same estimate
and would make this case ”redundant”.
19In an unfiltered concatenated database any information appear in either of their (unfiltered)
concatenating databases and find weight in their induced beliefs. However, for filtered databases
(P ◦ΓD◦E)(D ◦E) = λ(P ◦ΓD)(D) + (1−λ)(P ◦ΓE)(E) is meaningless, since the relationships
between Γ(D ◦ E) and the parts Γ(D) and Γ(E) are unclear.
20This is even impossible if the filtering occurs unconsciously, since the information entered already
her mind by the nature of the task.
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3.5 Representation Theorem
Theorem 3.1
Let there be given a function (P ◦ Γ) : C∗ × C∗ → ∆(R), where P : C∗ → ∆(R)
and Γ be an admissible filter on C∗×C∗. Let (P ◦ Γ) : C∗×C∗ → ∆(R) satisfy the
Collinearity Axiom.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) The function (P ◦ Γ) satisfies the filtered Concatenation Axiom
(ii) There exists for each c ∈ C a unique P c ∈ ∆(R), and a unique -up to multipli-
cation by a strictly positive number- strictly positive function s : C → R+, such that
for all D ⊆ E ∈ C∗ such that ΓE(D) 6= ∅
(P ◦ ΓE)(D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)P
c∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)
. (3.4)
Rough sketch of the proof
The necessity part is straightforward calculation. The sufficiency part follows the
rough structure of the proof of BGSS and Bleile (2014a) (or Chapter 2), but differs
in the crucial arguments. The idea is to transform the framework from the space of
databases to the space of frequency vectors that is structural more tractable, i.e. the
filtered belief based on databases (P ◦ ΓE)(D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)P
c∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)
for D ⊆ E ∈ C∗
translates to frequency vectors fD ⊆ fE by (P ◦ ΓfE)(fD) =
∑
j≤m sjΓ
fE
j (fD)P
j∑
j≤m sjΓ
fE
j (fD)
. In
order to show that this is viable we exploit some properties of the filter and the
Concatenation Axiom.
The essential part of the proof is to derive the similarity weights (si)i≤m. This will
be shown inductively over |C| = m and div(fE) ≤ m.
Step 1: Base case for the induction, i.e. |C| = m = 3 and div(fE) ≤ 3, w.l.o.g.
C = {c1, c2, c3}, i.e. aim to find s1, s2, s3.
For pairs (fD, fE) ∈ ∆ ×∆ (i.e. such that div(fE) ≤ 3) the properties of the filter
(in particular the minimal attention span) induce that the filtering stage disappears
and the axioms coincide with BGSS. Thus, the same steps (using simplicial parti-
tions) as in BGSS (or Chapter 2) will show the above representation for all pairs
(fD, fE) such that fD ⊆ fE and div(fE) ≤ 3.
Step 2: |C| = m > 3 and div(fE) ≤ m.
As in BGSS or Chapter 2, we can show (again using the minimal attention property)
that the similarity weights derived in Step 1 for any set of basic cases C = {ci, cj, ck}
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are independent of the triplet {i, j, k} and thus we can define for all fD ⊆ fE ∈ ∆
(P ◦ ΓfE)s(fD) =
∑
j≤m sjΓ
fE
j (fD)P
j∑
j≤m sjΓ
fE
j (fD)
using the derived s = (s1, .., sm)
The aim is to show (P ◦ ΓfE)(fD) = (P ◦ ΓfE)s(fD) for all fD ⊆ fE ∈ ∆ via
induction over m and using Step 1 (m = 3) as base case.
a) For all pairs (fD, fE) such that div(fE) = m and div(fD) < m the ”idempotence”
of the filter (i.e. Γ(ΓfE(fD)) = Γ
fE(fD)) is used to exploit the induction assumption.
b) For div(fD) = div(fE) = m we adopt (with different reasoning) the construc-
tion used in BGSS, i.e. fD = αq
j + (1 − α)f(j) (for some α ∈ (0, 1), where f(j)
denotes the point on conv{(ql)l∈{1,...,m}\j} on the line through fD and j-th unit vec-
tor qj. The result of a) allows to apply the filtered Concatenation Axiom, i.e.
(P ◦ΓfD)(fD) = λ(P ◦ΓfD)(qj) + (1−λ)(P ◦ΓfD)(f(j)). The filter properties (min-
imal attention and consideration property) ensure that there exist at least three qj
such that ΓfD(qj) 6= 0m and therefore there exist three P j that do not lie on one
line by the Collinearity Axiom. Thus, there are at least three different lines on
which (P ◦ΓfD)(fD) and (P ◦ΓfD)s(fD) lie and since their intersection is unique the
beliefs (P ◦Γ) and (P ◦Γ)s induced by the pair (fD, fD) have to coincide. The filter
ignorance property concludes the proof for all (fD, fE).
Interpretation of Theorem
The main difference to the axiomatized representation of BGSS (i.e. (3.1)) lies
obviously in the inclusion of the filtering process that captured by the indicator
function in the representation (3.4). Thereby the agent only employs and needs
to take into account the information that she really filtered to be most important,
”relevant” or acceptable (according to some criteria, such that the admissible filter
properties are met).21 Thus, the belief formation follows a two-stage procedure of
filtering and subsequent belief formation. Another deviation from BGSS concerns
the dependence of the axiomatization on pairs of databases and no single database
as in BGSS. Such a structure is necessary and reasonable for our axiomatization.
However, for interpretational purpose and the motivation behind this work, the
situation E = D is most interesting. In this context, an agent is not concerned
with additional information or priming of her mind by E, but evaluates the given
or evoked database D. By interpreting a database D as her potentially available
memory, an agent might recall or retrieve only some of her memorized experiences
21It allows also a conditional belief formation, i.e. s(x, c) = 1{x=xc}(c), mentioned already in
BGSS, but unfeasible in their setup.
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Γ(D). Basically Γ(D) can be seen as the result of a brainstorming or coming to
mind process of those past experiences that she deems most appropriate, valuable,
salient or wants to take into account.
3.5.1 Example: Similarity satisficing
Initially Simon (1955, 1957) introduced satisficing behavior as an alternative ap-
proach to the classical rational choice theory. According to him, in most global
models of rational choice all alternatives are evaluated before a choice is made, but
” in actual human decision-making alternatives are often examined sequentially.
We may, or may not, know the mechanism that determines the order of procedure.
When alternatives are examined sequentially, we may regard the first satisfactory
alternative that is evaluated as such as the one actually selected” (Simon (1955),
p. 110). In general, satisficing behavior is a relevant and often observed heuristic
in reality (e.g. for experimental evidence see Caplin et al. (2011), Reutskaja et al.
(2011)).
In our motivating example of a similarity satisficing procedure (3.2), the filtered
belief was
(P ◦ ΓE)(D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)1{s(c)≥s∗}(c)P
c∑
c∈D s(c)1{s(c)≥s∗}(c)
.
Its interpretation is especially appealing if a database is identified with recalled mem-
ory and assuming that those experiences are retrieved earlier that are most similar
to the current problem. In this situation an agent will stop to contemplate after
some time and starts to process the till-then recalled (most relevant) information.
Obviously, setting the threshold level to zero, i.e. s∗ = 0, would result in the BGSS
representation (3.1). This directly shows that s∗ needs to be restricted in order to be
meaningful embedded in our filtered belief formation framework. In particular, our
filtering process must satisfy the minimal attention and consideration property. The
former property requires that we need to take into consideration the k (k ≥ 3) most
similar cases. This determines the threshold values s∗. Obviously, such a threshold
needs to be database-dependent, i.e. s∗(E) =: sE for all E ∈ C∗. More precisely,
define for all E ∈ C∗ SE := {(s(c))c∈E} and denote by sEj the j-largest number
s(c) according to ≥ in SE. Then we get directly that for all E ∈ C∗ the database-
dependent threshold level sE is given by sE = sEk1{div(E)≥k}(E) for any cognitive
ability k ≥ 3. Such a definition of the threshold sE implies the minimal attention
property. In order to also satisfy the consideration property - i.e. c ∈ Γ(E), then
c ∈ Γ(D) for all D ⊆ E - we need to enforce sE ≥ sD for D ⊆ E. The resulting
filter ΓE(D) = (c ∈ D | s(c) ≥ sE) satisfies the remaining properties directly.
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Summarized, this yields the following Corollary.
Corollary 3.1
Let P be as in Theorem 3.1 and Γ a similarity satisficing filter ΓE(D) := (c ∈
D|s(c) ≥ sE) for D ⊆ E ∈ C∗ with database dependent similarity thresholds sE as
defined above. Then the equivalence in Theorem 3.1 holds with the specific represen-
tation
(P ◦ ΓE)(D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)1{s(c)≥sE}(c)P
c∑
c∈D s(c)1{s(c)≥sE}(c)
.
A database dependent threshold is even more in the spirit of Simon’s satisficing
behavior. Simons hypothesis is that most subjects search sequentially and stop
search when an environmentally determined level of reservation utility (similarity in
this context) has been surpassed. Hence, for the specification of their reservation
or satisficing level individuals take into account the environment, i.e. in our setup
the perspective or information set E. In addition, Simon proposed that the levels
of reservation utility (similarity here) increase with set size and object complexity,
i.e. for larger databases in our setup. Thus, both conditions on the threshold -
database dependence and increasing in database complexity - are well-grounded in
the satisficing literature.
A recent related paper that is concerned with the axiomatization of a two-stage
threshold representation (Manzini et al. (2013a)) obtains various structures for the
threshold values. Comparing it to Lleras et al. (2010) (or our admissible filter) they
get as well sE > sD for D ⊂ E. However, the attention filter model of Masatlioglu
et al. (2012) results in sE = sD for any nested D and E, such that Γ(E) ⊆ D and
for the two stage salience model of Tyson (2013) even the converse inequality holds.
3.6 Related literature with consideration or
elimination stage
3.6.1 Relationship to multi-criteria/stage Decision Theory
As mentioned in the introduction the (implicit) formation of a consideration set is
part of many recently developed multistage decision procedures in which a considera-
tion set is constructed by eliminating several alternatives according to some criteria.
The literature varies in the process of filtering. Some employ (sequences of) ratio-
nal(es) to eliminate alternatives (Manzini and Mariotti (2007, 2012a), Apesteguia
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and Ballester (2013), Houy (2007, 2010), Houy and Tadenuma (2009)) or accept
alternatives that can be justified by some of multiple criteria (Cherepanov et al.
(2013) (CFS from now on), Gerasimou (2013)). Other procedures are based on un-
dominated category(ies) (Manzini and Mariotti (2012b)) or specific frames (orders,
lists, moods, fairness) which are unrelated to preferences (Salant and Rubinstein
(2008)). Also mental constrains might induce consideration sets (Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005)).
The aim of this section is to interpret and identify our filter in terms of a multi-
criteria choice correspondence by adopting the above mentioned multistage elimina-
tion procedures. A problematic issue in merging both concepts lies in the fact that
choice models usually are intended to identify a single chosen alternative by choos-
ing in the final step the ”best” alternative within the remaining consideration set.
However, for a filtering process and implied corresponding consideration sets single-
tons are not desirable. For this reason we do not identify and compare the entire
choice process with a filtering process, but we are mainly interested in the filtering
and elimination stages and not on the final choice stage. On the other hand we can
stick to these choice models if we replace the criteria applied in the final choice step
(often binary asymmetric relations) by appropriate satisficing criteria (as discussed
above) such that we end up with a set of acceptable alternatives. Roughly speaking,
we discuss and relate the models in a more approximative and intuitive style, being
aware of the difficulties and basic differences.
3.6.2 Filter as choice correspondence in multistage procedures
In order to identify a filter Γ as a choice correspondence we need to discuss our filter
properties in a multistage decision theoretic framework.
The filter definition ∅ 6= Γ(D) ⊆ D is plausible for a choice correspondence since
active, non-empty choices need to be made from D. The second part of the definition
-ΓE(D) = Γ(E)∩D- can be interpreted as a usual consistency condition or as choice
from E given a (budget) constraint D.
Since usual decision theoretic frameworks deal with sets of alternatives in which
orderings and repetitions are immaterial, the properties of invariance, equal
treatment and ignorance of additional identical information are directly
satisfied for a choice correspondence.
Our minimal attention span property can be interpreted as a restriction to
multiple choices (i.e. correspondences) such that a minimum of k available cases
need to be chosen. Of course this requirement differs from common decision theoretic
frameworks in which no restrictions on the quantity of chosen elements is enforced
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(unless non-emptiness). Thus, it will be crucial to implement this property into an
adopted choice correspondence. A possible approach will be proposed and discussed
later in this section. In particular, we exemplarily adopt CFS’s rationalization
model, but the taken approach can be applied to other models as well (see below).
Another approach to guarantee for a minimum amount of choices can be imposed
by enforcing an appropriate satisficing strategy at some stage of the choice process.
However, for the moment we want to focus on the consideration property. In
the choice literature it is known as Sen’s property α or akin as Contraction Axiom.
Many modified versions of the weak Axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) satisfy
the consideration property. Manzini and Mariotti (2007) introduce a Weak WARP
that is also satisfied by CFS (2013), Lleras et al. (2010) and Lombardi (2009) that
states that for all c, c′ ⊂ D ⊂ E and c = Γ((c, c′)) = Γ(E), then c′ 6∈ Γ(D). This
coincides with ReWARP of Gerasimou (2013). Lleras et al. (2010) introduce a
Limited Consideration WARP that states that for any c ∈ D ∩E it holds that
c ∈ Γ(E) if (i) Γ(E) ∈ D and (ii) c ∈ Γ(A) for some A ⊇ E.
However, there are also some refinements of WARP in our context that do not satisfy
the consideration property, e.g. Gerasimou (2013)’s DeWARP is neither satisfied
in generality nor Moody WARP of Manzini, Mariotti (2013b).
For the remaining section our interest lies on the link between the elimination pro-
cedures suggested in the multistage decision models and the consideration property.
We translate the choice theoretic approaches directly into our database framework
and will not state the original versions of their models.
Models without an explicit procedure to form consideration
sets
In Lleras et al. (2010) the formation of the consideration set is directly charac-
terized by the consideration property, as in our approach.
Masatlioglu et al. (2012) axiomatizes choice based on a consideration set gener-
ated by an attention filter, which is characterized by
Γ(D) = Γ(D\c) for all c ∈ D\Γ(D).
Basically, such a filter selects only those cases in a database D that she is aware of
and effectively pays attention to. Hence, if an agent is not aware of c ∈ D\Γ(D),
then removing c from the database D should not affect the set of cases an agent
would pay attention to. In contrast, our consideration property does not rely on
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such an unawareness component and in general both properties (attention and con-
sideration) are independent (see Lleras et al. (2010) for an example demonstrating
the differences).
Models with explicit formation procedures
Given a binary relation R on C, we denote by U(D,R) := (c ∈ D | 6 ∃c˜ with c˜Rc)
the cases in D that are undominated22 in D and by Dom(D,R) := (c˜ ∈ D | ∃c ∈
D\c˜ such that cRc˜) the set of cases in D that are dominated by a case in D.
Sequential elimination Procedures
The following approaches adopt the same rough idea of ”short-listing” in which
multi-criteria are checked sequentially and only those alternatives survive until the
final consideration stage that meet some or all criteria. The elimination is based
mainly on un-dominance inspections regarding the specific criterion.
Manzini and Mariotti (2007) axiomatize choice following a rational shortlisting
behavior. The final choice is made according to criterion R2 within the alternatives
in the consideration set that are undominated and survived the elimination according
to R1 (asymmetric and transitive binary relation)
Γ(D) = (c ∈ D |c ∈ U(R2, U(R1, D))).
Houy (2007, 2010) introduces as well another mechanism to form a consideration
set that is based on a composition of some binary relations Ri, in which agents se-
quentially check for a certain pattern of (un)dominance according to ordered criteria
Γ(D) = (c ∈ D | for all c˜, cR1c˜ or (¬(c˜R1c) and cR2c˜) or (¬(c˜R2c) ∨ cR3c˜...)).
In a similar spirit Horan (2013) summarizes many of these two stage models in
which a consideration stage is formed according to undominance based on a asym-
metric relation and then a second (asymmetric) relation is used for the choice.
Obviously, all such short-listing procedures (and extended to more criteria (Ri)i) do
satisfy the consideration property.
A sequential elimination procedure of a different kind is discussed in Manzini and
22For our purpose it might make more sense to think rather in terms of satisficing than maximal
elements, e.g. in the sense of U(R,D) = (c ∈ D|cRc∗) for some threshold case c∗.
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Mariotti (2012b). Their consideration set is formed according to a (asymmetric,
possibly incomplete) relation P on subsets that are interpreted as categories. The
un-dominated categories survive the elimination phase.
Γ(D) = (S ⊂ D | 6 ∃S˜ ⊂ D such that S˜PS).
In order to capture the consideration property, specific requirements on the cate-
gorization structure are necessary. Bleile (2014c) (or Chapter 4) implements two
potential versions of categorizations on databases into a belief formation process.
Satisficing procedures
The following branch of literature adopts the satisficing idea of Simon (1955, 1957).
Tyson (2008) axiomatizes a satisficing procedure based on a considerations set
that contains only those elements that exceed some database dependent threshold
level Θ according to some numerical representation of a criterion f
Γ(D) = (c ∈ D | f(c) ≥ Θ(D)).
Such a filter satisfies the consideration property for an appropriate definition of the
database dependent threshold value Θ (as in our similarity satisficing example in
Section 3.5.1).
Tyson (2013) and Manzini et al. (2013a) modify and generalize this procedure to
salience measures and general relations.
Papi (2012) proposes an axiomatic characterization of the satisficing heuristic un-
der various informational structures in which the order of inspecting alternatives are
either full, partially or not observable. Especially the case of unobserved sequences
can be interpreted within a framework of choice correspondences by assuming that
for all possible orders the satisficing elements enter the consideration set.
Frame related elimination procedures
Salant and Rubinstein (2008) model a general approach in which the in princi-
ple available choice set is restricted by subjective and psychological constraints,
rationales or biases. They call such additional characteristics that are not directly
covered by the objective description of the alternatives as frames
Γ(D) = (c ∈ D |Γ(D, f) = c for some frame f).
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Obviously, for an unspecified frame our filter properties are not directly satisfied.
Reason Based Choice procedures
In general, the above mentioned procedures to form a consideration set can be
interpreted under the premise of having and/or seeking a reason to accept or elimi-
nate alternatives. This general idea follows the stream of literature on reason based
choice initiated by Shafir et al. (1993) or even Tversky (1972). That is, elements in
the consideration set are those that can be (internally) justified most easily (accord-
ing to some reasons). Thereby, as above, an (un)dominance structure (according
to one, some or all criteria) serves as convincing reason for choosing the specific
element. A link between reason based choice and the consideration property can be
established by the insight that in a smaller set it might be easier to find a reason
to choose some alternative, whereas in a larger set it also might be easier to find a
reason to reject.
Lombardi (2009) relies on the concept of reason based choice in the sense of
finding the best and most easily justifiable alternatives by possessing the ”most
convincing” dominance structure. It constructs a consideration filter by employing
the same criterion for the screening as well as for the final evaluation, but in different
ways.23 The rational (acyclical binary relation) used as a criterion in the first stage
is used to construct another criterion for the second stage.
Γ(D) = (c ∈ U(D) | 6 ∃ c˜ ∈ U(D) such that Dom(c˜, D,R) ⊃ Dom(c,D,R)),
where Dom(c,D,R) := (c˜ ∈ D such that cRc˜). Such a procedure does not satisfies
the consideration property in general.
Gerasimou (2013) also relies on a procedure based on a single (acyclical or asym-
metric) relation R. The consideration set contains elements that are justified by the
fact that they are un-dominated, but at least one alternative is worse24
Γ(D,R) = (c ∈ D | 6 ∃ c˜ ∈ D such that c˜Rc and ∃c′ ∈ D s. th. cRc′).
Such a procedure does not satisfy in general the consideration property.
Similarly, in the vein of seeking reasons to justify the selection, De Clippel and
23In general, the psychological literature (e.g. Andrews and Srinivasan (1995), Roberts and Lattin
(1997)) states that the criteria influencing consideration and the final evaluation stage may
differ as well as (partially) overlap. Overlapping criteria, however, play different roles at both
stages.
24Note, there is a difference to undomination
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Eliaz (2012) employ a pro-cons bargaining procedure based on linear orders P1, P2.
The agent forms the consideration set via (internal) compromising between P1 and P2
by trying to receive as many as possible dominated alternatives for both rationales.
Γ(D) = (c ∈ D | argmaxcmini|Dom(D,Pi)|)
The consideration property needs not to hold in general for this procedure.
However, the most interesting and elegantly fitting model for our approach is CFS’s
(2013) rationalization theory that we want to merge with our approach exemplarily.
Rationalization Theory and related psychological filter
CFS model a consideration filter explicitly as a rationalization procedure. For a
set of binary relations R = {R1, ..., Rn} on C, a case in database D is rational-
ized if cRic˜ for all c˜ ∈ D for some i ≤ n. This psychological filter contains those
alternatives that are justifiable by at least one criterium, rational, reason, story, etc.
ΓR(D) = (c ∈ D | ∃i ≤ n such that cRic˜ for all c˜ ∈ D).
This procedure is very interesting, since such a psychological filter satisfies the con-
sideration property directly and hence the rationalization procedure can be seen
as a generator of any filter satisfying the consideration property. However, for our
purpose we need to take care of our additional minimal attention property. Roughly
speaking, we want to find a reasonable procedure that delivers an admissible filter
via a rationalization similar to CFS.
For a binary relations S and for D ∈ C∗, we define the following recursive (maxi-
mal) domination sets for an attention level k ≥ 3
Max(D,S) =: Max1(D,S) := (c ∈ D | cSc˜ for all c˜ ∈ D)
for n > 1 : Maxn(D,S) := Max(D\ ∪i≤n−1 Maxi(D,S), S) and
Max∗(D,S) := Maxd(D,R) for d := argminn{div(Maxn(D,S)) ≥ k}.
Note that Max∗(D,S) can be empty, e.g. for div(D) < k.
Definition 3.9
a) Let S = {S1, ..., SN} be a be a set of binary relations on C and D ∈ C∗. Then
we call a case c minimal k-attentive rationalizable (MAR) by S in D if and only if
c ∈Max∗(D,S1) ∨ c ∈ ◦Ni=2Max(D,Si).
100
3.6 Related literature with consideration or elimination stage
The set of all MAR cases (by rationales S) in database D is denoted by MAR(D,S).
b) A filter Γ is called a minimal k-attentive psychological filter based on a set of
binary relations S = {S1, .., SN}, i.e. Γ = MAR(D,S), if it holds
(i) for any D ∈ C∗ such that div(D) ≤ k: Γ(D) = D and
(ii) for any D ∈ C∗ such that div(D) ≥ k and Max∗(D,S1) 6= ∅: Γ(D) =
MAR(D,S).
Basically the modification of a CFS filter serves the reason to capture the required
minimal attention property by enforcing ad hoc that always the k-best cases ac-
cording to a most important, seminal, distinguishing, leading rational (criterium,
reason, story) S1 are consider for sure. In addition, if they differ from the ”best”
cases according to the other criteria, also all cases which are rationalizable by these
other rationales survive the elimination procedure. A plausible way to justify such a
formation process would emphasize the extraordinary role of criterion S1. An agent
is focussing on the (at least) k-best un-dominated or most salient alternatives for the
most important criterion S1 and only the best alternatives according to the minor,
rather marginal or negligible criteria are worth to consider. For instance, an agent
buying a car would choose according to different criteria, like speed, mileage, gas
consumption, etc. Her major criteria might be gas consumption and hence includes
the k best cars regarding economy into her consideration set, whereas she only takes
the fastest car and that with lowest mileage into account, since they are outstanding
or salient within the minor criteria.
For the definition and the underlying recursive domination we had in mind k = 3.
For larger minimal attentions k one can generalize this approach to any specific
structure of ranking criteria. For instance for k = 4, one might assume to consider
for sure the two best alternatives according to rational S1, and additional the two
best remaining alternatives regarding to story S2. In this sense a minimal attentive
psychological filter can be generalized in arbitrary ways for specific attention levels.
The non-emptiness requirement of a MAR-filter, i.e. Max∗(D,S1) 6= ∅, is for
example satisfied if the binary relation S1 is complete. But also for an incomplete
”benchmark” or satisficing relation S1
25 the non-emptiness is satisfied if c∗ is chosen
such that there exist at least k cases c ∈ D such that cS1c∗.
Consequently, we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2
Let Γ be an (extended) MAR-filter on C∗ × C∗ based on a set of binary relations
25I.e. for a benchmark c∗ cS1c′ if and only if cS1c∗S1c′ or (cS1c∗ and c′S1c∗) for c, c′, c∗ ∈ D, see
also Definition 6.2 later.
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S = {S1, ..., SN}. Then Γ is an admissible filter and the equivalence in the Theorem
3.1 holds for all D ⊆ E ∈ C∗, such that ΓE(D) 6= ∅ with the specific representation
(P ◦ ΓE)(D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)1MAR∗(E,S)(c)P
c∑
c∈D s(c)1MAR∗(E,S)(c)
.
In general, most of the above mentioned multistage procedures can be adopted to
satisfy the minimal attention property by replacing an usual dominance structure
by our defined Max∗ structure for some rational at some stage of their elimination
procedures. In this way, these modified multistage choice processes (that satisfy the
consideration property) can be interpreted as an admissible filter and incorporated
into our filtered belief formation.
An appealing and intuitive example for rationales Si in S is to interpret them as
rationales that are related to componentwise similarities on the characteristics space
X = X1 × ...×XN , i.e. si(c) ∈ R+ for all c ∈ C (i ≤ N). One can understand the
endogenously derived similarity value s as an (complex) aggregation f (f: RN → R)
of these componentwise similarities- i.e. s(c) = f(s1(c), ...., sN(c)). An underlying
motive for choosing such a form relies on the fact that agents tend to evaluate the di-
mensions lexicographically instead of aggregating multi-evaluation criteria (Tversky
et al. (1988), Dulleck et al. (2011)), i.e. (si)i≤N versus s = f(s1, .., sN). In addition,
research shows that in the filtering stage agents use noncompensatory heuristics for a
rough screening based on simple criteria, e.g. a satisficing behavior like comparing si
with thresholds s∗i . But for the final evaluation stage a compensatory, more detailed
multi-component and compromise-based procedure is taken, as in our aggregated
similarity measure s = f(s1, .., sN).
26
Two candidates for a reasonable and plausible, but ad hoc, definition of binary
relations Si are based on comparisons of the componentwise similarities si in the
following way.
Definition 3.10
Let there be functions si : C → R for all i ≤ N .
(i) ”Componentwise similarity”: For all i ≤ N , a transitive and complete binary
relation S˜i is defined on C × C by cS˜ic′ if and only if si(c) ≥ si(c′)
(ii) ”Benchmark exceeding componentwise similarity”: For all i ≤ N the asymmet-
ric, transitive and possibly incomplete binary relation S∗i is defined by cS
∗
i c˜ if and
only if (si(c) ≥ s∗i > si(c˜) ∨ si(c) ≥ si(c˜) ≥ s∗i ) for componentwise threshold
26See e.g. Bettman (1979), Gensch (1987), Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990), Roberts and Lattin
(1991, 1997), Andrews and Srinivasan (1995) and for a model Lombardi (2009).
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values (s∗i )i.
Obviously, the binary relation defined in (i) can be used to define a MAR-filter. The
relations in (ii) can be applicable for a MAR-filter if for any D ∈ C∗ s∗1 is chosen
according to s∗1 ≤ sDk1 1{div(D)≥k}(D) (as defined in Section 3.5.1).
3.7 Conclusion
Chapter 3 examines how beliefs are formed by agents that are constraint or not
willing to pay attention to all potentially available pieces of information. It is
well known in the psychology and marketing literature that humans do not take
into account all available information due to many different reasons. Based on this
insight we axiomatize a two stage belief formation procedure in which agents employ
only these pieces of information that ”survived” a first step of (un(intentional))
filtering (or screening). The filter is required to satisfy natural, reasonable and well
known properties. The axioms on the belief level are closely related to the axioms
introduced in BGSS and modified in a way to capture the link to filtering information
and their consequences for induced beliefs. The resulting filtered belief is a weighted
sum of estimates induced by past observed information that are attention grabbing.
Thus, only pieces of information that attracted the attention and consideration of
an agent are taken into account. The weights are determined by the similarities of
the observed cases with the problem under consideration.
The axiomatized filtered belief formation generalizes the axiomatizations of BGSS,
EG and Bleile (2014a) in which all available pieces of information are necessarily
taken into account which prevents unintentional forgetting or unawareness as well
as intentional application of a heuristic screening techniques that often drive human
judgment. Hence, a filtered belief formation offers a cognitively less demanding and
more realistic behavioral procedure to form beliefs based on data.
An intuitive and natural application of a filtered belief formation are models of
satisficing behavior regarding the relevance or appropriateness of information for the
current problem. Moreover, it captures also a conditional belief formation process
that only takes into account identical problems in the past and neglects all not
perfectly similar observations - which cannot be covered by BGSS, EG and Bleile
(2014a).
In particular interesting is that filtering (and elimination) of information (or alter-
natives) emerged very recently as a research topic in the decision theory literature.
These multi-stage/criteria models incorporate as well a first step of filtering before
engaging into the final choice step. Many of these models can be easily translated
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and embedded into the filtering stage of our belief formation process such that our
filter stage can be interpreted as a choice correspondence in terms of decision theory.
3.8 Proof of Theorem 3.1, necessity part
Let (P ◦ ΓE)(D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)P
c∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)
for all D ⊆ E ∈ C∗, such that ΓE(D) 6= ∅.
Let D = D1 ◦D2 and D ⊆ E ∈ C∗ .
(P ◦ ΓE)(D) =
∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)P
c∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)
=
1∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)
(∑
c∈D1
s(c)1Γ(E)(c)P
c +
∑
c∈D2
s(c)1Γ(E)(c)P
c
)
=
∑
i=1,2
∑
c∈Di s(c)1Γ(E)(c)∑
c∈D s(c)1Γ(E)(c)
(∑
c∈Di s(c)1Γ(E)(c)P
c∑
c∈Di s(c)1Γ(E)(c)
)
= λ(P ◦ ΓE)(D1) + (1− λ)(P ◦ ΓE(D2)
Thus, the filtered Concatenation Axiom is satisfied. .
3.9 Proof of Theorem 3.1, sufficiency part
3.9.1 Important observations
In the proof, we treat the situation in which the level of minimal attention k is set
equal to three, i.e. k = 3. This simplifies notational effort and is sufficient to follow
the main steps of the proof that analogously work for any k ≥ 3.
The following Lemma states useful and crucial properties for the proof.
Lemma 3.1
Let Γ be an admissible filter, then the following holds:
(i) For all c ∈ D ∈ C∗, ΓD(cT ) ∈ {∅, cT} for all T such that cT ∈ D.
(ii) For all D ⊆ E ∈ C∗ such that div(E) ≤ 3: D ⊆ ΓE(D) ⊆ D = ((cfD(C)|D|)c∈C).
(iii) For all D ⊆ E ∈ C∗ we have some kind of idempotence, i.e.
Γ(ΓE(D)) = ΓE(D).
Proof:
(i) By definition ΓD(c) ⊆ c, hence the equal treatment property delivers directly the
desired result.
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(ii) By definition and the equal treatment property, we have for all D ⊆ E ∈ C∗
that ΓE(D) = ◦c∈C(ΓE(c))fD(c)|D|
If div(E) = k ≤ 3, then by minimal attention property div(Γ(E)) = k and thus by
the equal treatment property Γ(E) = ◦c∈CcfE(c)|E|. Since D ⊆ E, we get directly
ΓE(D) = ◦c∈CcfD(c)|D|.
(iii) By definition of a filter, we have Γ(ΓE(D)) ⊆ ΓE(D). The consideration prop-
erty implies
Γ(ΓE(D)) = ΓΓ
E(D)(ΓE(D)) ⊇ ΓE(ΓE(D)) = ΓE(E) ∩ ΓE(D) ⊇ ΓE(D)
and hence the claim holds true. 
Basically (ii) just says that no filtering of D takes place in this situation and only a
reordering takes place ( which is ”immaterial” for the induced belief).
3.9.2 Translating the database framework to frequencies
An essential step in the proof is to identify databases with their frequency vec-
tors. The space of frequency vectors is more tractable and enables us to adopt the
structure of BGSS’s proof (and use the procedure of Bleile (2014a) (or Chapter 2)).
However, the proof here requires some additional features, since in addition filters
are involved, which alters the crucial steps in the inductive proof.
General Definitions for a Frequency Framework
We need to introduce some definitions regarding the frequency framework.
The set of all frequency vectors on the ordered set of basic cases C = {c1, .., cm} is
given by (since C is fixed we skip it in the following)
∆(C) = ∆ := {f = (f1, ..., fm) s. th. fi ∈ Q∩ [0, 1] for all i ≤ m and
∑
i≤m fi = 1}
The following set represents all frequency vectors related to databases D ∈ CT :
∆T := {f ∈ ∆ fi = li
T
, li ∈ N+,
m∑
i=1
li = T and ∃D ∈ CT such that fD(ci) = fi = li/T}
Observe that if f ∈ ∆T (C), then f ∈ ∆TZ(C) for all Z ∈ N+, i.e. the frequency
vector fD represents all databases D
Z for some Z ∈ N and we cannot relate it to
any specific database Dk for a specific k ∈ N.
105
3 Limited Attention in Case Based Belief Formation
Definition 3.11
(i) Om denotes the null-vector on Rm.
(ii) For all j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} denote by qj the j-th unit vector in Rm, i.e. the frequency
vector representing a database containing only case cj ∈ C.
(iii) For all d ∈ ∆ its diversity is given by div(d) := |{i ≤ m | di > 0}|
Definition 3.12
(i) The ⊆-relation on frequencies ∆×∆ is defined as follows for d, e ∈ ∆:
d ⊆ e if and only if di ≥ 0 only if ei > 0 for all i ≤ m.
(ii) Let d ∈ ∆T and e ∈ ∆L, then the ∩-relation on ∆×∆ is defined by
d ∩ e := (( min{diT, eiL}∑
i≤m min{diT, eiL}
)i≤m) 27.
For definition (i) we have in mind that there exist T and L such that d represents
a database of length T, i.e. D ∈ CT , and e represents an E ∈ CL such that
minj≤m djT ≤ minj≤m ejL.
Why is a transformation viable?
Roughly, we want to show that for a filtered belief formation we can identify
databases D ⊆ E ∈ C∗ in the filtering process by frequencies fD ⊆ fE such that
ΓfE(fD) corresponds to Γ
E(D). For this purpose, we exploit the properties of an
admissible filter and the axioms on filtered belief formation in the following way.
(i) The filter ignorance property for Γ implies directly ΓE
L
(D) = ΓE(D) for D ⊆ E
and for all L ∈ N, i.e. (P ◦ ΓE)(D) = (P ◦ ΓEL)(D).
(ii) The filtered Concatenation Axiom implies (by DZ = D ◦ ... ◦D) (P ◦ ΓF )(D) =
(P ◦ ΓF )(DZ) for an appropriate F such that DZ ⊆ F holds for Z ∈ N.
However, since for all Z ∈ N there exists a L ∈ N such that DZ ⊆ FL, observations
(i) yields that for D ⊆ E
(P ◦ ΓE)(D) = (P ◦ ΓEL)(DZ) for all Z ∈ N and sufficiently large L ∈ N. (3.5)
27 (Consistency) Remark: If d ⊆ e, then obviously d ∩ e = (( min{diT,eiL}∑
i≤mmin{diT,eiL} )i≤m) =
(( diT∑
i≤m diT
)i≤m) = d
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Further, by the definition of a filter and its order invariance property (and hence
its implied belief invariance property) the order of the cases do not matter, which
enables us to represent all involved databases by their frequency vector on C (which
are independent of lengths) and their corresponding lengths.
However, by the above observations, within the filtered belief formation, lengths
of databases become irrelevant in the sense of equation (3.5). In particular, since
each DZ ∈ C∗ (for any Z ∈ N) is represented by the same frequency vector fD, the
”sufficiently large”-condition looses its bite (see below). Thus, we can identify the
filtered belief formation process on databases by frequency vectors.
Filtered belief induced by frequencies
Definition 3.13
The filtered beliefs (P ◦ Γ) : C∗ × C∗ → ∆(R) based on databases D ⊆ E translates
to corresponding beliefs based on frequency vectors fD ⊆ fE in the following way:
(P ◦ Γ) : ∆ × ∆ → ∆(R) such that Γ(fD, fE) := Γ(D,E) and (P ◦ Γ)(fD, fE) :=
(P ◦ Γ)(D,E).
Basically, the weakening of the condition D ⊆ E to fD ⊆ fE runs through the
implicit or intuitive interpretation of ΓfE(fD) in a way such that there exists an ap-
propriate replication Z of database E (i.e. fE = fEZ ) such that E
Z ⊇ D is matched
and since by the ignorance property ΓE
Z
(D) = ΓE(D) the nestedness condition can
be relaxed.
Thus an application of filter properties and belief axioms show the viability of the
transformation from databases to the frequency framework.
Filter definition in frequency terms
Definition 3.14
For d ⊆ e ∈ ∆, a function Γ: ∆×∆→ ∆ is called an e-induced filter on d if
(i) Γ(e, e) := Γe(e) := Γ(e) ∈ ∆ and (ii) Γe(d) := Γ(e) ∩ d hold.
Definition 3.15
(i) Consideration property
A filter Γ on ∆×∆ satisfies the consideration property if for d ⊆ e ∈ ∆: Γ(e)∩d ⊆
Γ(d)
(ii) Minimal attention span
A filter Γ satisfies the minimal attention of k ≥ 3 if for all d ∈ ∆:
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(a) If div(d) = l ≤ k, then div(Γ(d)) = l
(b) If div(d) > k, then div(Γ(d)) ≥ k.
(iii) Filter ignorance of repeated information
Let e = (p1
p
, p2
p
, ..., pm
p
), f = ( p1
p+1
, p2
p+1
, .., pi+1
p+1
, ..., pm
p+1
) ∈ ∆, where p := ∑j≤m pj ∈ N
and pi > 0. Let d ⊆ e ⊆ f . A filter Γ satisfies the ignorance property if Γe(d) =
Γf (d).
The equal treatment property is directly satisfied by the definition of a filter in
frequency terms.
Definition 3.16
A filter Γ on ∆ × ∆ → ∆ satisfying the consideration, equal treatment, minimal
attention span and ignorance property is called admissible.
Analogously to Lemma 3.1, we get in frequency terms:
Lemma 3.2 (Lemma 3.1 in frequency terms)
Let Γ be an admissible filter on ∆×∆.
(i) For all qj ⊆ d ∈ ∆, we have Γd(qj) ∈ {∅, qj}.
(ii) For all d ⊆ e ∈ ∆ such that div(e) ≤ 3 Γe(d) = d holds.
(iii) For all d ⊆ e ∈ ∆: Γ(Γe(d)) = Γe(d).
Axioms in frequency terms
Filtered Concatenation Axiom
Let Γ be a filter on ∆ × ∆. For all d ∈ ∆T and e ∈ ∆L for any T, L ∈ N, there
exists λ ∈ [0, 1], such that for g ⊇ f := T
T+L
d+ L
T+L
e
(P ◦ Γg)(f) = λ(P ◦ Γg)(d) + (1− λ)(P ◦ Γg)(e),
where λ = 0 if and only if Γg(d) = 0m.
Collinearity Axiom
No three of {((P ◦ Γqj)(qj))j≤m} are collinear.
Sufficiency part of Theorem 3.1 in frequency terms
Proposition 3.1
Let there be given a function (P ◦ Γ) : ∆ → ∆(R), where P : ∆ → ∆(R) and Γ an
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admissible filter on ∆×∆. Let a filtered belief (P ◦Γ) : ∆×∆→ ∆(R) satisfies the
filtered Concatenation and Collinearity Axiom.
Then, there exist unique probability vectors (P j)j≤m ∈ ∆(R), and unique -up to
multiplication by a strictly positive number- strictly positive numbers (sj)j≤m ∈ R
such that for all q ⊆ f ∈ ∆ such that Γf (q) 6= 0m
(P ◦ Γf )(q) =
∑
j≤m sjΓ
f
j (q)P
j∑
j≤m sjΓ
f
j (q)
,
where Γfj (q) denotes the frequency of case cj in Γ
f (q).
3.9.3 Proof of sufficiency part of Theorem 3.1 in frequency
terms
We have by Lemma 3.2 (ii) directly that Γf (qj) = qj for all f ⊇ qj such that
div(f) ≤ 3 and hence we need to choose
P j = (P ◦ Γf )(qj) (3.6)
The aim of the inductive proof over m with |C| = m and div(f) ≤ m is to find the
similarity values s1, ..., sm.
Step 1: |C| = m = 3, w.l.o.g. C = {c1, c2, c3}, thus ∆ = ∆(q1, q2, q3)
Step 1.1: Defining similarity weights
We define q∗ := 1
3
(q1 + q2 + q3) and for f ⊇ q∗ Lemma 3.2 (ii) yields
(P ◦ Γf )(q∗) =
∑
j≤3 sjΓ
f
j (q
∗)P j∑
j≤3 sjΓ
f
j (q
∗)
=
∑
j≤3 sj
1
3
P j∑
j≤3 sj
1
3
=
∑
j≤3 sjP
j∑
j≤3 sj
According to the filtered Concatenation Axiom there exist λ ∈ int(∆3) (by minimal
attention, i.e. Γf (qj) = qj) such that
(P ◦ Γf )(q∗) =
∑
j≤3
λj(P ◦ Γf )(qj) =
∑
j≤3
λjP
j,
where the last equality follows from (3.6).
By equating both representations we can derive the corresponding similarity weights
s1, s2, s3 uniquely up to multiplication by a strictly positive number and define for
all q ⊆ f ∈ ∆
(P ◦ Γf )s(q) :=
∑
j≤m sjΓ
f
j (q)P
j∑
j≤m sjΓ
f
j (q)
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The aim is now to show that for all (q, f) ∈ ∆×∆ such that q ⊆ f
(P ◦ Γf )s(q) = (P ◦ Γf )(q). (3.7)
All such (q,f) are collected in E := {(q, f) ∈ ∆ × ∆ | (P ◦ Γf )s(q) = (P ◦ Γf )(q)},
where obviously by definition
(qj, f) ∈ E for all j ≤ 3 and f ∈ ∆ such that qj ⊆ f
and (q∗, f) ∈ E for all f ∈ ∆ such that q∗ ⊆ f. (3.8)
Step 1.2: All simplicial points (with appropriate perspective) satisfy
equation (3.7)
Notation: In the following we will denote for a, b ∈ ∆ or a, b ∈ ∆(R) the straight
line through a and b by (a, b) (since there won’t be a confusion to the usual interval
notation).
The main tool of the proof is the following observation, which will be recursively
applied in an appropriate manner in the proof.
Lemma 3.3
Let a, b, c, d, e ∈ ∆, where e = (a, b)∩ (c, d) and for all f ∈ {a, b, c, d} let div(f) ≤ 3
and (f, f) ∈ E. If ((P ◦Γf )(f))f∈{a,b,c,d} are not collinear, then (e, g) ∈ E for g ∈ ∆
such that div(g) ≤ 3 and e, f ⊆ g for all f ∈ {a, b, c, d}.
Proof:
W.l.o.g. let e be between a and b on the line through a and b. Since (P ◦ Γ)s and
(P ◦ Γ) satisfy filtered Concatenation Axiom we get
(P ◦ Γe)(e) ∈ ((P ◦ Γe)(a), (P ◦ Γe)(b)) and
(P ◦ Γe)s(e) ∈ ((P ◦ Γe)s(a), (P ◦ Γe)s(b)).
For f ∈ {a, b} such that div(f) ≤ 3, we get with Lemma 3.2 (ii) for all g ∈ ∆ such
that div(g) ≤ 3 and e, f ⊆ g
(P ◦ Γg)(e) ∈ ((P ◦ Γg)(a), (P ◦ Γg)(b)) and
(P ◦ Γg)s(e) ∈ ((P ◦ Γg)s(a), (P ◦ Γg)s(b))
Analogously, we get a similar result for the segment (c, d).
By Lemma 3.2 we know that Γg(f) = Γf (f) for all f ∈ {a, b, c, d} and since by
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assumption (f, f) ∈ E, i.e. (P ◦Γf )s(f) = (P ◦Γf )(f), we directly get (P ◦Γg)s(f) =
(P ◦ Γg)(f) and
(P ◦ Γg)(e), (P ◦ Γg)s(e) ∈ ((P ◦ Γg)(a), (P ◦ Γg)(b)) ∩ ((P ◦ Γg)(c), (P ◦ Γg)(d)).
Since the intersection of the two line is unique due to the Collinearity Axiom, we
get the desired result, i.e. (P ◦ Γg)(e) = (P ◦ Γg)s(e) and (e, g) ∈ E. .
By Lemma 3.2 we know that Γf (q) = q for any q ⊆ f such that div(f) ≤ 3, hence
we need to show equality (3.7) not for all appropriate pairs (q, f), but only for any
q and some appropriate f such that q ⊆ f . Then it will hold for all f such that q ⊆ f .
In the following, we will partition the simplex ∆ into so called simplicial trian-
gles recursively, as illustrated in the Figure 3.1 below.
Definition of Simplicial Triangles:
The 0-th simplicial partition consist of vertices qj0 ∈ ∆, which are exactly the unit
vectors qj for j = 1, 2, 3. The first simplicial partition of ∆ is a partition to four
triangles separated by the segments connecting the middle points between the two
of the three unit frequency vectors, i.e. q11 := (
1
2
q1 + 1
2
q2), q21 := (
1
2
q2 + 1
2
q3) and
q31 := (
1
2
q3 + 1
2
q1). The second simplicial partition is obtained by similarly parti-
tioning each of the four triangles to four smaller triangles, and the l-th simplicial
partition is defined recursively. The simplicial points of the l-th simplicial partition
are all the vertices of triangles of this partition.
q1 q2
q3
q∗
q21q
3
1
q11
•
•
•
• •
•
•
•
q12
•
q22
•q32 •
q42
•
q52
• q62
•
q72
•q82 • q92
Figure 1: a
1
Figure 3.1: 1st and 2nd Simplicial partitions
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We want to show that all simplicial points (with appropriate perspective) satisfy
equation (3.7), i.e. are in E, by induction over the l-th simplicial partitions. Step
1.1. showed the claim for l = 0 (equation (3.8)). We proceed to the points in the
First simplicial partition:
Since
q11 = (q
1, q2) ∩ (q3, q∗),
and we already know that for all f ∈ {q1, q2, q3, q∗} (f, f) ∈ E we can apply Lemma
3.3 if the collinearity condition holds. However, since (P ◦Γqi)(qi) = P i for i = 1, 2, 3
and (P ◦Γq∗)(q∗) ∈ int(conv({P 1, P 2, P 3})) the Collinearity Axiom directly induces
the non-collinearity condition. Hence, by Lemma 3.3 we get that (q11, f) ∈ E for all
f such that q11 ⊆ f .
With the same reasoning, we get (q21, f), (q
3
1, f) ∈ E where f ⊇ q21 (respectively q31).
Thus all pairs (qi1, f) consisting of a simplicial points of the first simplicial partition
and all f such that qj1 ⊆ f are included in E.
For the second simplicial partition we distinguish between inner simplicial points
and points on the boundary of the simplex ∆, i.e. between two of the corners qj.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the intuition.
q1 q2
q3
q∗
q21q
3
1
q11
•
•
•
• •
•
•
•
q42
•
q52
•
q72
•q92
Figure 1: a
1
Figure 3.2: Step from 1st to 2nd Simplicial partition
(a) The first step involves the inner simplicial points q42, q
5
2, q
7
2 ∈ int(conv({q1, q2, q3})).
Since
q42 ∈ (q11, q31) ∩ (q1, q21)
and for all f ∈ {q11, q31, q1, q21} (f, f) ∈ E by Step 1.1 and Step 1.2 for the first sim-
plicial partition, we need to check the collinearity condition to apply Lemma 3.3.
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However, the condition is met since the induced beliefs for (qj1, q
j
1) with j = 1, 2, 3
are in int(conv({P i, P j})) (for appropriate i 6= j) that cannot lie on one line since
(P j)j≤3 are not collinear by the Collinearity Axiom. Consequently by Lemma 3.3
we get that (q42, f) ∈ E for all f ⊇ q42.
Analogously, we can get that all simplicial points (combined with appropriate per-
spective f) of the 2nd partition in the interior of ∆, i.e. q52, q
7
2 with appropriate
super-frequencies f are in E.
(b) In the second step we will deal with and focus on the simplicial points on
the boundary of ∆ (e.g. representative q92, see Figure 3.2).
We have that q92 ∈ (q3, q2) ∩ (q42, q72). All frequencies f involved in the intersec-
tion are shown (Step 1.1. and Step 1.2 (a) for second partition) to be contained
in E, in the sense of (f, f) ∈ E. Again, the non-collinearity is fulfilled since (P 2
and P 3) and induced beliefs in int(conv({P 1, P 2, P 3})) are involved and (P 2, P 3) 6∈
int(conv({P 1, P 2, P 3})) since (P j)j≤3 are not collinear. Thus, Lemma 3.3 delivers
(q92, f) ∈ E for all f ⊇ q32.
The same procedure with analogous and adjusted arguments yield that all simplicial
points on the boundary of the 2nd simplicial partition combined with appropriate
super-frequencies (perspectives) are also included in E.
The same kind of algorithm works for all simplicial points of any l-th simplicial
partitions, i.e. obviously each q ∈ rim(conv({q1, q2, q3})) is for some l captured. For
q ∈ int(conv({q1, q2, q3})) one can approximate q via a series of simplicial points
(q1l , q
2
l , q
3
l ) such that q ∈ int(conv({q1l , q2l , q3l }l)) for all l. In detail, the completion
for all permissible (q, f) ∈ ∆×∆ can be shown almost similarly as in Step 1.3 Bleile
(2014a) (or Chapter 2) (or differently in BGSS Step 1.2 in their proof) and hence
we refer to these papers for the entire procedure.
This concludes the proof for the case |C| = 3 and (q, f) with q ⊆ f such that
div(f) ≤ 3.
Now we need to show the claim for |C| = m > 3 and div(f) ≤ m.
Step 2: |C| = m > 3
Step 2.1: Defining the similarity weights
Using the considerations from Step 1 above for {j, k, l} (i.e. q∗{j,k,l} := 13
∑
i∈{j,k,l} q
i,
qi ∈ ∆ and q ⊆ f ∈ ∆(qj, qk, ql)) we can derive the similarity weights (s{j,k,l}i )i∈{j,k,l}.
Further, for all (q,f) such that q ⊆ f ∈ conv({qj, qk, ql}) the following representation
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holds
(P ◦ Γf ){j,k,l}(q) =
∑
i=j,k,l s
{j,k,l}
i Γ
f
i (q)P
{j,k,l}(qi)∑
i=j,k,l s
{j,k,l}Γfi (q)
i
.
Moreover for all i ∈ {j, k, l}, we have (P ◦Γf ){j,k,l}(qi)) = P i and (s{j,k,l}i )i∈{j,k,l} are
unique up to multiplication by a positive number.
Similar to BGSS or Bleile (2014a) (or Chapter 2), we can show that the similarity
values s
{j,k,l}
i are independent of the choice of j, k and l for all i ∈ {j, k, l}, since
filtering is not present in the arguments. Thus we can define for all q ⊆ f ∈ ∆
(P ◦ Γf )s(q) :=
∑
i≤m siΓ
f
i (q)P
i∑
i≤m siΓ
f
i (q)
.
The aim is to show that for all (q, f) ∈ ∆ × ∆ such that q ⊆ f (P ◦ Γf )(q) =
(P ◦ Γf )(q).
Step 2.2: Completion to all (q, f) ∈ ∆×∆
By Step 1 we know that the claim (P ◦ Γf )s(q) = (P ◦ Γf )(q) is true for all (q, f)
such that div(f) ≤ 3. We take this as the base case of our induction.
For the induction assumption, we have that (P ◦ Γf )s(q) = (P ◦ Γf )(q) for all
(q, f) ∈ ∆×∆ with q ⊆ f and div(f) ≤ k − 1.
The induction step considers q, f ∈ ∆ with q ⊆ f and div(f) ≤ k :
We can restrict the analysis to f such that div(f) = k, since for all other f ∈ ∆ the
claim is true by the induction assumption.
We split the proof into two parts. First for which div(q) ≤ k − 1 and then for
div(q) = k.
First Situation: Consider q ⊂ f , i.e. div(q) ≤ k − 1.
By Lemma 3.2 (iii), we have Γ(Γf (q)) = ΓΓ
f (q)(Γf (q)) = Γf (q) and hence directly
(P ◦ Γf )(q) = (P ◦ ΓΓf (q))(Γf (q)), (3.9)
since Γf (q) ⊆ q by definition of a filter and hence div(Γf (q)) ≤ k − 1 the induc-
tion assumption applies to the RHS of equation (3.9), i.e. (P ◦ ΓΓf (q))(Γf (q)) =
(P ◦ ΓΓf (q))s(Γf (q)) which is again identical to (P ◦ Γf )s(q) and hence the desired
result (P ◦ Γf )s(q) = (P ◦ Γf )(q) is implied directly.
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Second Situation: Consider q ⊆ f with div(q) = k
A similar construction as in BGSS, but with different reasoning, yields the result.
Let q =
∑
l∈K αlq
l with αl > 0 and K ⊆ {1, ...,m} such that |K| = k.
Define the frequency vector q(l) to be the vector in conv({(qj)j∈K\l}) such that q
lies on the line (q(l), ql).
By the minimal attention span property div(Γq(q)) = div(◦{l:ql>0}Γq(ql)) ≥ 3, i.e.
there exist at least three l’s (e.g. l = i, j, k) such that Γq(ql) = ql 6= 0m and hence
(P ◦ Γq)(ql) = P l = (P ◦ Γq)s(ql).
Further, for these l ∈ {i, j, k} we get (P ◦Γq)s(q(l)) = (P ◦Γq)(q(l)) by the result of
the first situation, since div(q(l)) ≤ k − 1.
Hence we have that (P ◦ Γq)s(q), (P ◦ Γq)(q) ∈ (P l, (P ◦ Γq)(q(l))) =: L(l), for
those three l = i, j, k. Since no three P j are collinear, there are at least two dis-
tinct lines L(l), i.e. L(l) 6= L(n) for at least two distinct l, n ∈ {i, j, k}. Since
(P ◦ Γq)s(q), (P ◦ Γq)(q) are both on these distinct lines and these lines need to
intersect uniquely, we have (P ◦ Γq)s(q) = (P ◦ Γq)(q). By the ignorance property
(P ◦ Γq)(q) = (P ◦ Γf )(q) for all f with div(f) = k, which completes the proof. .
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Categorization
Abstract
An agent needs to determine a belief over potential outcomes for a new problem
based on past observations gathered in her database (memory). There is a rich lit-
erature in cognitive science showing that human minds process information in cat-
egories, rather than piece by piece. We assume that agents are naturally equipped
(by evolution) with a efficient heuristic intuition how to categorize information in
general.. Depending on how available categorized information is activated and pro-
cessed, we axiomatize two different versions of belief formation relying on categoriza-
tions. In one approach an agent relies only on the estimates induced by the single
pieces of information contained in so called target categories that are activated by
the problem for which a belief is asked for. Another approach forms a prototype
based belief by averaging over all category-based estimates (so called prototypical
estimates) corresponding to each category in the database. In both belief forma-
tions the involved estimates are weighted according to their similarity or relevance
to the new problem. We impose normatively desirable and natural properties on
the categorization of databases. On the stage of belief formation our axioms spec-
ify the relationship between different categorized databases and their corresponding
induced (category or prototype based) beliefs. The axiomatization of a belief forma-
tion in Billot et al. (Econometrica, 2005) is covered for the situation of a (trivial)
categorization of a database that consists only of singleton categories and agents
basically do not process information categorical.
4.1 Introduction and motivation
Often agents need to evaluate and judge the likelihood of future uncertain events.
On which basis can individuals derive and assign likelihoods and form probabilistic
beliefs over random incidents?
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Traditionally, economic theory models uncertainties in a state space representation
a la Savage (1954) and Bayes and derive a subjective prior based on observable
actions of the agent. However, this procedure implicitly assumes that agents already
know or are endowed with a subjective prior belief, which they express through their
observable actions. In this way, the Savage and Bayesian approach does not advice
agents how to find or form a prior explicitly. Basically, the belief is purely subjective
and offers no mechanism to incorporate information directly into a belief formation.
Consequently, their normatively appealing and convincing approach to endogenously
derive a belief is not feasible in situation in which an agent might not be able to
condense her insufficient or too complex information into a consistent state space.
We consider an axiomatization of belief formation that allows and requires to
take directly into account the available information (gathered in form of a list or
database of past observations or cases). The influence of data and experience on
the formation of a probabilistic belief was examined initially by the axiomatization
of Billot et al. (2005) (BGSS from now on). The axiomatizations of BGSS and
related ones of Eichberger and Guerdjikova (2010) (EG) (for ambiguous multiprior
beliefs) and Bleile (2014a) (precision dependent cautious beliefs) yield that a belief
induced by a database is a similarity weighted average of the estimations induced
by all observed cases in the database. Thereby similarity weights capture different
degrees of relevance of the potentially very heterogenous information.
A common shortcoming of these approaches to belief formation is that an agent
processes each distinct single piece of information separately and forms its induced
estimate. Interpreting a database as memory an agent is assumed to store (memo-
rize) all single pieces of information and needs to retrieve any single piece of infor-
mation from her memory.1
However, numerous studies in (social) psychology and cognitive science show that
humans do not store and treat single pieces of information in such a one by one
procedure, but classify information in different categories. The prominent social
psychologist Allport (1954) memorably noted ”the human mind must think with
the aid of categories. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends
upon it ”. There is a wealth of research demonstrating that humans’ cognition pro-
cesses information by employing categorical thinking, reasoning and stereotyping.2
1An axiomatization that does not take into account all potentially available information in this
vein is Bleile (2014b)(or Chapter 3). It deals with a two stage belief formation that consists of
a initial filtering process that ”screens and selects” the information that finally flows into the
belief formation process.
2The psychology literature on categorization is vast, e.g. see Rosch and Lloyd (1976), Murphy
and Medin (1985), Goldstone (1994), Rips (1989), Smith et al. (1998), Medin and Aguilar
(1999), Murphy (2002). Real life examples discuss that consumers categorize products (Smith
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In particular, one can interpret categorization as model of similarity-based reasoning
(Tversky (1977), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995)) in which information needs not to
be understood in its particularity, but as member of a larger classified category that
allows to generalize properties from category members to new members through
analogies and similarities. This makes categorical thinking especially helpful for
predictions (Osherson et al. (1990), Anderson (1991)).
In order to capture the impact of categorical thinking and reasoning in agent’s
belief, we modify and extend the mentioned axiomatic approaches (in particular
BGSS) by adding a categorization procedure that affects the processing, storing,
retrieving and employing of potentially available information.
In complex and poorly understood environments, categorizations emerge naturally
to simplify actions by gathering many distinct experiences together and ignoring the
details of each single piece of information. Limited learning and memorizing oppor-
tunities drive agents into relying on abstractions and (categorical) summarizations
rather than on single past cases. Processing and storing of all past cases in full detail
bears costs in storing and retrieving the information, since the finer information is
stored the more effort is required to activate it. The classification of information
in different categories offers a less demanding way of storing and retrieving infor-
mation, since only the assignment to suitable categories and their characteristics
needs to be memorized. In particular, the literature on ”optimal” categorization
focuses on the issue how fine or coarse categories ought to be formed in order to
process information in a way to gain a maximum amount of information with the
least cognitive effort. In particular, it should be more efficient than some other form
of case-based reasoning, as for instance kernel-based estimation.
Another important function of categorical reasoning concerns its role for facilitat-
ing and improving inductive inference and prediction. The underlying idea is that
an assignment to categories does allow an agent not only to use the information
contained in the current problem, but exploit as well the additional information
provided by the categories to which this problem belongs (or which it activates). Of
course, this is only helpful if the previous experiences contained in the specific cate-
gories provide some information for the actual problem such that the agent can infer
or generalize some information and properties from past observations in the cate-
gories. From this perspective, a categorization of information enables and implicitly
provides an agent with additional (more detailed) information than mentioned in the
initial description of the problem. Ideally categories are formed like sufficient statis-
1965), investors engage in ”style investing” (Sharpe (1992), Bernstein (1995)), rating agencies
categorize firms wrt. default risk (Coval et al. (2009)), etc.
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tics for its assigned members and thus would make prediction particularly simple
and reliable.3
In this chapter, we are not concerned with the formation of categories, but assume
that a set of (optimal) categories is already naturally or evolutionary determined.4
In particular, we are solely interested in an axiomatic description on how categorized
information is incorporated into a belief formation by agents.
The categorization literature identified several procedures in using categorical
thinking for belief formation. The approaches differ in the way how many categories
are taken into account. Either all categories are considered or only some specific
target category(ies) are taken into account. Another difference concerns (a still on-
going discussion about) the issue how categories are represented themselves. Either
categories are represented by an aggregated summarizing representative that cap-
tures the essence or central tendency of the category - a so called prototype - or all
members of the category are used for its representation.5
There is experimental evidence in psychology that individuals tend to rely on
(a single) most likely target category(ies), whereas the other categories (and their
content) are immaterial for the belief formation (e.g. Murphy and Ross (1994),
Krueger and Clement (1994), Malt et al. (1995)). When faced with a new problem,
an agent’s mind activates automatically some already generated category(ies) that
are best fitting according to some metric for the current problem.6 Depending on
how an agent treats categories she will form her belief either based on all single pieces
of information contained in the target category(ies) or use the estimates induced by
a prototypical representative associated with the (target) category(ies). Our first
axiomatization of a category based belief formation will adopt this approach based
on activated target categories, which simplifies (cognitively) the belief formation,
since an agent only needs to process the information that is directly evoked for the
current problem.
The second stream of literature -which is covered in our second axiomatization of
3Peski’s (2011) categorization model can be interpreted as such an optimal statistical procedure.
4Traditionally, categories are formed based on (attribute-wise, overall, functional or casual) simi-
larity considerations. Roughly speaking, in general categories are often formed as to maximize
the similarity of objects within a category and the dissimilarity of objects from different cate-
gories. However, there is an ongoing discussion and debated whether categorization presupposes
a notion of similarity or not (see Goldstone (1994) and Ga¨rdenfors (2000), Pothos (2005)). For
instance some literature argue that categorization is theory or rule-based (according to various
criteria).
5There are also approaches in between (Vanpaemel and Storms (2008)), but we stick to the
benchmark procedures.
6For example by comparing the actual problem to the prototypical problem of different categories
until a closest match is found. The automaticity in categorical thinking is discussed e.g. in
Allport (1954), Bargh (1994, 1997, 1999).
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a prototype based belief- is based on the prototype of all categories in a database.
Such a prototype based belief adopts the approach taken in Anderson (1991) and
models the situation, in which an agent might not be able to figure out best fit-
ting target category(ies). The simplifying power of categorization in this approach
results from taking into account all (categorized) information through prototypical
summaries and not by memorizing and retrieving all single pieces of information.
This reduces the cognitive and memorization effort. It averages the particular pro-
totypical estimates induced by the categories.
Our axiomatizations of both kinds of belief formation -category and prototype
based- are based on modified and extended versions of the axioms of BGSS and
partly Bleile (2014b) (or Chapter 3). Categorization based belief formations can be
seen as two stage procedures. First, agents are endowed with a natural categoriza-
tion structure on the in principle available information (e.g. like through a natural
or evolutionary developed optimal heuristic algorithm). On the basis of this cate-
gorization structure and the current problem, the available information (provided
by the database/memory of past experiences) will be categorized. We will assume
some reasonable, natural and well known -but rather weak- properties on this in-
duced categorization of databases. The (structural) properties on the (induced)
categorization of databases differ for our two versions of categorization based belief
formation. However, a common feature concerns our main requirement that an agent
will not categorize any database, but that databases must be sufficiently complex
or diverse to initiate a categorization process. We assume that a database need to
contain a minimum amount of distinct cases such that an agent really (wants to)
thinks in categories.7 However, this is a quite natural requirement, since one rea-
son for categorizing information is to overcome limitations in processing cognitively
challenging information or environments. Another common property says that the
order of cases in a database is immaterial for the categorization, i.e. a categorization
procedure depends only on content and not on the sequences of pieces of informa-
tion.
For a prototype based belief we require that a ”real” category ought to contain a
minimum number of distinct cases. In particular, we require for a prototype based
belief formation that a database is categorized (in some accordance with the natu-
ral categorization) in such a way that at most one singleton category exits and all
other non empty categories consist of at least two members. Of course a degenerate
categorization in which each category contains only one member is meaningless for
7Complexity is certainly related to the number of options to be considered, but also few options
characterized by difficult interwoven features might be challenging to evaluate.
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our purpose (and is covered directly by BGSS).
The second stage of a belief formation based on categorized information deals with
the behavioral impacts on the actual belief level. As in BGSS, we require that the
belief is independent of the order of the (categorized) information and that some form
of Concatenation Axiom holds. Explicitly, a belief induced by the combination of
two databases should lie between the beliefs induced by the two databases separately.
However, to keep the normatively appealing spirit of the axiom, we need to ensure
that the categorized information of the combination of two databases coincides with
the combination of the two separately categorized underlying databases.8
The particular properties of the categorization procedures and the axioms on the
belief formation level guarantee that the beliefs based on categorized information
can be represented only based on information in the target categories evoked by the
new problem (i.e. as the category based belief) or based only on all prototypes of
the categorized information (i.e. as the prototype based belief).
As already mentioned, there exist research discussing predictions based on cate-
gorical thinking, but none of them is of an axiomatic nature. However, we are solely
interested in the behavioral foundation of a belief formation based on categorized
information. Our approach is closest to BGSS and Bleile (2014b) with regard to the
proposed axioms. In particular, a category based belief can be seen as a special case
of a belief formation under limited attention as axiomatized in Bleile (2014b). Such
a filtered belief relies only on pieces of information that are contained in a so called
consideration set that gather all information that survive a filtering stage. Basically,
the evoked target categories can be interpreted as such a consideration set and thus
a category based belief is a specifically filtered belief.
Concerning the two axiomatized procedures of employing categorized informa-
tion, the most relevant works are Anderson (1991) for the prototype based belief
and Murphy and Ross (1994) for the category based belief. The existing literature
deals either with applying prediction procedures based on categorized information
and discussing its consequences for specific situation (e.g. Mullainathan (2002)) or is
concerned with how and why ”optimal ” formations of categories emerge (Fryer and
Jackson (2008), Mohlin (2014), Peski (2011)). The mentioned papers all employ a
belief formation relying on prototypes (of the main target categories or the category
the current problem belongs to). However, they all differ with regard to their notion
of an ”optimal” categorization. In Fryer and Jackson (2008) the optimal categoriza-
8For the axiomatization of a prototype based belief we deal with this issue in a similar spirit as in
Bleile (2014b) by introducing another simultaneously available (super)-database, which serves
as the common reference which ”dictates” the categorization in a consistent manner for any
subdatabase.
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tion minimizes the sum (across categories) of within category variations between
objects that have already been encountered (for an exogenously fixed number of
categories). Mohlin (2014) aims to find the optimal number of categories in order
to minimize the prediction error, which amounts to tackling the tradeoff between
small and fine or more coarse but larger categories to avoid overfitting problems
(which is also the principle rational of Peski (2011) and Al Najjar and Pai (2014)
for decision making). Peski (2011) shows when categorical learning is optimal for
prediction (in the sense of an (asymptotic) statistical tool equivalent to learning
by Bayesian updating). He compares a categorization algorithm with Bayesian up-
dating. The underlying assumption is that the environment is symmetric meaning
that the Bayesian prior is symmetric. The categorization algorithm is such that
categories are formed in order to minimize the inner entropy of the categories, i.e.
to maximize the informational content in the categories. His categorization proce-
dure combines deductive reasoning (i.e. learn to form categories) and applying the
deduced categorization inductively to belief formation. This is structural impossible
in our axiomatization.
The following section will introduce the database related framework. Section
4.3 illustrates by means of an example the two beliefs based on categorizations.
In Section 4.4 our natural categorization structure is discussed. Section 4.5 and 4.6
cover the categorization of databases, the axioms on the belief level and the resulting
belief formations for both categorization based belief formations separately. We
conclude in Section 4.7. All proofs can be found in the last two sections.
4.2 The model
In this section, we introduce the case-based information framework and the basic
building blocks of our belief formation based on filtered information. Further, we
introduce some definitions and notations necessary for our approach.
4.2.1 Database framework
A basic case c = (x, r) consists of a description of the environment or problem
x ∈ X and an outcome r ∈ R, where X = X1 ×X2 × ....×XN is a finite set of all
characteristics of the environment, in which Xj denotes the set of possible values
features j can take. R denotes a finite set of potential outcomes, R = {r1, ..., rn}
The ordered set C ⊆ X ×R consists of all m ≥ 3 basic cases, i.e. C = {c1, ..., cm}.
A database D is a sequence or list of basic cases c ∈ C. The set of databases D
consisting of L cases, i.e. D = (c1, ..., cL) where ci ∈ C for all i ≤ L, is denoted
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by CL and the set of all databases by C∗ = ∪L≥1CL, including the empty database
∅. The description of databases as sequence of potentially identical cases allows
multiple observation of an identical case to be taken into account and treated as an
additional source of information.
For a database D ∈ C∗, fD(c) denotes the relative frequency of case c ∈ C in
databases D.
The concatenation of two databasesD = (c1, c2, ..., cL) ∈ CL and E = (c′1, c′2, ..., c′T ) ∈
CT (where ci, c
′
j ∈ C for all i ≤ L, j ≤ T ) is denoted by D◦E ∈ CL+T and is defined
by D ◦ E := (c1, c2, ..., cL, c′1, c′2, ..., c′T ).
In the following we will abbreviate the concatenation or replication of L-times the
identical databases D by DL. Specifically, cL represents a database consisting of
L-times case c.
For any D ∈ C∗ the diversity of a database D is given by div(D) := |{D}|, where
as usual {D} denotes the set of different cases contained in database D. So div(D)
gives the number of different cases contained in database D.
We need to translate some relations from sets to the list framework.
Definition 4.1
(i) The ∈-relation on databases is defined by c ∈ D if fD(c) > 0.
(ii) The ⊆-relation on the set of databases C∗ is defined by D ⊆ E ⇔ fD(c)|D| ≤
fE(c)|E| for all c ∈ C. We will call such databases to be nested.
(iii) The ∩-relation on databases is given by D ∩ E = ((cmin{fD(c)|D|,fE(c)|E|})c∈C)
(iv) Two databases D and E are disjoint if for all c ∈ C: c ∈ D if and only if c 6∈ E.
The definitions are basically independent of the order of cases in the databases.
Note however that the definition of ∩-relation in (iii) is very specific, since the order
of C is transferred, i.e. by intersection a specific order (on C) is induced.9
4.2.2 Induced belief
For a finite set S, ∆(S) denotes the simplex of probability vectors over S and for
n ∈ N ∆n denotes the simplex over the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
As in BGSS, EG and Bleile (2014a) an agent forms a belief over outcomes P (x,D) ∈
∆(R) in a certain problem characterized by x ∈ X using her information captured
in a database D ∈ C∗, i.e. P : X × C∗ → ∆(R).
9In contrast to intersections of sets, where orderings are immaterial, intersection of databases do
require some assumption on resulting orderings.
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4.3 Motivating example
In order to illustrate the basic idea and plausibility of categorization based belief
formation, we incorporate the two categorization procedures into the doctor example
of BGSS.
A doctor needs to evaluate different outcomes of a treatment. She has some
working experience or access to some medical database related to the treatment
D = (c1, ..., cl), where she recorded in a case ci = (xi, ri) the vector of characteristics
of a patient i, xi ∈ X, (e.g. age, gender, weight, blood count, specific illness) and
the observable outcome of the treatment ri ∈ R (e.g. better, worse, adverse effects).
A new patient characterized by x enters her office and using a medical record D, the
doctor wants to derive a belief Px(D) ∈ ∆(R) over potential outcomes in R. She
might apply an empirical frequency and use only a part Dx of the database D, which
contains only cases c = (xc, rc) of patients with ”identical” characteristics xc = x
compared to the current patient,
”Frequentist”: Px(D) =
∑
c∈Dx δrc
|Dx| .
However, if the database contains not sufficiently many of these ”identical” patients
x, she might want to include also ”similar” patients. She judges the degree of
similarity between patients x and x′ by s(x, x′) ∈ R+. Further, she might induce
from a case c = (xc, rc) not only a point estimate δrc on the realized outcome, but
derives a more general estimate P c ∈ ∆(R) on likelihoods of particular (related)
outcomes and forms the belief as axiomatized in BGSS (2005) by
”BGSS-belief”: Px(D) =
∑
c∈D s(x, xc)P
c∑
c∈D s(x, xc)
.
However, as discussed above, the cognitive science literature emphasized the role of
categories in storing, retrieving and processing of information. The literature argues
as well for a naturally (by evolution) given ability or heuristic feeling to categorize.
Thus, assume the doctor is implicitly able to categorize the set C of all potentially
possible patient-outcome pairs (x, r) ∈ C into different categories C˜l ⊂ C for l ≤ L,
such that the set C˜ = {C˜1, .., C˜L} partitions the set of all possible cases c = (x, r).
For example category C˜1 contains all male patients, with age below 60 years, any
weight, good blood count and sore throats and category C˜l contains all male pa-
tients, overweight and heart problems and so forth. In general, categories might
be exclusive or non-disjoint, for instance male patients might appear in different
categories. Such an implicit preexisting natural categorization structure might be
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subconsciously rooted in the mind of a doctor and induces some consistent (embed-
ded) categorization of a database D. Alternative, one might think of the preexisting
natural categorization structure as the patient groups that the doctor are taught at
medical school and the database D as the experience she made working in a hospital.
Receiving information about a new patient, she wants to predict the outcome based
on (a natural or taught) categorization of her past experience. Depending on how
the doctor uses her categorized patient database D, she might form a category or
prototype based belief as follows.
Suppose the current patient x is male, older than 40 years, overweight, etc. and
the doctor knows for each characteristic its value. The doctor partitioned her expe-
rience D with the treatment into categories consistent with the natural (preexisting)
categorization. A specific patient x might trigger, activate or evoke automatically
the category(ies) to which this patient belongs, is related to or matches best. For
example this might be the category C˜1 (as above) ”synchronized” (intersected) with
the actually experienced database D, which we denote by C˜(x,D) ⊆ D. Thus,
not only the identical patient profiles are recalled and considered, but the entire
x-evoked category in D that also may contain different, but somehow similar or re-
lated patients (according to the criteria for categorization, which might be optimal
for predictive tasks by evolution). A doctor might form a category based belief
based only on the members the category(ies) that patient x evokes, i.e. C˜(x,D),
”Category based belief”: Px(D) =
∑
c∈C˜(x,D) s(x, xc)P
c∑
c∈C˜(x,D) s(x, xc)
,
where as above s measures the similarity between the current patient and the al-
ready treated patients.
Of course C˜(x,D) might not consist only of a single category, but several categories
that are activated by the patient x.
Alternatively, the doctor might have already categorized her experience D prior a
new patient arrives, i.e. C˜D = {C˜D1 , .., C˜DL } for l ≤ L, such that
⋃
l≤L C˜
D
l = D in a
consistent manner with respect to the (preexisting) natural categorization structure
C˜. Furthermore, she might have formed some prototypical estimates P C˜
D
l ∈ ∆(R)
for each of these categories. For a given database D and a new patient x, the doctor’s
prototype based belief in such a situation might be given by a weighted average
of these prototypical estimates, where the weights are determined by the relevance
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of the particular category for the current patient, i.e. s˜(x, C˜Dl ) for all l ≤ L,10
”Prototype based belief”: Px(D) =
∑
l≤L s˜(x, C˜
D
l )P
C˜Dl∑
l≤L s˜(x, C˜
D
l
.
4.4 Natural evolutionary (optimal) categorization
structure
Definition 4.2
A (natural) categorization structure C˜ = {C˜1, .., C˜L} on the set of basic cases C
partitions C into L different nonempty categories C˜l ⊆ C for l ≤ L ∈ N, i.e.
C =
⋃
l≤L{C˜l}.
The definition allows non-disjoint categories, since it is quite naturally that a case
could be classified into multiple categories if a categorization depends on more than
one criterion. For instance, the categories of young and male patients are not neces-
sarily disjoint, when gender and age are criteria. Moreover, hierarchical categories
are not mutually exclusive, e.g. the category of young patients and the one of young
male patients.
We will not care about the formation of categories and assume that agents are
naturally endowed with an idea, how to construct categories. In particular, through
evolutionary pressure nature equipped us with an heuristic algorithm or tool that
allows to form categorizations that organize our experience in an almost optimal
way for prediction and that tends to minimize prediction errors (and thus increase
the likelihood to survive and stay fit). This is supported by the findings that young
children appear to form, acquire and use categories from very early on (Gelman
and Markman (1986), Smith (1989), Murphy (2002)), showing also that many cat-
egorizations are innate.11 However, if the categorization is based on data, the de-
velopmental literature shows that especially in the beginning of learning (i.e. with
small databases (i.e. for children)) the categorization is still flexible (Hayne (1996),
Quinn and Eimas (1996)). This concern is immaterial for a natural categorization,
since it is based already on all potential pieces of information. However, we will
take care of it, when we consider categorization induced by database (in particular
in the framework of a prototype based belief formation).
Another justification for assuming such a fixed preexisting categorization structure
on the set of all potential cases is by interpreting it as a result of an already developed
10Alternatively, s˜ measures likelihood of patients x to be assigned or belonging to the particular
category.
11It is not observable that children rely on on purely empirical learning.
126
4.5 Axiomatization of category based belief formation
optimal categorization with regard to numbers and content of the categories. The
literature varies in the way how they define an optimal categorization (as already
discussed in the introduction, e.g. Fryer and Jackson (2008), Peski (2011), Mohlin
(2014)).
A more direct reason, why we assume a preexisting natural categorization is based
on the fact that we want to avoid the many difficult and interacting mechanisms
involved in a categorization process12 and want to focus solely on the belief formation
issue.
Also in the literature it is not uncommon to assume a fixed preexisting catego-
rization structure (Anderson (1991), Murphy and Ross (1994), Mullainathan (2002),
Manzini and Mariotti (2012), Al-Najjar and Pai (2014) or Mohlin’s (2014) ex ante
optimal categorization).
4.5 Axiomatization of category based belief formation
4.5.1 Specific properties of the categorization procedure
In this section we specify the list of categories a problem x ∈ X evokes or activates
and our concept of a x-evoked categorization of a database.
Problem evoked categorization of a database
The definition of a problem evoked categorization of information captures the intu-
ition that a new problem activates specific most appropriate or relevant categories
(that are already generated in the natural categorization structure). An agent takes
into account these ”target” categories for the current problem.
Definition 4.3
For all x ∈ X a categorization structure C˜ induces a list C˜x of categories that problem
x evokes. For all x there exist a Mx ⊆ {1, .., L}, such that C˜x := ((C˜l)l∈Mx) ∈ C∗
We call C˜x the categories that are activated (evoked) by problem x or short
x-activated categories.
There is substantial experimental evidence showing that when faced with an object,
humans’ brains automatically activate category(ies) that (according to some metric)
appears to suit the current problem best (with regard to best fitting, most likely
12e.g. initial encoding, abstraction of conceptual representation (if any), storage of the abstraction
and/or exemplars in memory, retrieval of stored representations, decision process that produce
categorization or typicality, see Murphy and Ross (1994).
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or analogous category(ies)).13 Basically, a new problem does not trigger some most
relevant single pieces of information, but the activation process is based on categor-
ical thinking.
Our definition does not specify the exact procedure of activation. However, for our
purpose to form a belief given a current problem, i.e. the characteristic part of case
x ∈ X, it is most reasonable to think about a categorization of past observations
according to their characteristics.14 In this way, the characteristic x can be seen
as a basic sensory input such that categories are formed based on a relationships
between the characteristics of the cases (e.g. like a metric on the characteristics
space or feature overlaps, etc.). In this way, for instance a very specific procedure to
evoke categories might solely activates categories that contain a case that coincides
(with regard to the characteristic part) with the current problem, i.e. C˜x is the
list of categories that contain at least one case with characteristic x ∈ X, i.e. let
Al := {x ∈ X|∃c = (x, r) ∈ C s. th. c ∈ C˜l} for all l ≤ L, then
C˜x := (1A1(x)C˜1, 1A2(x)C˜2, ...., 1AL(x)C˜L) ∈ C∗.
Such an procedure would imply that cases with different characteristics than x are
only activated if they are contained in categories that include member cases with
characteristic (problem) x.15
However, our definition is general and thus may not necessary rely on the x charac-
teristics specifically, but may take into account the categories that are activated by
any characteristics that are close or related to x. Furthermore another widely ac-
cepted procedure depends on the closest ”distance” (with respect to similar, salient,
related, familiar) to the prototypical element of a categories (e.g. Rosch and Lloyd
(1978)), which then trigger their corresponding category(ies) members.
Properties on problem activated categories
Now we define a consistent transfer to activations of the categories in a database.
Based on a natural categorization structure C˜ = {C˜1, C˜2, ...., C˜L}, we will define a
function C˜ : X × C∗ → C∗ that determines the single pieces of information in a
database D ∈ C∗ that belong to categories that are activated by a specific problem
x ∈ X.
13Some research on this issue is mentioned in the introduction. Note that under automaticity
subjects are often not even aware of this process.
14However, an outcome dependent categorization is in principle also possible.
15Such a categorization is only useful if cases with different characteristics are in the same cate-
gories.
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Thereby, our main assumption concerns a minimal amount of distinct cases in a
database that initiates categorical processing of information in agents’ minds. For
a less diverse or complex database (i.e. div(D) ≤ k) an agent’s brain does not
start to simplify and reduce the set of information by categorizing the information,
but will just process, inspect and take into account all single pieces of information
directly. However, for more diverse or complex databases agent’s mind will initiate a
rough (problem evoked) classification of the database in accordance with the natural
categorization C˜ and then consider in detail only the information in her database
that are also contained in categories activated by the current problem.
Definition 4.4 Induced minimal categorization
Let C˜ be a categorization structure on C and k ∈ N with k ≥ 3 . A database
C˜(x,D) results from a categorization function C˜ : X × C∗ → C∗16 that categorizes
each database D ∈ C∗ according to the categories in C˜x that are evoked by problem
x ∈ X. We call C˜(x,D) the x-evoked/activated categorized database D (for cognitive
ability level k) and define it for all D ∈ CT for all T ∈ N by
C˜(x,D) :=
{
D ∩ (cT )c∈C for div(D) ≤ k
D ∩ (C˜x)T for div(D) > k.
In the following, we will fix k = 3 without loss of generality. Obviously C˜(x,D) ⊆ D.
Example:
In order to clarify the definition of the categorization function for a database D ∈ CT
such that div(D) > 3, i.e. C˜(x,D) := (C˜x)
T ∩D, consider the following situation.
Let D = (c21, c2, c
4
3, c6, c
3
7) ∈ C11, i.e. div(D) = 5, and a categorization structure
induced by problem x ∈ X C˜x = (C˜1, C˜2), where C˜1 = (c1, c2) and C˜2 = (c2, c4, c7).
Then (C˜x)
11 ∩D = (c1, c2)11 ◦ (c2, c4, c7)11 ∩D ≈ (c21, c2, c37) (up to order), which is
normatively and descriptively appealing for such a categorized database.
Remark 4.1
(i) Since C˜x is insensitive to repetitions of cases, we need to ensure that repeated
observations in D ∈ CT are captured, which is guaranteed by introducing the T-
replicated C˜x.
17
(ii) An immediate consequence of the minimal induced categorization property is that
16With slight abuse of notation we name the function and the natural categorization identical to
emphasize that for each fixed categorization structure a corresponding function can be defined,
i.e. that the function relies on this fixed categorization structure like a parameter.
17We use the total length of the database just for simplicity. One might also take the maximal
amount of a case appears in D.
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for database D such that div(D) ≤ 3, we have no categorization and the framework
(and later defined axioms) coincides with the framework of BGSS. Thus, it enables
us to mirror their proof for these kind of databases.
Apart from the minimality condition for an activated categorization of databases,
the definition makes implicitly three additional important assumptions.
First, a very important ingredient of this definition is that the evoked categories
C˜x are totally unrelated to the database under consideration. Only the underlying
problem activates the relevant categories. In accordance with these categories the
actually available information in the database is intersected. One may argue that a
database itself determines which categories are evoked (or even formed), since the
database might provide some intuition and motivation how to categorize it. How-
ever, our intuition runs solely through a new problem x that activates the relevant
categories in the subconsciously pre-existing natural categorization C˜. In this sense
the induced categorization of the database occurs not directly on the level of the
database.
Second, the ordering of the database D does not affect the resulting categorized
database. Any reordered database pi(D) of the database D results identically acti-
vated categorized information, i.e. the content of the categorized database C˜(x,D)
and C˜(x, pi(D)) coincides. In this sense, the definition induces some categorization
invariance that is driven by our assumption that the categorization is evoked by the
underlying problem x and not by the database. This precludes that a categorization
of a database is affected by order effects.18 However, since the x-evoked categories
are activated independent from any database in our approach, it is quite natural
that their intersections with any reordered database result in the same content.
Finally however, even though the content of differently ordered database are iden-
tical after the categorization, the order of its evoked content (cases) in the catego-
rized databases may still be different, i.e. C˜(x,D) and C˜(x, pi(D)) may consist of
the same content but differently ordered. However, the definition precludes this dif-
ference by assuming a specific ordering for all categorized databases according to the
order on the set of basic cases (induced by the definition of ∩ for databases and the
order on C). Yet, the reason for this assumption is not that we want to restrict the
categorization process on databases in this way, but it is rather an anticipation of
a property (or axiom) we would enforce for the subsequent belief formation. In the
manner of BGSS, an Invariance Axiom on beliefs would say that the belief induced
by a database is determined only by its content and not its ordering in the database,
18For instance a first impression effect might might induce a bias for the category that the first
case in the database is most related to.
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i.e. the beliefs induced by any reordering of the same content coincides. Thus, the
assumption of a specific (seemingly restrictive) order of the categorized databases
is innocent in combination with an Invariance Axiom on the belief stage, since then
the order of any categorized database would be immaterial for a belief.
4.5.2 Induced category based belief
A category based belief is composed of a usual belief P : X × C∗ → ∆(R) and a
previous problem evoked categorization of the underlying information C˜ : X×C∗ →
C∗ (i.e. C˜(x,D) ⊆ D), such that (P ◦ C˜) : X × C∗ → ∆(R), i.e.
(P ◦ C˜)(x,D) = P (x, C˜(x,D)). Faced with a new problem x ∈ X, the agent’s brain
activates or evokes some appropriate categories for this problem according to the
natural categorization structure C˜ and forms the belief based only on those pieces of
information in the activated categories that are actually available in her database,
i.e. subdatabase C˜(x,D) ⊆ D.
In the following we will fix a problem x ∈ X and write for convenience C˜(x,D) =
C˜(D) and for (P ◦ C˜)(x,D) = (P ◦ C˜)(D) when no confusion arises.
4.5.3 Axioms on the level of belief formation
Categorized Invariance Axiom (already implied)
For all D ∈ C∗ and all permutations pi on D, i.e. D = (c1, ..., cT ), then pi(D) =
(cpi(1), ..., cpi(T )) the following holds:
(P ◦ C˜)(D) = (P ◦ C˜)(pi(D)).
The axiom basically says that the order or sequence of appearance of the cases in D
is immaterial for the induced category based belief, only the content matters. Thus,
the axiom is directly implied by our definition of a problem evoked categorization
of databases, since we discussed already that for any two databases containing the
same content, their induced categorization coincide, i.e. C˜(D) = C˜(pi(D)) for all
databases D ∈ C∗ and reordered database pi(D). In this sense the categorized
Invariance Axiom is superfluous and indirectly substituted by the definition of a
categorized database.19
Per se the invariance property does not allow for different impacts if a case appears
earlier or later in a database. However, the order in which information is provided
19Technically speaking, there is no difference between restricting the categorization process to
specific orders or allowing for different orderings and requiring an Invariance Axiom for beliefs.
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or obtained can influence the judgment strongly and may carry information by it-
self. One way to cope with these order effects is to describe the cases informative
enough. E.g. if one wants to capture the position or time of occurrence of a case in
the categorized database, one could implement this information into the description
of the cases itself. Put differently, if one challenges the consequences of an invari-
ance property, then there must be some criteria which distinguishes the cases and
paying attention explicitly to this difference in the description of the case may lead
the agent to reconcile with such an invariance.
Category based Concatenation Axiom
There exists some λ ∈ [0, 1], such that for C˜(D ◦ E) 6= ∅
(P ◦ C˜)(D ◦ E) = λ(P ◦ C˜)(D) + (1− λ)(P ◦ C˜)(E),
where λ = 0 if and only if C˜(D) = ∅.
In the following we will call the database which emerges from concatenation
of other databases as the combined or concatenated database, whereas the
databases used for the concatenation will be called combining or concatenat-
ing databases.
The category based Concatenation Axiom states that a category based belief
induced by a concatenated database is a weighted average of the category based
beliefs induced by its respective combining databases. The axiom captures the
idea that a belief based on the combination of two databases can not lie outside
the interval spanned by the beliefs induced by each combining database separately.
Intuitively it can be interpreted in the following way (stated from an exclusion point
of view): if the information in any database induces an agent’s belief not to exclude
an outcome r, then the outcome r cannot be excluded by the belief induced by the
combination of all these databases.20
However, in order to sustain the normative appealing interpretation of averaging
(category based) beliefs, the categorized concatenation of two databases must co-
incide with the concatenation of these two categorized databases, i.e. the union of
the elements surviving the categorization process for each single database should
not differ from the elements surviving the categorization of the database generated
20Of course the axiom is stronger in the sense that it not only requires that the probability of
such an r is positive, but it should lie between the minimal and maximal assigned probabilities
induced by the combining (filtered) databases.
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by the combination of the two. This would ensure that a category based belief in-
duced by the concatenated database relies on information that is also employed in
the category based beliefs induced by the single concatenating databases. However,
this is directly achieved by the definition of a problem evoked categorization of a
database, i.e. for D ∈ CT and E ∈ CL
C˜(x,D ◦ E) = (C˜x)T+L ∩ (D ◦ E) = ((C˜x)T ∩D) ◦ ((C˜x)L ∩ E) = C˜(x,D) ◦ C˜(x,E)
The category based Concatenation Axiom assumes λ = 0 for databases such that
C˜(D) = ∅. Of course λ 6= 0 would result in inconsistencies, since then (P ◦ C˜)(D ◦
E) = λP (∅) + (1 − λ)(P ◦ C˜)(E), which implicitly states that the category based
beliefs induced by C˜(D ◦ E) and C˜(E) would differ, even though the categorized
databases coincide.
Collinearity Axiom
No three of {((P ◦ C˜)(c))c∈C} such that C˜(c) 6= ∅ are collinear.
Technically speaking this axiom allows to derive an unique similarity function (in
combination with the other axioms), but it has also some reasonable intuition.
Roughly it states that a (non trivial) estimate based on a case is never equiva-
lent to the combined (non-trivial) estimates based on two other cases. Hence, a
case is always informative in the sense that no combination of two other cases can
deliver the same estimation and would make this case ”redundant”. By non trivial
we mean that the case is activated (since a not activated case might only contribute
a trivial (uninformed) uniform-like estimate).
4.5.4 Representation Theorem of category based belief
formation
Theorem 4.1
Let there be a function (P ◦ C˜) : C∗ → ∆(R), where P : C∗ → ∆(R) and C˜ =
{C˜1, ..., C˜L} a categorization structure on C with corresponding induced minimal
categorization function C˜ : C∗ → C∗, i.e. for each D ∈ C∗ a categorized database
C˜(D) ⊆ C∗ is given. Let (P ◦ C˜) : C∗ → ∆(R) satisfy the Collinearity Axiom.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) The function (P ◦ C˜) satisfies the category based Concatenation Axiom
(ii) There exists for each c ∈ C a unique P c ∈ ∆(R), and a unique strictly positive
-up to multiplication by a strictly positive number- function s : C → R+, such that
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for all D ∈ C∗ with C˜(D) 6= ∅
(P ◦ C˜)(D) =
∑
c∈C˜(D) s(c)P
c∑
c∈C˜(D) s(c)
.
Rough sketch of the proof:
The necessity part is straightforward calculation. The sufficiency part follows the
rough structure of the proof of BGSS and Bleile (2014b) (or Chapter 3), but differs
in the crucial arguments. The idea is to transform the framework from the space
of databases to the space of frequency vectors that is structural more tractable, i.e.
the category based belief (P ◦ C˜)(D) =
∑
c∈C˜(D) s(c)P
c∑
c∈C˜(D) s(c)(c)
based on database D ∈ C∗
translates to frequency vectors fD by (P ◦ C˜)(fD) =
∑
j≤m sjC˜j(fD)P
j∑
j≤m sjC˜j(fD)
. In order to
show that this is viable we exploit the structure of the categorization procedure and
the category based Concatenation Axiom.
The essential part of the proof is to derive the similarity weights (si)i≤m. This will
be shown inductively over |C| = m and div(fE) ≤ m.
Step 1: Base case for the induction, i.e. |C| = m = 3. Since C˜(f) = f for all
f such that div(f) ≤ 3, we are exactly in the BGSS framework, which directly de-
liver the result for these kind of frequency vectors.
Step 2: |C| = m > 3 and div(fE) ≤ m.
As in BGSS or Chapter 2, we can show (using C˜(f) = f for all f such that div(f) ≤ 3)
that the similarity weights derived in Step 1 are independent of the triplet {i, j, k}
for any set of basic cases C = {ci, cj, ck} and thus we can define for all f ∈ ∆(C)
(P ◦ C˜)s(f) :=
∑
j≤m sjC˜j(f)P
j∑
j≤m sjC˜j(f)
.
The aim is to show (P ◦ C˜)s(f) = (P ◦ C˜)(f) for all f ∈ ∆(C) via induction over m
and using Step 1 (m = 3) as base case.
Let f = αqj + (1− α)f(j) (*) (for some α ∈ (0, 1)) where f(j) denotes the point in
conv({(ql)l∈{1,...,m}\j}) that is on the line through f and the j-th unit vector qj, as
in BGSS.
(i) If there exists a j ≤ m such that qj 6∈ C˜(f), then the decomposition (*) and
the category based Concatenation Axiom (and induction assumption) delivers the
claim.
(ii) If qj ∈ C˜(f) for all j ≤ m, then there are m many qj such that C˜(qj) 6= 0m.
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Again, the category based Concatenation Axiom applied to the m many decom-
positions yields that (P ◦ C˜)(f) lies in the interior of the intervals spanned by
((P ◦ C˜)(qj), (P ◦ C˜)(f(j))) for all j ≤ m. Combined with the Collinearity Axiom
this delivers a unique intersection of these lines in (P ◦ C˜)(f) and (P ◦ C˜)s(f), since
the elements determining the lines satisfy already the claim by the induction as-
sumption.
Interpretation of Theorem
A category based belief formation can be interpreted as a two stage process in
which in an initial step the rough categorized information is activated by the cur-
rent problem and in a subsequent step the information contained in these activated
categories are processed and evaluated in detail for the belief formation.
A category based belief follows exactly the experimental evidence in psychology in
which individuals focus on the category(ies) that a problem belongs to or are most
relevant and fitting (Murphy and Ross (1994)) and all other categories are imma-
terial, not retrieved and excluded. This implies that an agent does not need to
retrieve or consider all potentially memorized or all past cases (as in BGSS, EG,
Bleile (2014a)). In this way, such a procedure may reduce enormously the cogni-
tive effort, since only a subset of past cases is processed in detail and all pieces of
information that are members of irrelevant categories are not even needed to be
retrieved.
A category based belief is not based on estimations that are associated with
entire categories, but it relies on all estimates induced by the single cases in the
categories activated by the problem. This is an important distinction to the ax-
iomatized prototype based belief in the next section and reflects the disagreement
in the categorization literature on how categories are actually represented. One
stream of literature argues for a representation through all its members (Kruschke
(1992), Medin and Schaffer (1978)), whereas another branch reasons in favor of an
abstracted summary in terms of a prototype representation (e.g. Rosch and Mervis
(1975) and references in Murphy (1994)).21
Since a category based belief relies only on the information of some activated
categories, it can be interpreted as a limited attention model as in Bleile (2014b),
21In general, there is tradeoff between informativeness and economy involved that might be better
balanced by a more intermediary representation as offered in VAM models (Vanpaemel and
Storms (2008)), which allows for varying abstraction levels. It seems that people shift from
using a prototype representation early in training to using an exemplar representation late in
training.
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where a filtered belief22 is based only on some parts of the potentially available
information (so called consideration set that survives a screening/filtering stage).
For a category based belief, the information in the evoked categories can be identified
as the information that is contained in such a consideration set. From this point of
view, the filtering runs on the category level and the categories are roughly screened
with the purpose to ”determine” whether they are appropriate or not for the current
problem. The ”surviving” categories are examined in full detail in the further belief
formation. In this way, the category based belief formation can also be interpreted
as an adaption of the choice model of Manzini and Mariotti (2012b) (”Categorize
then choose”) to belief formation. In particular, the category based belief can be
embedded into a filtered belief in the following way. A filter process Γ : X × C∗ ×
C∗ → C∗ is defined for any x ∈ X by (i) Γ(x,E,E) 6= ∅ for all E ∈ C∗ and (ii)
Γ(x,D,E) = Γ(x,E,E) ∩ D for all D ⊆ E. A problem evoked categorization of a
database E ∈ CT , i.e. C˜(x,E), can be related to a specific filter defined by
Γ(x,E,E) :=
{
E ∩ (cT )c∈C for div(E) ≤ k
(C˜x)
T for div(D) > k.
Then Γ(x,D,E) coincides with C˜(x,D) for all D ⊆ E and all the required properties
of the filter process (order invariance, equal treatment of information, ignorance of
repeated information, consideration property, minimal attention span) are met by
the (x-evoked) categorization function. As well, the category based Concatenation
Axiom translates into its filtered version. In this way, Theorem 4.1 is a corollary of
representation theorem in Bleile (2014b) or Theorem 3.1. However, for the sake of
completeness and self-containedness of the chapter, we state a direct (lighter) proof
of Theorem 4.1 (in Section 4.8).
4.6 Axiomatization of prototype based belief
formation
4.6.1 Specific properties of the categorization procedure
For a prototype based approach we will define a specific categorization of databases
in accordance with a natural categorization structure, but independent of the current
problem of categorizing information. In this regard it differs from the first procedure.
22A filtered belief (P ◦ Γ)(x,D,E) that is based only on some filtered Γ(D,E) ⊆ D information
captured in D, i.e. (P ◦ Γ) : X × C∗ × C∗ → ∆(R).
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Natural categorization structure
Let there be given a natural (evolutionary optimal) categorization structure C˜ as
discussed in Section 4.4. We slightly restrict the natural categorization structure
such that it satisfies some additional structural properties regarding the content of
the categories.
Definition 4.5
For a set of basic cases C we call C˜ = {C˜1, ..., C˜L} for some L ∈ N a categorization
structure, if
(i) C˜k ∩ C˜l = ∅ and
(ii) C = ◦j≤LC˜l and
(iii) for all l < L |C˜l| ≥ 2 and |C˜L| ≥ 1
In contrast to the unrestricted natural categorization structure in the section before,
now the categories are explicitly defined to be disjoint and should contain sufficiently
many elements. Disjointness is natural when a category is identified by a (set of)
property or attribute. An object does either possess a property or it does not,
which implies the disjointness. We stick to disjoint categories mainly for reasons of
technical and notational simplicity, but it could be generalized.
The assumption that almost all categories contain at least two members captures
the motivation to deal with ”real” categories.23 Basically, a ”real” category in our
definition exists whenever at least two heterogenous or distinguishable cases can be
gathered in the same category according to some common criteria. Categorization
is only meaningful if some pieces of information can be classified into a common
genuine category. We rule out a degenerate (trivial) singleton-categorization, in
which all cases get their own category. Furthermore, the optimal categorization
literature (Fryer and Jackson (2008), Mohlin (2014), Peski (2011)) supports our
defining properties (under some mild conditions). It shows that there exist many
more cases than categories and that an optimal categorization results in few and
relatively coarse categories, which implies that ”optimal” categories should contain
many members, i.e. |C˜l| ≥ 2.
The underlying reason originates from a tradeoff between benefits and disad-
vantages of a fine or coarse categorization.24 A finer categorization implies more
23Manzini and Mariotti (2012b) consider a similar requirement for their 2nd version of categoriza-
tion.
24This is closely relate to the problem of over-fitting in statistics, where a too close/precise fit
of limited observations- i.e. using high-dimensional models- comes with risk of loosing the
predictive power.
137
4 Belief Formation Based on Categorization
categories that contain less but more homogenous and similar members, but results
in a decreasing robustness or reliability of a prediction based on these (less precise
or noisy) categories with less many observations. Another compromise concerns
the increasing challenge in searching and identifying the ”correct” category(ies) for
new objects for finer (and more narrow) categorization (e.g. Medin (1983), Jones
(1983)). Thus, an agent might prefer to categorize more coarsely into larger cate-
gories, which is well known and discussed in the psychology literature and referred
to as basic level categories. Basic level categories are neither the most general nor
the most detailed categories.
A categorization based solely on characteristics satisfies our definition under the
condition that the L categories are not empty, since if a case c = (x, r) ∈ C˜l, then
the cases c = (x, ri) would be in the category C˜l for all i ≤ n.
The assumption that there exists at most one singleton category reflects the in-
tuition of a category that might collect the cases that are ”uncategorizable” into
”real” categories.
Specific database induced categorization
Based on a natural categorization structure, we define a specific categorization pro-
cedure for given databases that transmits the idea that there is one category that
contains the ”uncategorizable” elements. Further it assumes - similar to the prob-
lem evoked categorization of databases in Section 4.5.1 - that a minimum amount of
complexity of the database is required in order to initiate categorical thinking and
processing of information. For less diverse databases categorization is not necessary
and the agent considers just all cases in detail.
Definition 4.6
Let C˜ = {C˜1, .., C˜L} be a categorization structure on C. For all E ∈ C∗ a categoriza-
tion of E or E-categorization structure C˜E = {C˜E1 , ..., C˜EL+1} is given in the following
way:
(i) If div(E) < 5, i.e. E = (cri , c
s
j , c
t
k, c
u
n) for distinct i, j, k, n ≤ m and r, s, t, u ∈ N0,
then C˜E = {C˜E1 = {ci}, C˜E2 = {cj}, C˜E3 = {ck}, C˜E4 = {cn}, C˜E5 = ∅, ..., C˜EL+1 = ∅}
Basically C˜E = {{c}c∈E}
(ii) If div(E) ≥ 5, then C˜E := {C˜E1 , ..., C˜EL+1}, where C˜El for l ≤ L is defined as
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follows:
C˜El =
{
C˜l ∩ E if div(C˜l ∩ E) ≥ 2
∅ if div(C˜l ∩ E) ≤ 1
and
C˜EL+1 =
⋃
{l≤L||C˜l∩E|=1}
C˜l ∩ E
Note that by definition C˜El (for all l ≤ L+ 1) does not contain repetitions of cases.
The difference in processing information depending on div(D) Q 5 captures the mo-
tivation to have at least three meaningful categories, in the sense that at least two
”real” non singleton categories exist, which requires div(D) ≥ 5.
A category C˜EL+1 of ”uncategorizable” cases is supported by an implication of opti-
mal categorizations (e.g. Fryer and Jackson (2008)) which shows that experiences
and objects in databases that are not ”easy” to categorize (i.e. tend to form a sin-
gleton category) are more coarsely categorized and more often lumped together (i.e.
gathered in the category of uncategorizable elements C˜L+1).
Remark 4.2
The definition of a categorization of a database implies some sort of categorization
invariance, i.e. categorizations are independent of the order, number and frequency
of cases in a database. More precisely,
C˜E = C˜D for all D,E ∈ C∗ containing the same cases, i.e. for all c ∈ C fD(c) > 0
if and only if fE(c) > 0.
In particular C˜E = C˜E
Z
and C˜E = C˜pi(E) for all re-orderings pi(E) on E.
Basically, we require that a category (and later its prototype) is not affected by
repetitions of already observed information, indirectly saying that categories are
characterized by single observations of different cases and not influenced by their
frequencies. Interestingly, an optimal categorization procedure (a la Jackson and
Fryer (2008)) results as well in categories that remain unchanged when experiences
is simply replicated (and also their prototypes), i.e. C˜E
Z
l = C˜
E
l for some Z ∈ N.25
The categories of an E-categorization structure (that an agent has in mind) can
be evoked or activated by cases that are also contained in another (simultaneously)
available (somehow related) database D.
25However, the optimal categorization of Fryer and Jackson is sensitive to additional already known
information if it concerns only single pieces of information. Increasing the size of only a single
group of cases may lead to a shift in the categorization.
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Definition 4.7
Let D,E ∈ C∗, such that fD(ci) ≥ 0 only if fE(ci) > 0 for all i ≤ m. Then,
the E-categories evoked by D result from an D-induced E-categorization function
C˜ : C∗ × C∗ → P (C∗)
C˜(D,E) := C˜E(D) = (C˜E1 (D), .., C˜
E
L+1(D)), where for all l ≤ L+ 1
C˜El (D) :=
{
C˜El if D ∩ C˜El 6= ∅
∅ otherwise.
The definition is basically some consistency condition (note that C˜El (E) = C˜
E
l ), but
one can interpret it as well in the following way. An agent having already categorized
a database E and is ”simultaneously” faced with processing the less rich database
D (consisting only of already categorized cases in E) will not forget her already
”internalized” E-categorization structure. In particular, the cases in D activate some
categories in the richer E-categorization structure C˜E and it might only happen that
some of these categories are not activated by cases in D, i.e. if for a l ≤ L+1 and all
c ∈ D c 6∈ C˜El , then C˜El is not evoked by D. However, this interpretation does only
apply to ”simultaneously” available and actively categorized databases. It does not
hold for the natural categorization structure that is subconsciously (evolutionary
and automatically) anchored in the brain and thus not actively formed in a process.
An important implication of the definition is that for any reordering pi(D) of the
database D, we have the same list of evoked categories in terms of content as well
as in terms of order, i.e. C˜E(D) = C˜E(pi(D)). In combination with the Remark 4.2,
this implies a categorization invariance, i.e. for any (D,E) ∈ C∗ × C∗ such that
fD(c) ≥ 0 if fE(c) > 0 and appropriate permutations pi, pi′
C˜E(D) = C˜E
L
(DZ) = C˜pi(E)(pi′(D)). (4.1)
This property of a database evoked categorization of information is restrictive, since
the order of cases in D might affect the order in which the E-categories are ac-
tivated.26 However, similar as in Section 4.5.1, this specific assumption is not a
property we want to enforce explicitly, but it is an anticipation of an Invariance Ax-
iom on the belief level, we would have enforced if the evoked categorization structure
would be order sensitive.
26With additional effort on notation and definitions we could take care of orders.
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Admissability of database based categorization
We defined an environment in which pairs of (somehow nested) databases (D,E) ∈
C∗×C∗ affect the belief formation. The richer database E induces some categoriza-
tion, where the cases of D activate the E-categories for the actual process of belief
formation. In such a framework not all potential combinations of databases are
plausible and meaningful for a belief formation based on categorized information.
Our admissibility condition specifies the circumstances under which categorization
of information is normatively and descriptively reasonable.
As discussed already, a categorization heuristics is useful for sufficiently complex
and diverse databases. However, a sufficiently diverse database is not directly com-
plex, e.g. if it is classified into a single (or very few) large category(ies) or into almost
singleton (very fine) categories. Basically, only if sufficiently many meaningful cat-
egories are evoked an agent starts to think and process information categorical and
feels confident in relying on (summarized) information on the category level. For
databases that involve only very few activated databases an agent may not want
to rely on only coarse (imprecise) summaries of these few categories, but might go
through the information case by case in order to be sufficiently informed.27 Thus,
in such a situation a categorization of information does not offer some advantage to
an approach of just taking into account all single pieces of information directly.
Our admissibility condition (i.e. (ii) and (iii)) restricts the pairs of databases for
which an agent starts categorical thinking and processing. It requires that a mini-
mum number of ”real” categories of C˜E (namely three) are in some sense activated
by a database D and considered for its evaluation.
Definition 4.8
The admissible pairs (D,E) ∈ C∗ × C∗ are given by the set A as follows
A :=
{
(D,E) ∈ C∗ × C∗| (i) fD(c) > 0 then fE(c) > 0 for all c ∈ C
(ii) if div(D) = 2 then there must exist c ∈ E\D
such that |C˜E(D ◦ c)| = 3
(iii) if div(D) ≥ 3 then |C˜E(D)| ≥ 3
}
Note that (D,E) ∈ A if and only if (DZ , EL) ∈ A.
A necessary condition for a ”real” categorization is div(E) ≥ 5. For less diverse E
each contained case is interpreted as singleton category and all conditions in A are
27As in the setup of a category based belief or the original belief formation without a categorization
as taken in BGSS, EG, Bleile (2014a).
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naturally satisfied. Thus, we need to discuss the admissibility conditions only for
more diverse databases that induce non trivial singleton categories.
For condition (ii) and (iii) to be satisfied we need |C˜E| ≥ 3, which captures our
motivation to employ only sufficiently ”rich” categorizations. Consequently, those
pairs (D,E) are ruled out such that |C˜E| < 3. Part (iii) captures explicitly the
intuition of ”satisfactorily” many activated E-categories, by enforcing that there
must exist at least three different cases in D that evoke three different E-categories.
For database D such that div(D) = 2 part (ii) requires that both contained dif-
ferent cases need to belong to different categories according to the E-categorization
structure. The underlying idea is that D activates two different E-categories and
thus triggers (makes aware) some categorical thinking and processing. However, if
the database D evokes just one category C˜El in the E-categorization, then an agent
might not initiate any categorical thinking and processing at all or is just not aware
of different categories, but might rely on each single case directly. This is exactly
ruled out by condition (ii).28
The admissibility condition is justifiable in general, but our initial motivation
originates in the most interesting situation D = E. The condition (i) is directly
met. A pair (D,D) with div(D) = 2 is not admissible. This matches our desire
that no categorization is induced for databases that has no sufficiently complex cat-
egorization - i.e. not at least three categories- such that a categorization procedure
offers (summarized) information on the category level for acceptable many cate-
gories. For more diverse databases, div(D) ≥ 3, the admissibility just requires that
the D-categorization structure consists of at least three different categories, as we
desire.
4.6.2 Induced prototype based belief
An agent forms a prototype based belief based on her available admissible pair of
information (D,E) ∈ C∗ × C∗ in the following way. Based on a natural catego-
rization structure C˜, a categorization of a database E result in the categorization
C˜E. An agent evaluates the simultaneously available database D by exploiting the
categorized information C˜E contained in the richer database E that is activated by
cases in D.
Thus, a prototype based belief relies on categories in E that are evoked/activated by
28Note that for all D ⊆ E ∈ C∗ with div(D) = 1 (D,E) is admissible, in particular for any
E ∈ C∗ and all c ∈ E (c, E) ∈ A. This requires an exception of the given interpretation,
since it is obvious that only one E-category can be activated. However, this is driven by the
situation D = E = (cT ), which implies a belief only based on information c (and single category
member), which is acceptable in the light of the desired representation in Theorem 4.2.
142
4.6 Axiomatization of prototype based belief formation
the D induced categorization function C˜ : C∗ × C∗ → C∗ (i.e. C˜(D,E) = C˜E(D))
such that (P ◦ C˜) : X ×C∗ ×C∗ → ∆(R), i.e. (P ◦ C˜)(x,D,E) = P (x, C˜(D,E)) =
P (x, C˜E(D)).29
(P ◦ C˜) is a belief induced by the categories in the richest database available (i.e. E)
that are activated by single pieces of information in the database under considera-
tion (i.e. D). The most intuitive situation is where E = D, in which all D-categories
are employed.
Throughout the paper the problem x is fixed, therefore x is often suppressed in
the following, i.e. (P ◦ C˜)(x,D,E) = (P ◦ C˜)(D,E).
4.6.3 Axioms on the level of belief formation
As already mentioned above, our (restrictive) assumptions on the categorization
procedure (see Remark and 4.2 equation (4.1)) replaces the otherwise imposed In-
variance Axiom.
Implied Invariance Axiom
For all admissible pairs (D,E) ∈ A and D ∈ CT and all permutations pi on T for
all T, we have
(P ◦ C˜)(D,E) = (P ◦ C˜)(pi(D), E)
The Invariance Axiom says that the order of the information in the database is
immaterial for the induced belief. Only their content is important. For a discussion
of the axiom see Section 4.2.
Remark 4.3
Note that in particular (P ◦ C˜)(D,E) = (P ◦ C˜)(pi(D), pi′(E)) by Remark 4.2.
Thus the order invariance accounts for both databases, which is important for the
proof.
Prototype based Concatenation Axiom:
For all D,E, F ∈ C∗ such that (D,F ) ∈ A, (E,F ) ∈ A and (D ◦ E,F ) ∈ A are
admissible pairs, then there exist λ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
(P ◦ C˜)(D ◦ E,F ) = λ(P ◦D)(D,F ) + (1− λ)(P ◦ C˜)(E,F ).
29I.e. P : X × P (C∗)→ ∆(R) relies only on categories.
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The interpretation of the axiom is similar to the Concatenation Axiom in BGSS
and as in Section 4.5.3. In order to keep the normatively desirable spirit of aver-
aging, we need to ensure that the information employed in the belief formation for
the concatenation D ◦ E is meaningfully related to the single databases D and E.
Intuitively, the categories evoked by (D ◦ E) need to be covered by the categories
evoked by either D or E. This can only hold in general if a common categoriza-
tion structure underlies all involved activation processes, i.e. for a common C˜F .
A determination of a belief as an average of two other beliefs would be hard to
justify if the underlying beliefs rely on different categorizations. If so, there might
be very different categories involved in the different beliefs that would prevent an
easy averaging, since no common evaluation basis exists. Of course, to be able to
activate some categories from this common categorization structure, all observed
cases in D and E need to be categorizable with regard to this common basis. Thus,
the F-categorization ought to cover at least the available information in D ◦ E, i.e.
F ⊇ D ◦ E. Moreover, having this categorization structure in mind, it appears
reasonable to employ it in the belief formation process and not to shift to another
less rich categorization, e.g. like moving to a E-categorization for database E, i.e.
C˜E(E). Thus, the assumed structure ensures that C˜F (D ◦ E) = C˜F (D) ∪ C˜F (E)
and therefore the induced beliefs rely on the same F-categories and are only distinct
in the way which categories their contained cases evoke.
The prefix ”prototype based” Concatenation Axiom or belief will become clear in
the representation in Theorem 6.1, which suggests an interpretation of the axiom in
terms of category related prototypes.
Identity Axiom
Let (D1, E), (D2, E) ∈ A and related categorization structure C˜E = {C˜E1 , .., C˜EL+1}.
For all D1, D2 such that C˜
E(D1) = C˜
E(D2) = C˜
E
l for some l ≤ L + 1, then
(P ◦ C˜)(D1, E) = (P ◦ C˜)(D2, E).
The axiom says that the prototype based beliefs induced by databases (given an
E-categorization structure) coincide if the databases evoke only one identical E-
category. In this situation, the specific content of the information is immaterial for
the induced belief, since only the activated category is relevant.
Collinearity Axiom
For all databases D ∈ C∗, no three distinct vectors of {((P ◦ C˜)(c,D))c∈D} are
collinear.
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The interpretation is the same as in Section 4.5 or BGSS.
The only difference is the requirement of distinctiveness, since (P ◦ C˜)(c,D) is iden-
tical for cases in D that are contained in (and activate) the same category. Basically,
no three (prototypical) estimates based on different categories are collinear.
4.6.4 Representation Theorem of prototype based belief
formation
Theorem 4.2
Let (P ◦ C˜) be a function (P ◦ C˜) : C∗ × C∗ → ∆(R), where C˜ : C∗ × C∗ → P (C∗)
is an induced categorization function with underlying E-categorization structures
C˜E = {C˜E1 , ..., C˜EL+1} for all E ∈ C∗. Let the prototype based belief (P ◦ C˜) satisfy
the Collinearity Axiom.
Then the following are equivalent
(i) (P ◦ C˜) satisfies the prototype based Concatenation and Identity Axiom
(ii) For all E ∈ C∗ and any l ≤ L + 1 such that C˜El 6= ∅ there exists a unique
P C˜
E
l ∈ ∆(R) and a unique -up to multiplication by a strictly positive number- strictly
positive function s˜ : C∗ × C∗ → R+, such that for all (D,E) ∈ A the following
representation holds:
(P ◦ C˜)(D,E) =
∑L+1
l=1 s˜(D, C˜
E
l )P
C˜El∑L+1
l=1 s˜(D, C˜
E
l )
.
Moreover, s˜(D ◦ c, C˜El ) > s˜(D, C˜El ) for all c ∈ C˜El .
Rough sketch of the proof:
The necessity part is straightforward calculation. The sufficiency part follows the
rough structure of the proof of BGSS and Bleile (2014b) (or Chapter 3), but differs
in the crucial arguments. Again, the first step is to reason, why it is viable to trans-
form (P ◦ C˜)(D,E) for (D,E) ∈ A into (P ◦ f˜)(fD, fE) for appropriate adjusted
definitions of admissible pairs (fD, fE).
The essential part of the proof is to derive the similarity weights (si)i≤m. This will
be shown inductively over div(fD) ≤ m.
Step 1: Base case for the induction, take any triplet {i, j, k} ⊂ {1, ..,m} such that
fD ∈ conv({(qv)v∈{i,j,k}}), i.e. div(fD) ≤ 3, and (fD, fE) ∈ A.
(i) For (fD, fE) ∈ A such that 2 ≤ div(fD) ≤ 3 and 3 ≤ div(fE) ≤ 4 the categoriza-
tion procedure is vanished and coincide with the BGSS framework.
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(ii) For (fD, fE) ∈ A such that div(fD) ≤ 3 and div(fE) ≥ 4.
(a) For fD ∈ (qi, qj) and (fD, fE) ∈ A, there exist some k-th unit vector qk
such that admissibility condition (ii) holds. Then take the simplex spanned by
{qi, qj, qk} and adopt Step 1 of BGSS, Bleile (2014a,b), i.e. find si, sj, sk, define
(P ◦ f˜)s(fD, fE) and run the recursive procedure to cover all simplicial points on
this simplex for the fixed fE. This yields that for (P ◦ f˜)s(fD, fE) = (P ◦ f˜)(fD, fE)
for all fD ∈ conv({qi, qj, qk}) and fixed fE.
(b) Since for an admissible pair (fD, fE) ∈ A from (a) there might exist many qk
such that the admissibility condition (ii) holds. Repeat (a) for all such k.
(c) Since for fD ∈ (qi, qj) in (a) there exist many fE such that (fD, fE) is admissible,
repeat (a) and (b) for all these fE.
(d) Repeat (a), (b) and (c) for any pair (qi, qj) with distinct i, j ≤ m.
Thus, we have that (P ◦f˜)s(fD, fE) = (P ◦f˜)(fD, fE) for all admissible pairs (fD, fE)
such that div(fD) ≤ 3.
Step 2: For all (fD, fE) ∈ A such that div(fD) > 3
By the properties of the categorization, we know that at least two fE-categories
contain a least two cases and another category contains at least one member, e.g.
f˜ fE1 ⊇ {q1, qi}, f˜ fE2 ⊇ {q2, qj}, etc.
Let fD = αq
j + (1 − α)f(j) (for some α ∈ (0, 1)) where f(j) denotes the point in
conv{(ql)l∈{1,...,m}\j} that is on the line through fD and qj, as in BGSS.
Then the prototype based Concatenation Axiom and the induction assumption de-
livers
(P ◦ f˜)(fD, fE), (P ◦ f˜)s(fD, fE) ∈
⋂
t=1,2
((P ◦ f˜)(qt, fE), (P ◦ f˜)(f(t), fE)).
Applying the Collinearity Axiom yields the uniqueness of the intersection and the
desired result.
Interpretation of Theorem
The theorem is described for general pairs of admissible databases (D,E) ∈ A.
However, the most interesting and natural situation is given by identical information
(D,D), which motivated our examination of a belief formation based on categorized
information. For (D,D) ∈ A, an agent only employs the categorized information in
database D and is not involved in the process of case based activation of categories
as necessary for pairs (D,E) ∈ A. For (D,D), the admissibility condition for a
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”real” categorization of the information D requires that the database D is catego-
rized at least into three different categories (which is in principle only possible for
databases with at least five different cases). Thus, the most interesting and mean-
ingful situation is for (large) databases that allow sufficiently rich categorization
structures.
A prototype based belief formation does not focus on employing the information
contained in the most appropriate evoked (target) categories for a problem, but
it takes into account the entire categorized information in a database. The belief
uses the summarized category based information across all categories. This tries to
compensate for potential misassignments if the actual problem does not allow for
straightforward most appropriate ”target” category(ies). The process is not based
on a detailed piece by piece evaluation of all cases and their induced estimates sepa-
rately, but relies on the summarized coarse information on the category level. This
is in line with the procedure in Anderson (1991). In particular, an agent only needs
to compare and balance the categories (as an entity) at large and use their category
specific predictions. Thus not all single pieces of information need to be evaluated,
which is a severe (cognitive) simplification and captures the underlying aspect and
motivation of a categorization (heuristic). The category based estimation P C˜
D
l is
the main ingredient and eponymous for our belief, since it can be interpreted as
representative or prototypical estimate associated with the category C˜Dl . Each cat-
egory has a unique representative prototypical estimate, which does not distinguish
between between cases in the same category, i.e. for all c ∈ C˜El (P ◦C˜)(c, E) = P C˜El .
Implicitly, this means that a category is understood in terms of a prototypical el-
ement that captures, compresses, aggregates, summaries and abstracts the essence
and central tendency of a category (for prototype theory see e.g. Posner and Keele
(1968), Reed (1972)). A specific representation of such an aggregated prototype
based estimate is not implied, but a very natural prototype is simply the mean
across previously experienced objects in the category. But also other statistics can
serve as prototypes.
The weights (s˜(C˜Dl , D))l that are assigned to each category specific estimate P
C˜Dl
reflect the relevance of category l in the database D for the current problem. The
weights do not only measure the relevance of the categories C˜Dl , but also incor-
porate how often (in similarity weighted terms) this category is activated by the
specific database D.30 Thus, the specific content and structure (frequencies) of the
(activating) databases are taken care of, i.e. two databases that are categorized
in identical categories can induced different beliefs if they contain differently many
30Remember that a category does not contain repetitions of cases, i.e. C˜Dl = C˜
D◦c
l for any c ∈ C˜Dl .
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cases of specific types, since then the relative relevance of the same categories can
be altered.
In sum, a prototype based belief formation facilitates fast and cognitive less de-
manding predictions compared to ”smoother” forms of similarity based reasoning as
for instance provided by kernel-based predictions or BGSS, EG and Bleile (2014a).
These approaches need to incorporate all single pieces of information. For the proto-
type based approach, an agent simply evaluates a problem in terms of prototypical
thinking and reasoning, by averaging the categories’ prototypical estimates, which
can be derived, stored and retrieved solely on the category level, independent of the
problem. A kernel based or BGSS belief requires a higher and more complex cogni-
tive load and task by the need to store a large amount of information and generate
many more (conditional) estimations that complicates the belief formation.
4.7 Conclusion
Chapter 4 examines how beliefs are formed by agents that use a categorization proce-
dure in order to process, store and retrieve the available information. The cognitive
science literature emphasizes the role of categorical processing, thinking and reason-
ing. Based on this insight we axiomatize two stage belief formation procedures in
which agents employ categorized information and do not incorporate the available
information piece by piece. We assume that an agent is equipped (or has acquired
(evolutionary)) subconsciously with some intuition or heuristic how to (optimally)
categorize the entire set of possible pieces of information. Based on such a naturally
given categorization heuristic, we introduce a procedure that consistently categorizes
databases. We consider two well known and observed procedures of categorizations
differing in how categories are activated for a new problem and how they are repre-
sented. One procedure relies only on the information in specific ”target” categories
that are the most appropriate categories for the current problem (our axiomatized
category based belief formation). Another procedure relies on all categories of the
database. However, they are not represented by their contained single pieces of in-
formation, but rest on so called prototypical elements that represent a summary or
central tendency of the category (our axiomatized prototype based belief formation).
These two versions of belief formation based on categorizations are represented as
weighted sums of estimates induced by past respectively categorized and represented
information. The weights, that are assigned to the different estimates, measure the
similarity of the current problem with the single piece of information that induced
the estimate or respectively its relevance with the particular category (or its proto-
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type).
For both procedures, we require a minimum amount of complexity/diversity of the
underlying information such that an agent really engages into categorical processing
and thinking. Otherwise an agent sticks just to piece by piece evaluation of the
information.
The axioms on the belief level are closely related to the axioms introduced in BGSS
and Bleile (2014b) (or Chapter 3) and modified in a way to capture the categoriza-
tion of information and their consequences for induced beliefs.
Compared to the beliefs axiomatized in BGSS, EG and Bleile (2014a), both belief
formations based on categorized information reduce the cognitive effort extensively.
For the category based belief an agent only needs to consider, evaluate and esti-
mate each single piece of information within the target categories, i.e. only some
subset of the available information. In the prototype based belief, an agent even
thinks entirely categorical or in prototypes and thus treats information always on
an aggregate level.
4.8 Proof of Theorem 4.1 (Category based belief
formation)
It is straightforward to show that the representation satisfy the axioms.
The difficult part is the sufficiency direction, i.e. axioms imply representation. As
before, the essential step in the proof will be to identify database with their fre-
quency vectors, which allows to exploit the more tractable structure of the space of
frequencies on C and to adopt the approach taken in BGSS (and use the mechanism
of Bleile (2014a) (or Chapter 2)). However, since in addition a categorization step
is involved, the crucial steps in the inductive proof require different arguments.
The notation and definitions on the space of frequency vectors are identical as in
Section 3.9.2.
4.8.1 Translating the database framework into frequencies
Why is it viable?
Remember that we fixed a categorization structure C˜ and a problem x ∈ X.
In the following, we show that a consistent transformation from databases to fre-
quencies is viable. Roughly, we want to identify a problem evoked categorization
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C˜(D) of a database D by its frequency vector in ∆(C) such that C˜(fD) ∈ ∆(C)
corresponds to C˜(D) ∈ C∗ within the category based belief formation, i.e. such that
(P ◦ C˜)(D) corresponds to (P ◦ C˜)(fD). For this purpose, we exploit the structure
of the categorization procedure and the axioms on the belief formation stage.
We need to show that the two stage procedure is independent of the order of the
involved database and its length. However, as already discussed in Section 4.5.1,
for the specific categorization procedure only the content matters and the order of
cases is irrelevant, i.e. C˜(D) = C˜(pi(D)) for any reordering pi(D) of the database
D. Furthermore, the length of the database is immaterial, since the category based
Concatenation Axiom implies that (P ◦ C˜)(DZ) = ∑i≤Z λi(P ◦ C˜)(D) = (P ◦ C˜)(D)
for all Z ∈ N and appropriate λ ∈ ∆Z . Consequently, for a category based belief
we can identify any database D ∈ C∗ by its frequency vector fD, i.e. the category
based belief translates from (P ◦ C˜) : C∗ → ∆(R) to (P ◦ C˜) : ∆(C) → ∆(R) by
(P ◦ C˜)(fD) := (P ◦ C˜)(D).
We need to reformulate the categorization, axioms and results from databases to
frequency vectors, given a fixed problem x ∈ X.
Categorization in frequency terms
Definition 4.9
(i) Given a natural categorization C˜ = (C˜1, .., C˜L), the list of x-evoked categories on
C, i.e. C˜x = (C˜l)l∈Mx ⊆ C˜ ⊆ C∗ for a corresponding Mx ⊆ {1, .., L} translates to a
x-evoked categorized frequency vector C˜x ∈ ∆(C):
C˜x =
( 1
|C˜x|
∑
l∈Mx
1{C˜l}(c
1), ...,
1
|C˜x|
∑
l∈Mx
1{C˜l}(c
m)
)
∈ ∆(C),
which describes how often the ordered cases in C appear in the list of evoked cate-
gories.
(ii) A x-evoked categorization function for a database D ∈ C∗, i.e. C˜(x,D) ∈ C∗
translates to a x-evoked categorization function for a frequency vector f = fD, i.e.
C˜ : X×∆(C)→ ∆(C)∪0m such that C˜(x, f) = (C˜1(x, f), ..., C˜m(x, f)) ∈ ∆(C)∪0m
is defined for j ≤ m by
C˜j(x, f) = fj1{div(f)≤3}(f) +
fj1{C˜x}(q
j)∑
i≤m fi1{C˜x}(q
i)
1{div(f)>3}(f).
C˜(x, f) is the frequency vector of a categorized database D (represented by frequency
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vector f) evoked by a problem x, i.e. describes the resulting frequencies of the cases
in D that are also contained in the x-evoked categories.
Note that C˜(fD) represents C˜(E) for all E = pi(D
Z) and any Z ∈ N.
As before, we will suppress a fixed x, i.e. C˜(x, f) = C˜(f).
Axioms in frequency terms
Category based Concatenation Axiom
For all Ti ∈ N (i = 1, 2) and any fi ∈ ∆Ti , there exists λ ∈ [0, 1], such that for
f = T1
T1+T2
f1 +
T2
T1+T2
f2
(P ◦ C˜)(f) = λ(P ◦ C˜)(f1) + (1− λ)(P ◦ C˜)(f2),
where λ = 0 if and only if C˜(f1) = 0
m.
Collinearity Axiom
No three of {((P ◦ C˜)(qj))j≤m} such that C˜(qj) 6= 0m are collinear.
4.8.2 Theorem 4.1, sufficiency part in frequency terms
Proposition 4.1
Let there be a function (P ◦ C˜) : ∆(C) → ∆(R), where P : ∆(C) → ∆(R) and
C˜ : ∆(C)→ ∆(C) a categorization function on the set of frequency vectors.
If (P ◦ C˜) satisfies the category based Concatenation and Collinearity Axiom, then
there exist unique probability vectors (P j)j≤m ∈ ∆(R), and unique -up to multiplica-
tion by a strictly positive number- strictly positive numbers (sj)j≤m ∈ R, such that
for all q ∈ ∆(C) such that C˜(q) 6= 0m
(P ◦ C˜)(q) =
∑
j≤m sjC˜j(q)P
j∑
j≤m sjC˜j(q)
, (4.2)
where C˜j(q) denotes the frequency of case cj in C˜(q).
4.8.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1, sufficiency part in frequency terms
Step 0:
Obviously, by the definition of the categorization on frequency vectors we need to
choose P j = (P ◦ C˜)(qj) for j ≤ m, since C˜j(q) ∈ {qj, 0m} and for some q (e.g. for
q s.th. div(q) ≤ 3)) C˜j(q) = qj.
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The aim is to find numbers (sj)j≤m such that representation (4.2) holds for all
q ∈ ∆(C).
Step 1: |C| = m = 3
By the definition of the categorization function we have that C˜(q) = q for all
q ∈ ∆(C), since div(q) ≤ 3. In such a situation a categorization of information does
not take place and thus the framework coincides with the one in BGSS. Basically
(P ◦ C˜)(q) coincides with P (q) in the BGSS framework for div(q) ≤ 3 and there-
fore Step 1 of the proof in BGSS can be directly adopted for these frequency vectors.
Step 2: Now we consider |C| = m > 3.
Step 2.1: Defining the similarity weights
Using the considerations from Step 1 for all triplets {i, j, k} and C = {ci, cj, ck}
we can derive the similarity weights (s
{i,j,k}
v )v∈{i,j,k} and we know that for all q ∈
∆({qi, qj, qk}), the following representation holds
(P {i,j,k} ◦ C˜)(q) =
∑
v∈{i,j,k} s
{i,j,k}
v C˜v(q)P
v∑
v∈{i,j,k} s
{i,j,k}
v C˜v(q)
,
where for all v ∈ {i, j, k} P v are independent of the triplet {i, j, k} (by Step 0) and
(s
{i,j,k}
v )v∈{i,j,k} are unique up to multiplication by a positive number.
With a similar reasoning as in the proof in BGSS Step 2.1 (or Section 2.9.7) and
using again that C˜(q) = q for q such that div(q) ≤ 3, we can show that the similarity
values s
{i,j,k}
v are independent of the choice of i, j and k for all v.
Thus, given these (sv)v≤m we can define for all q ∈ ∆
(P ◦ C˜)s(q) :=
∑
j≤m sjC˜j(q)P
j∑
j≤m sjC˜j(q)
.
Obviously, (P ◦ C˜)s satisfies the category based Concatenation Axiom.
Step 2.2: Completion to all q ∈ ∆(C), i.e. show that for all q ∈ ∆(C)
(P ◦ C˜)s(q) = (P ◦ C˜)(q)
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We proof this by induction over k for q ∈ ∆(C) such that div(q) = k.
By Step 1 we know that the claim (P ◦ C˜)s(q) = (P ◦ C˜)(q) is true for all q ∈ ∆(C)
such that div(q) ≤ 3. This serves as the base case for the induction. Now we assume
that (P ◦ C˜)s(q) = (P ◦ C˜)(q) for q ∈ ∆(C) such that div(q) = k − 1 and we will
show it for q ∈ ∆(C) such that div(q) = k.
A similar construction as in BGSS, but with different reasoning yields the result.
Let q =
∑
l∈K αlq
l with αl > 0 and K ⊆ {1, ...,m} such that |K| = k.
Define for all l ∈ K the frequency vector q(l) to be the vector in conv({(qj)j∈K\l})
such that q lies on the line generated by (q(l), ql). By the category based Concate-
nation Axiom there exists some λ ∈ [0, 1] such that for all j ∈ K
(P ◦ C˜)(q) = λ(P ◦ C˜)(qj) + (1− λ)(P ◦ C˜)(q(j)).
We distinguish between two cases:
(i) If there exists a j ∈ K such that qj 6∈ C˜(q), then the category based Concate-
nation Axiom implies for q = αqj + (1 − α)q(j) for an appropriate α ∈ (0, 1) that
(P ◦C˜)(q) = (P ◦C˜)(q(j)), since (P ◦C˜)(qj) receives zero-weight. The same is true for
(P ◦ C˜)s, since it satisfies also the category based Concatenation Axiom. However,
since div(q(j)) = k−1, the induction assumption yields (P◦C˜)s(q(j)) = (P◦C˜)(q(j))
and we get the desired result:
(P ◦ C˜)(q) = (P ◦ C˜)(q(j)) = (P ◦ C˜)s(q(j)) = (P ◦ C˜)s(q).
(ii) If for all j ∈ K qj ∈ C˜(q), then there are k > 3 many qj such that C˜(qj) 6= 0m.
Again, the category based Concatenation Axiom applied to the k many decomposi-
tions of q = αjqj + (1− αj)q(j) for appropriate αj ∈ (0, 1) for all j ∈ K yields that
(P ◦C˜)(q) lies in the interior of the intervals spanned by ((P ◦C˜)(qj), (P ◦C˜)(q(j))) for
all j ∈ K. Since for no three different j ∈ K these intervals can lie on the same line
by the Collinearity Axiom (since no three of {((P ◦ C˜)(qj) = P j)j≤C} are collinear),
there must exist some intersections of the lines. However, since (P ◦ C˜)(q) lies in
all these intervals, the intersection must be unique and exactly equal to (P ◦ C˜)(q).
However, also (P ◦ C˜)s(q) lies on all these intervals, since by induction assumption
(P ◦ C˜)(f) = (P ◦ C˜)s(f) for all f ∈ ∆(C) such that div(f) ≤ k − 1 (which qj and
q(j) satisfy). Thus the unique intersection can only be (P ◦ C˜)s(q), which shows the
equivalence of (P ◦ C˜)(q) = (P ◦ C˜)s(q). This completes the proof for |C| > 3 and
eventually the Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.1. 
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4.9 Proof of Theorem 4.2 (Prototype based belief
formation)
It is straightforward to show that the representation satisfies the axioms.
To show that the axioms imply the representation requires some work. As before,
we identify databases with their frequency vectors in order to adopt the approach
taken in BGSS (and use the mechanism of Bleile (2014a) (or Chapter 2)). However,
the additional categorization procedure alters the reasoning in the inductive proof
significantly.
The notation and definitions necessary for the framework of frequencies are identical
as in Section 3.9.2.
4.9.1 Translating the database framework into frequencies
Why is it viable?
We want to identify the prototype based belief induced by categorized databases,
i.e. (P ◦ C˜) : C∗×C∗ → ∆(R) by a belief (P ◦ f˜) : ∆(C)×∆(C)→ ∆(R) based on
frequency vectors and their induced categorization structures f˜ ∈ P (∆(C)), i.e. C˜
is represented by f˜ and (P ◦ C˜)(D,E) by (P ◦ f˜)(fD, fE).
Let (D,E) ∈ A.
(1) In a first step we exploit Remark 4.3, i.e. (P ◦ C˜)(D,E) = (P ◦ C˜)(pi(D), pi′(E)),
where pi, pi′ are permutations that reorder the cases in D and respectively in E ar-
bitrarily. Basically it says that orders of databases are totally immaterial for the
induced prototype based belief, i.e. only frequency vectors matter.
(2) a) The definition of a prototype based belief and database related categorization
structures yields
(P ◦ C˜)(D,E) = P (C˜E(D)) = P (C˜EZ (D)) = (P ◦ C˜)(D,EZ) for all Z ∈ N
b) In addition the prototype based Concatenation Axiom implies for DZ = D◦...◦D
for all Z ∈ N.
(P ◦ C˜)(DZ , E) = (P ◦ C˜)(D,E).
Combining (2)a) and (2)b) yields for all (D,E) ∈ A and V, Z ∈ N
(P ◦ C˜)(DV , EZ) = (P ◦ C˜)(D,E) (4.3)
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and thus the lengths of the involved databases are immaterial as well.
Combining (1) and equation (4.3) shows that we can identify any D,E ∈ C∗ by
their frequency vectors fD, fE ∈ ∆(C) for a prototype based belief formation.
Consequently, we can rewrite our framework into a frequency framework.
Categorization structures in frequency terms
Definition 4.10
A categorization structure f˜ = {f˜1, ..., f˜L} on ∆(C) satisfies the following properties
(i) (f˜l)i :=
1
|C˜l|1C˜l(ci) for all l ≤ L and i ≤ m
(ii) (f˜k)i > 0 if and only if (f˜j)i = 0 for all i ≤ m and any distinct j, k ≤ L (i.e.
disjointness)
(iii)
∑
l≤L(f˜l)i > 0 for all i ≤ m (i.e. all cases are categorized)
(iv) for all l ≤ L (f˜l)i ≤ 1/2 and f˜L(i) ≤ 1 for all i ≤ m (i.e. specific content
structure)
Define for all l ≤ L+ 1 and any q ∈ ∆(C) A(l, q) := {j ≤ m|(f˜l)j > 0 and qj > 0},
i.e. the indices j such that case qj contained in database q belongs to category f˜l.
Definition 4.11
Let f˜ = {f˜1, ..., f˜L} be a categorization structure on ∆(C). A categorization struc-
ture f˜ q = {f˜ q1 , ..., f˜ qL+1} on q is defined by
(i) if div(q) ≤ 4, i.e. q ∈ conv({qh, q, qj, qk}), then f˜ q = {f˜1 = qh, f˜2 = qi, f˜3 =
qj, f˜4 = q
k, f˜5 = 0
m, ..., f˜L+1 = 0
m}
(ii) if div(q) > 4, then f˜ q is given for all l ≤ L+ 1 by
f˜ ql : =

(1A(l,q)(1)
|A(l, q)| , ...,
1A(l,q)(m)
|A(l, q)|
)
if |A(l, q)| ≥ 2
∅ = 0m if |A(l, q)| ≤ 1
f˜ qL+1 =
∑
l≤L 1{l≤L||A(l,q)|=1}(l)q
A(l,q)∑
l≤L 1{l≤L||A(l,q)|=1}(l)
By the equation (4.1) it is also possible to define C˜E(D) in frequency term.
Definition 4.12
For any q, e ∈ ∆(C) such that qi ≥ 0 only if ei > 0:
f˜ e(q) = {f˜ e1 1{q|∃i≤m qi>0 and f˜e1 (i)>0}(q), ..., f˜
e
L+11{q|∃i≤m qi>0 and f˜eL+1(i)>0}
(q)} ∈ P (∆(C))
is the result of an q-induced e-categorization function f˜ : ∆(C)×∆(C)→ P (∆(C)).
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Admissibility condition in frequency terms
Definition 4.13
Define the set of admissible pairs (q, e) ∈ ∆(C)×∆(C) by the following
A :=
{
(q, e)| (i) for all i ≤ m qi > 0 only if ei > 0
(ii) if div(q) = 2 then ∃i ≤ m qi = 0 and ei > 0
s. th. for α ∈ (0, 1) |f˜ e(αq + (1− α)qi)| = 3
(iii) if div(q) ≥ 3 then |f˜ e(q)| ≥ 3
}
Axioms in frequency terms
Prototype based Concatenation Axiom
For all (αq + (1− α)q′, e) ∈ A for some α ∈ (0, 1), there exists λ ∈ (0, 1)
(P ◦ f˜)(αq + (1− α)q′, e) = λ(P ◦ f˜)(q, e) + (1− λ)(P ◦ f˜)(q′, e).
Identity Axiom
For all (q, e), (q′, e) ∈ A such that there exists a unique e-category f˜ el (q) 6= 0m and
f˜ el (q
′) 6= 0m and f˜ ej (q) = 0m = f˜ ej (q) for all j 6= l ≤ L+ 1 it holds
(P ◦ f˜)(q1, e) = (P ◦ f˜)(q2, e).
Collinearity Axiom
No three distinct vectors of {((P ◦ f˜)(qj, e))j≤m} are collinear for any (qj, e) ∈ A.
4.9.2 Theorem 4.2, sufficiency part in frequency terms
Proposition 4.2
Let there be given a function (P◦f˜) : ∆(C)×∆(C)→ ∆(R), where f˜ a categorization
function f˜ : ∆(C) ×∆(C) → P (∆(C)) with related categorization structure f˜ e for
all e ∈ ∆(C). If the prototype based belief (P ◦ f˜) satisfies the prototype based
Concatenation, Identity and Collinearity Axiom.
Then for all e ∈ ∆(C) and each l ≤ L + 1 such that f˜ el 6= 0m there exist P f˜el ∈
∆(R) and a strictly positive -and unique up to multiplication with a strictly positive
number- values s = (sj)j≤m such that for all admissible (q, e) ∈ A
(P ◦ f˜)(q, e) =
∑
l≤L+1 s˜(f˜
e
l , q)P
f˜el∑
l≤L+1 s˜(f˜
e
l , q)
, (4.4)
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where s˜(f˜ el , q) :=
∑
{i≤m|qi⊆q ∧ qi⊆f˜el } qisi.
4.9.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2, sufficiency part in frequency terms
Step 0:
We get directly that for all l ≤ L + 1 and all e ⊆ ∆(C) P f˜el must be chosen by
(P ◦ f˜)(qj, e) for an appropriate j ≤ m such that qj ⊆ f˜ el . By the Identity Axiom
this is unique.
The aim is to find the (sj)j≤m such that the representation (4.4) holds for all ad-
missible pairs (q, e) ∈ A. We proceed in two steps, where the first step considers
(q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) ≤ 3 and in a second step we inductively generalize it to
q with larger diversity.
Step 1: (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) ≤ 3, i.e. take any triplet {i, j, k} ⊂ {1, ..,m}
such that q ∈ conv({(qv)v∈{i,j,k}}).
Step 1.1: (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) = 1 is covered in Step 0.
Step 1.2: (q, e) ∈ A such that 2 ≤ div(q) ≤ 3 and 3 ≤ div(e) ≤ 4
Note that (q, e) with div(e) = 2 are not admissible.
By the definition of an e-categorization structure the categorization step vanishes for
all such pairs (q,e). This means that the prototype based framework (and axioms)
directly amounts to the BGSS framework, i.e. (P ◦ f˜)(q, e) coincides with the belief
P (q) in BGSS. Applying their proof yields the desired representation for all (q, e)
with the above properties.
Step 1.3: (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) ≤ 3 and div(e) > 4
Step 1.3.1: Determine the similarity weights (sv)v∈{i,j,k}
Define for all triplets {i, j, k} ⊂ {1, ..,m} q∗{i,j,k} := 13(qi + qj + qk)
Obvious div(q∗{i,j,k}) = 3 and to fulfill the admissability take e such that |f˜ e(q∗{j,k,l})| =
3 and hence each qv for v ∈ {i, j, k} needs to be contained in a different category of
f˜ e.
We assume for convenience that qv ∈ f˜ ev (it simplifies the notational effort
extensively) for v ∈ {i, j, k} which is possible after renaming the categories appro-
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priately.
Observe that, since (q∗{i,j,k}, e) is admissible, also (q, e) ∈ A for any q ∈ conv({qi, qj, qk})
and q ⊆ e.
Now, we use q∗{i,j,k} to determine the values (sv)v∈{i,j,k} given in the representa-
tion of the theorem. By the prototype based Concatenation Axiom there exist
λ = (λv)v∈{i,j,k} ∈ int(∆3) such that
(P ◦ f˜)(q∗{i,j,k}, e) =
∑
v∈{i,j,k}
λvP
f˜ev ,
where we have used that (P ◦ f˜)(qv, e) = P f˜ev , as shown in Step 0.
The representation of the theorem (plugging in the definition of s˜) delivers
(P ◦ f˜)(q∗{i,j,k}, e) =
∑
v∈{i,j,k} sv1/3P
f˜ev∑
v∈{i,j,k} sv1/3
Equating these two equations and using that (P f˜
e
v )v∈{i,j,k} are not collinear yields
a solution for (sv)v=i,j,k, (i.e. sv =
λv∑
v∈{i,j,k} λv
). These sv might depend on the
specific triplet used in q∗{i,j,k}, whereas obviously P
f˜ev = (P ◦ f˜)(qv, e) is independent
of {i, j, k}, since only depending on e and qv. However, similar as in Step 2.1 of the
previous proof (or as in BGSS) we can show that the similarity values can be chosen
independently of the particular triplet.
Thus, given these s = (s1, ..., sm) we define for any triplet {i, j, k} ⊂ {1, ...,m} and
q ∈ conv({qi, qj, qk}) and e such that (q, e) ∈ A the following prototype based belief
(P ◦ f˜)s(q, e) :=
∑
v∈{i,j,k} svqvP
f˜ev∑
v∈{i,j,k} svqv
. (4.5)
Recall that we assumed for convenience that qv ∈ f˜ ev , which allows this easy repre-
sentation.
Furthermore, observe that Ps satisfies the prototype based Concatenation Axiom.
Step 1.3.2: Completion to all (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) ≤ 3
Define E := {(q, e) ∈ A | (P ◦ f˜)s(q, e) = (P ◦ f˜)(q, e)}. In the following we want to
derive that for all q ∈ conv({qi, qj, qk}) and all e such that (q, e) ∈ A also (q, e) ∈ E.
As in BGSS, the idea is to show that for all simplicial points g of any simplicial
partition (see Section 2.9.6 for a definition) such that (g, e) ∈ A as well (g, e) ∈ E
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holds. We apply the mechanism as in Bleile (2014a,b) to cover all simplicial points
recursively. Based on this, it is possible to cover each q ∈ conv({qi, qj, qk}) by se-
quences of (appropriate) simplicial points.
In order to illustrate the intuition, we will describe only the first step, i.e. the
simplicial points of the first simplicial partition. The further steps are analogously
modified versions (to the prototype based setup) of arguments used in Bleile (2014b).
Remark 4.4
For all e ∈ ∆(C) such that qi ⊂ e, the pair (qi, e) is admissible. However, for q
such that div(q) ∈ {2, 3} this does not hold true in general. Nevertheless the sets of
frequency vectors e ∈ ∆(C) that makes (q, e) admissible for div(q) = 3 coincides with
the set of frequency vectors that ”make” (q′, e) admissible for q′ ⊂ q and div(q′) = 2.
This follows directly from the definition of the admissibility condition (ii). This
guarantees that there exists a common set of vectors e that make any t-th (t ≥ 1)
simplicial point admissible, when it is paired with such an e. This is important for
our recursive procedure of combining all (differently diverse) simplicial points (as
well become clear below).
Consider q such that 2 ≤ div(q) ≤ 3
Step A:
Consider any two distinct qi, qj (i, j ≤ m), w.l.o.g let i = 1, j = 2. Define q11 :=
1
2
q1 + 1
2
q2 and obviously div(q11) = 2. For all e such that (q, e) ∈ A, there exist some
qk (which might be different for different e) such that for α ∈ (0, 1) |f˜ e(αq11 + (1 −
α)qk)| = 3. q11 is a simplicial point of the first simplicial partition of the triangle
spanned by conv({q1, q2, qk}).
The prototype based Concatenation Axiom delivers the existence of β, γ ∈ (0, 1)
such that
(P ◦ f˜)(q∗{1,2,k}, e) = β(P ◦ f˜)(q11, e) + (1− β)(P ◦ f˜)(qk, e)
(P ◦ f˜)(q11, e) = γ(P ◦ f˜)(q1, e) + (1− γ)(P ◦ f˜)(q2, e)
Hence we get (using the notation that (a,b) indicates the line running through a
and b) that (P ◦ f˜)(q11, e) is contained in
((P ◦ f˜)(q1, e), (P ◦ f˜)(q2, e)) ∩ ((P ◦ f˜)(qk, e), (P ◦ f˜)(q∗{1,2,k}, e)). (4.6)
The same holds true for (P ◦ f˜)s, since it also satisfies the prototype based Concate-
nation Axiom. Moreover, by Step 0 we know already that for all (qj, e) ∈ A, also
(qj, e) ∈ E and that for any triplet {i, j, k} and all (q∗{i,j,k}, e) ∈ A also (q∗{i,j,k}, e) ∈ E.
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Thus, it only remains to check, whether the induced prototype based beliefs of
(q1, e), (q2, e), (qk, e) and q∗{1,2,k} are not collinear. Then, the two lines involved in
(4.6) have an unique intersection. This implies that (P ◦ f˜)(q11, e) and (P ◦ f˜)s(q11, e)
must coincide, since both lie on both lines, i.e. (q11, e) ∈ E. However, the non-
collinearity can be easily seen, since (qv, e) for v = 1, 2, k induce three different
prototype based beliefs P f˜
e
v (since |f˜ e(αq11 + (1−α)qk)| = 3 for any α ∈ (0, 1)) that
are not collinear by the Collinearity Axiom.
Analogously, we can analyze all simplicial points of the first simplicial partition of
conv({q1, q2, qk}), i.e. for q21 = 12(q1 +qk) and q31 = 12(q2 +qk). Following the (slightly
modified) reasoning/method as in Sections 2.9.6 or 3.9.3 (or Bleile (2014a,b) Step 1),
we can show that for the chosen e, all simplicial points of any t-th simplicial partition
are in E. Finally, one can find a sequence of simplicial points that converges to any
q ∈ ∆({q1, q2, qk}), where their induced prototype based belief converge. For the
details see the proofs of BGSS or the above mentioned sections. Thus, for a given e
such that (q, e) ∈ E (which induces qk as above) we have for all q ∈ conv({q1, q2, qk})
as well (q, e) ∈ A.
Step B:
Observe that for each admissible pair (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) = 2 the frequency
vector e induces a set of frequency vectors ead := {qk | ∃k ≤ m s. th. |f˜ e(αq11 + (1−
α)qk| = 3}.
Hence keeping q1, q2 fixed, the same procedure as in Step A can be applied to the
triangle conv({q1, q2, qk}) for all k ≤ m such that qk ∈ ead for this specific e.
Step C:
Now, apply Step A and B to all e such that (q, e) ∈ A for div(q) ∈ {2, 3}.
Step D:
Finally, applying the procedure to all possible pairs qi, qj, instead of i = 1, j = 2,
we get that for all admissible (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) ≤ 3 the claim (q, e) ∈ E,
i.e. A = E for all q such div(q) ≤ 3, which concludes the proof of Step 1.
Now, we consider the situation for (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) > 3. Therefore
we need an extended definition of (P ◦ f˜)s for (q, e) ∈ ∆(C)×∆(C):
(P ◦ f˜)s(q, e) :=
∑
i≤m siqi(
∑
l≤L+1 1f˜el (q
i)P f˜
e
l )∑
i≤m siqi
.
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The indicator function appears in comparison to definition (4.5) since at this point,
it is not anymore clear to which category f˜ el a specific unit vector q
i belongs. Basi-
cally, (P ◦ f˜)s is a reformulation of the representation (4.4).
Step 2: Show that (q, e) ∈ E for all (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) > 3
We prove inductively over k that for all q such that div(q) = k with 3 ≤ k ≤ m
and all admissible pairs (q, e) ∈ A it holds, that (P ◦ f˜)s(q, e) = (P ◦ f˜)(q, e), i.e.
(q, e) ∈ E.
We take the situation div(q) = k = 3, which was shown in Step 1, as the basis of the
induction and assume that the claim is true for all (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) = k−1
for k > 3.
Take any (q, e) ∈ A such that div(q) = k, w.l.o.g. q ∈ int(conv({q1, .., qk})). By
admissibility |f˜ e(q)| ≥ 3 holds, i.e. there are at least two categories f˜ el for some
l ≤ L + 1 containing at least two different cases qj for some j ≤ m and another
category containing at least one different case. W.l.o.g. let these categories be given
in the following way (for distinct i, j, k 6= 1, 2)
f˜ e1 (q) ⊇ {q1, qi}
f˜ e2 (q) ⊇ {q2, qj}
f˜ eL+1(q) ⊇ {qk}
f˜ el (q) ⊇ ∅ for all l 6= 1, 2 ≤ L
Now, let q be decomposed by q = αtq
t + (1 − αt)q(t), where for t = 1, 2 q(t) is
the point in conv({qj|j ≤ k, j 6= t}) that is on the line connecting qt and q and
αt ∈ (0, 1) accordingly. By the prototype based Concatenation Axiom we know that
there exist λt ∈ (0, 1) such that
(P ◦ f˜)(q, e) = λt(P ◦ f˜)(qt, e) + (1− λt)(P ◦ f˜)(q(t), e)
This is possible since (qt, e) ∈ A and (q(t), e) ∈ A, since f˜ e(q(t)) = f˜ e(q) by con-
struction. Since in addition (qt, e), (q(t), e) ∈ E by the induction assumption (since
div(q(t)) = k− 1) and (P ◦ f˜)s satisfies the prototype based Concatenation Axiom,
we have
(P ◦ f˜)(q, e), (P ◦ f˜)s(q, e) ∈
⋂
t=1,2
((P ◦ f˜)(qt, e), (P ◦ f˜)(q(t), e))
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This intersection is unique since for t = 1, 2 it can be shown that the following holds:
(P ◦ f˜)(q2, e) = P f˜e2 6∈ ((P f˜e1 , (P ◦ f˜)(q(t), e)) =: h (4.7)
If this would not be true, i.e. if P f˜
e
2 would be on this line h, it would require
that (P ◦ f˜)(q(t), e) is on the line between P f˜e1 and P f˜e2 . However, by construction
(P ◦ f˜)(q(t), e) ∈ int(conv({P f˜e1 , P f˜e2 , P f˜ek , ...})), which implies that it cannot lie
on (P f˜
e
1 , P f˜
e
2 ) , since by the Collinearity Axiom no three of (P f˜
e
l )l are collinear.
Thus in sum, claim (4.7) is true, which implies that for t = 1, 2 the lines based on
((P ◦ f˜)(qt, e), (P ◦ f˜)(q(t), e)) are distinct and intersect uniquely in (P ◦ f˜)(q, e) =
(P ◦ f˜)s(q, e), i.e. (q, e) ∈ E.
This completes the entire proof. 
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